182
Milton L. Mueller
In addition to those limitations on control, China is constrained by the need for
economic development and productive exchanges with the rest of the world. Thus,
in its experimentation with combinations of restriction and openness and its sensitivity to its economic interdependence with the developed world, China ’ s approach to
the Internet mirrors its strategic approach to openness to foreign investment and trade
generally. With its aspiration to become a global leader in high technology, China
simply cannot afford to turn its back on the Internet.
China ’ s Predictable Clash with (and Adjustment to) the Current Internet
Governance Regime
The current Internet governance regime clashes with China ’ s preferences in two distinct ways. First, the legacy of denationalized liberalism associated with the Internet ’ s
early development still powerfully shapes the Internet ’ s operations and the social,
economic, and political norms associated with its use. Instead of traditional, intergovernmental institutions there are private-sector-based, transnational forms of governance and a widespread ethic of self-regulation and civil society support for Internet
freedom. Second, the privileged role of the United States in the current Internet governance regime, especially its control over ICANN, rankles the Chinese. Although in
many respects denationalized liberalism and U.S. preeminence are at odds with each
other, it is not surprising that China sees them as related and mutually reinforcing.
In China ’ s state-centric view, Internet freedom and the U.S. doctrine of the “ free fl ow
of information ” are merely tools that a hegemonic America uses to penetrate and
subvert other states with its own worldviews and values. China ’ s accusations that
Hillary Clinton ’ s “ Internet freedom ” initiatives are part of a calculated “ information
imperialism ” fl ow logically from this perspective.
8 The Chinese view is given some
credence, since U.S. “ Internet freedom ” initiatives are in fact rather selectively targeted
at U.S. geopolitical rivals China and Iran, as opposed to other equally censorious
countries that are allies of the United States.
9
China and ICANN
To the Chinese state (in common with other cyber-nationalist and cyber-reactionary
nation-states), ICANN is highly objectionable for two reasons: fi rst, because of its status
as a nonstate actor that supplants or competes with states in the exercise of policymaking and governance responsibilities; and second, because of its unilateral establishment by the United States and its contracts that make it beholden to the U.S.
Department of Commerce. Initially, the Chinese also objected to ICANN because, as
a private corporation free from intergovernmental diplomacy, the corporation allowed
representatives of the government of Taiwan to participate openly and freely in ICANN
Milton L. Mueller
In addition to those limitations on control, China is constrained by the need for
economic development and productive exchanges with the rest of the world. Thus,
in its experimentation with combinations of restriction and openness and its sensitivity to its economic interdependence with the developed world, China ’ s approach to
the Internet mirrors its strategic approach to openness to foreign investment and trade
generally. With its aspiration to become a global leader in high technology, China
simply cannot afford to turn its back on the Internet.
China ’ s Predictable Clash with (and Adjustment to) the Current Internet
Governance Regime
The current Internet governance regime clashes with China ’ s preferences in two distinct ways. First, the legacy of denationalized liberalism associated with the Internet ’ s
early development still powerfully shapes the Internet ’ s operations and the social,
economic, and political norms associated with its use. Instead of traditional, intergovernmental institutions there are private-sector-based, transnational forms of governance and a widespread ethic of self-regulation and civil society support for Internet
freedom. Second, the privileged role of the United States in the current Internet governance regime, especially its control over ICANN, rankles the Chinese. Although in
many respects denationalized liberalism and U.S. preeminence are at odds with each
other, it is not surprising that China sees them as related and mutually reinforcing.
In China ’ s state-centric view, Internet freedom and the U.S. doctrine of the “ free fl ow
of information ” are merely tools that a hegemonic America uses to penetrate and
subvert other states with its own worldviews and values. China ’ s accusations that
Hillary Clinton ’ s “ Internet freedom ” initiatives are part of a calculated “ information
imperialism ” fl ow logically from this perspective.
8 The Chinese view is given some
credence, since U.S. “ Internet freedom ” initiatives are in fact rather selectively targeted
at U.S. geopolitical rivals China and Iran, as opposed to other equally censorious
countries that are allies of the United States.
9
China and ICANN
To the Chinese state (in common with other cyber-nationalist and cyber-reactionary
nation-states), ICANN is highly objectionable for two reasons: fi rst, because of its status
as a nonstate actor that supplants or competes with states in the exercise of policymaking and governance responsibilities; and second, because of its unilateral establishment by the United States and its contracts that make it beholden to the U.S.
Department of Commerce. Initially, the Chinese also objected to ICANN because, as
a private corporation free from intergovernmental diplomacy, the corporation allowed
representatives of the government of Taiwan to participate openly and freely in ICANN