Internet Politics in Thailand after the 2006 Coup
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grounds. Critics have alluded to constitutional provisions that guarantee freedom of
expression when attacking the blocking ’ s illegality. For instance, the fi rst clause in
section 45 of the constitution reads, “ A person shall enjoy the liberty to express his
or her opinion, make speeches, write, print, publicize, and make expression by other
means. ” The section goes on to prohibit the shutdown of media outlets like newspapers and broadcasting. While the Internet is never addressed in this constitutional
provision, many cyber libertarians still see the Internet as a form of mass media that
warrants the same protection. But with the passing and enforcement of the new computer crime law, blocking of Internet content is now legalized, falling as it does under
the category of an offense. As section 20 of the law reads:
In case the offences according to this law involve the publicizing of computer information that
may have negative implications to national security as indicated in Part II of this law or as prescribed in 1/1 of the penal code or which may violate public order or good morals of the people,
the competent offi cials, with approval from the appointed Minister, may petition, with supporting evidence, to the court within the jurisdiction, to halt the spread of such computer
information.
If the court issues an order to block the spread of information as in clause 1, competent offi cials
may block the spread of that information themselves or request service providers to block the
spread of that information.
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As a result, Internet fi ltering, which was a controversial issue in the past, is now considered legal. Since the act fi rst came into effect, the MICT has applied section 20 to
order thousands of Web sites alleged to contain l è se-majest é or pornographic materials
to be blocked. Cracking down on l è se-majest é content has been identifi ed as the
MICT ’ s policy priority.
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While the law specifi es that a court warrant is mandatory, the actual enforcement
has not been entirely strict. Based on interviews conducted as part of this study with
selected Internet service providers, “ requests for cooperation ” from government agencies like the MICT and the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) do not always
come furnished with court orders. The usual objectives of such requests are obtaining
log fi les of Internet traffi c, blocking problematic Web sites, and deleting problematic
postings in online discussion forums. The requests often plainly make reference to
provisions in the Computer-Related Offenses law, but without court orders. Although
many service providers have qualms about blocking Internet content, they do not
have any option but to comply.
2. Indirect regulation via intermediary providers and self-censorship of online content
providers
The computer crime law enables the state to regulate intermediary providers who in
turn regulate users. Section 15 of the law creates the burden of intermediary liability
by imposing the same penalty on offenders as on intermediaries, regardless of prior
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