viii Preface
Godfrey-Smith (1996a) and Sterelny (2003), with Dretske (1981), Gibson (1979)
and Millikan (1984) as the relevant proximate and the American naturalists as the
historically more distant precursors.
Some readers may be struck by the lack of a clear distinction between the concepts of cognition and perception in what follows. However, there is a method to
this apparent confusion: as some of the authors referred to in this book, and unlike
the advocates of what is inelegantly called “cognitivism”, and certainly unlike a
great deal of philosophical tradition (which, I am told, was even more scrupulous
in distinguishing among sensation, perception and cognition), I believe that there
is no such clear distinction. There is no thinking without perceiving and acting in,
and interacting with, an environment. Perception already is a form of interacting
with the environment and, historically and systematically, all of the less actionbound activities of our nervous systems flow from such interaction.
In pursuit of its main argument, this book will incorporate some themes from the
philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science (with focus on cognitive sciences
and biology) and the philosophy of technology, but at its very heart it involves
all three of them at once, and it draws on some disciplines outside philosophy.
The specific constellation of disciplines involved is a reflection of my intellectual
upbringing, but I am hopeful to make a credible case for the usefulness and nonarbitrariness of this combination – and perhaps for the virtue of a certain degree
of intellectual generalism. If one still needs a rubric under which to file this work,
that rubric may read “philosophy of mind-through-machines” (but certainly not
conventional, qualia-and-supervenience philosophy of mind) or “philosophy of
technologies of cognition” (but certainly not philosophy of engineering or critical theory of technology) or “philosophy of biology of cognitive functions” (but
certainly not of a comprehensive sort), or perhaps to some extent “philosophy of
some of the cognitive sciences” (but certainly not philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, and nothing near proficient in those sciences). Each of these labels will
fit partly, none entirely, and all will look a bit awkward. Hence, I am aware of
the risk of getting proverbially “caught between two stools” (or even more if that
were topologically possible), but by virtue of incurring that risk, this book may
have something to offer to several audiences.
So let me try to identify a few matches between parts of my argument and
some communities to which these might be of interest: first, philosophers of mind
interested in the varieties of naturalised semantics may find something worthwhile in my reconstruction of the notion of natural information and informational
environments (see Chapters 2 through 6). Second, philosophers of perception or
philosophers of psychology, and possibly some cognitive psychologists, might
be interested in my reconstruction of what is ecological in the ecology of perception (see Chapter 3 in particular). Third, students of 4E cognition might see a
contribution to their debates in my exposition of how cognition “extends” over
and is “embedded” in the environment (see Chapter 7 in particular). Fourth, philosophers of technology and members of the science and technology studies community who are interested in digital technologies might find something to relate to
both in the general outlook of the study and in the case studies presented towards
Godfrey-Smith (1996a) and Sterelny (2003), with Dretske (1981), Gibson (1979)
and Millikan (1984) as the relevant proximate and the American naturalists as the
historically more distant precursors.
Some readers may be struck by the lack of a clear distinction between the concepts of cognition and perception in what follows. However, there is a method to
this apparent confusion: as some of the authors referred to in this book, and unlike
the advocates of what is inelegantly called “cognitivism”, and certainly unlike a
great deal of philosophical tradition (which, I am told, was even more scrupulous
in distinguishing among sensation, perception and cognition), I believe that there
is no such clear distinction. There is no thinking without perceiving and acting in,
and interacting with, an environment. Perception already is a form of interacting
with the environment and, historically and systematically, all of the less actionbound activities of our nervous systems flow from such interaction.
In pursuit of its main argument, this book will incorporate some themes from the
philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science (with focus on cognitive sciences
and biology) and the philosophy of technology, but at its very heart it involves
all three of them at once, and it draws on some disciplines outside philosophy.
The specific constellation of disciplines involved is a reflection of my intellectual
upbringing, but I am hopeful to make a credible case for the usefulness and nonarbitrariness of this combination – and perhaps for the virtue of a certain degree
of intellectual generalism. If one still needs a rubric under which to file this work,
that rubric may read “philosophy of mind-through-machines” (but certainly not
conventional, qualia-and-supervenience philosophy of mind) or “philosophy of
technologies of cognition” (but certainly not philosophy of engineering or critical theory of technology) or “philosophy of biology of cognitive functions” (but
certainly not of a comprehensive sort), or perhaps to some extent “philosophy of
some of the cognitive sciences” (but certainly not philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, and nothing near proficient in those sciences). Each of these labels will
fit partly, none entirely, and all will look a bit awkward. Hence, I am aware of
the risk of getting proverbially “caught between two stools” (or even more if that
were topologically possible), but by virtue of incurring that risk, this book may
have something to offer to several audiences.
So let me try to identify a few matches between parts of my argument and
some communities to which these might be of interest: first, philosophers of mind
interested in the varieties of naturalised semantics may find something worthwhile in my reconstruction of the notion of natural information and informational
environments (see Chapters 2 through 6). Second, philosophers of perception or
philosophers of psychology, and possibly some cognitive psychologists, might
be interested in my reconstruction of what is ecological in the ecology of perception (see Chapter 3 in particular). Third, students of 4E cognition might see a
contribution to their debates in my exposition of how cognition “extends” over
and is “embedded” in the environment (see Chapter 7 in particular). Fourth, philosophers of technology and members of the science and technology studies community who are interested in digital technologies might find something to relate to
both in the general outlook of the study and in the case studies presented towards