Preface ix
the end of the book (see Chapters 8 and 9 in particular). And, fifth, computer
scientists, designers and engineers working on smart environments might gather
some useful information for their work from those same chapters. Reaching this
latter audience I would consider the greatest success for this book, as it might
stand a chance of, however indirectly and modestly, feeding into the shaping of
those environments.
The unabashed naturalism of what follows has a serious epistemological implication that should be added as a disclaimer here: real-world scientific theories
of perception, evolution and other phenomena as well as some of their empirical groundwork will be relevant and sometimes indispensable to my arguments.
I hence not merely incur the risk of my arguments falling with the possible empirical falsification of the theories in question; I actually embrace that risk, happily
embarking on the boat imagined by Quine (with the help of Neurath 1983, 92), in
which philosophy and science sail together:
A boat which [. . .] we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There
is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. All scientific findings, all
scientific conjectures that are at present plausible, are therefore in my view as
welcome for use in philosophy as elsewhere.
(Quine 1969b, 126f )
Any serious quest for knowledge is exposed to the risks that come with this openended task.
the end of the book (see Chapters 8 and 9 in particular). And, fifth, computer
scientists, designers and engineers working on smart environments might gather
some useful information for their work from those same chapters. Reaching this
latter audience I would consider the greatest success for this book, as it might
stand a chance of, however indirectly and modestly, feeding into the shaping of
those environments.
The unabashed naturalism of what follows has a serious epistemological implication that should be added as a disclaimer here: real-world scientific theories
of perception, evolution and other phenomena as well as some of their empirical groundwork will be relevant and sometimes indispensable to my arguments.
I hence not merely incur the risk of my arguments falling with the possible empirical falsification of the theories in question; I actually embrace that risk, happily
embarking on the boat imagined by Quine (with the help of Neurath 1983, 92), in
which philosophy and science sail together:
A boat which [. . .] we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There
is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. All scientific findings, all
scientific conjectures that are at present plausible, are therefore in my view as
welcome for use in philosophy as elsewhere.
(Quine 1969b, 126f )
Any serious quest for knowledge is exposed to the risks that come with this openended task.