This is a book about machines, intelligence and environments, but it is not a book
about intelligent machines inhabiting some environment. Nor is it a book about
machine intelligence as conceived of under the paradigm of Artificial Intelligence.
Let alone is it a book about environments as intelligent agents of sorts. Instead, it
is a book about human intelligence, how it is shaped by its environments and what
role some kinds of artefacts play in that shaping. It sets out as an endeavour to
defend and refine a concept of information as primarily natural, environmentally
embedded information, which had been eclipsed by the notions of information
processing that came to the fore with the rise of the computer. The argument continues with an inquiry into the cognitive bearing of some technologies that happen
to be computational by design and are sometimes referred to as “intelligent environments” – and that do not necessarily have much to do with Artificial Intelligence. This work aims at a somewhat unconventional perspective on technologies
whose relationship to human cognition may have been misrendered by the notion
of intelligent machines and, vice versa, it aims at a somewhat unconventional perspective on human cognition whose nature may have been misrendered by models
that rely on that same notion.
If one looks for a banner under which my project sails, that banner should read,
in the naturalist spirit of a robust cognitive externalism: “Reasoning [. . .] is done
in the world, not in one’s head” (Millikan 1993b, 12). If reasoning commences
from direct interaction with the world, it might be worthwhile to begin with taking a closer look at what that world does to and with our thinking rather than
starting from a rather traditional, cognitivist or ‘Cartesian’ image of the mind in
order to criticise it and then move on to claim that our thinking is situated in and
extends into the world. (Anyway, that Cartesian image usually seems to serve as
a convenient myth rather than being treated as a serious philosophical position
worthy of serious critique.) The variety of externalism endorsed in what follows
will be roughly in line with the views of extended, embedded, embodied and
enactive cognition, also known by the family name “4E cognition”. Even though
not all of the following authors would agree to be subsumed under this rubric,
and even though they would not all agree with my arguments, the closest match
between what is presented here and other contemporary work in philosophy and
cognitive science is, on my opinion, to be found in Chemero (2009), Clark (1997),
Preface
about intelligent machines inhabiting some environment. Nor is it a book about
machine intelligence as conceived of under the paradigm of Artificial Intelligence.
Let alone is it a book about environments as intelligent agents of sorts. Instead, it
is a book about human intelligence, how it is shaped by its environments and what
role some kinds of artefacts play in that shaping. It sets out as an endeavour to
defend and refine a concept of information as primarily natural, environmentally
embedded information, which had been eclipsed by the notions of information
processing that came to the fore with the rise of the computer. The argument continues with an inquiry into the cognitive bearing of some technologies that happen
to be computational by design and are sometimes referred to as “intelligent environments” – and that do not necessarily have much to do with Artificial Intelligence. This work aims at a somewhat unconventional perspective on technologies
whose relationship to human cognition may have been misrendered by the notion
of intelligent machines and, vice versa, it aims at a somewhat unconventional perspective on human cognition whose nature may have been misrendered by models
that rely on that same notion.
If one looks for a banner under which my project sails, that banner should read,
in the naturalist spirit of a robust cognitive externalism: “Reasoning [. . .] is done
in the world, not in one’s head” (Millikan 1993b, 12). If reasoning commences
from direct interaction with the world, it might be worthwhile to begin with taking a closer look at what that world does to and with our thinking rather than
starting from a rather traditional, cognitivist or ‘Cartesian’ image of the mind in
order to criticise it and then move on to claim that our thinking is situated in and
extends into the world. (Anyway, that Cartesian image usually seems to serve as
a convenient myth rather than being treated as a serious philosophical position
worthy of serious critique.) The variety of externalism endorsed in what follows
will be roughly in line with the views of extended, embedded, embodied and
enactive cognition, also known by the family name “4E cognition”. Even though
not all of the following authors would agree to be subsumed under this rubric,
and even though they would not all agree with my arguments, the closest match
between what is presented here and other contemporary work in philosophy and
cognitive science is, on my opinion, to be found in Chemero (2009), Clark (1997),
Preface