190 Environments of intelligence
a naturalistic view will depend on the concrete contents of scientific inquiries, in
Dewey’s case on inquiries into evolution and cognition. Still, a naturalist view
thus anchored in science does not need to amount to a scientistic philosophy –
at least not to a larger extent than any other philosophical doctrine in history that
relied on the state of scientific inquiry of its age.
Either way, scientific and philosophical concepts are likely to turn out to be
subject to change, so that the very notion of the existence of a priori justified
statements of any sort, synthetic or analytic, is called into question – with the
exception perhaps of logical constants and the tautological statements derivable
from them. Do we need an a priori concept of space to reasonably think and act
in this world in the first place, as Kant (1781, “Transzendentale Ästhetik”, § 1–3)
famously insisted and James Jerome Gibson (1979, 32) denied? As Gibson’s work
was rooted in the tradition of the American naturalists, we should naturally expect
him to cancel space from the list of a priori concepts, along with many others. But
then, do we need an a priori concept of natural information as a specification relation in order to explain perception? Hence, should we expel the concept of natural
information from the realm of a priori statements, too?
The relations singled out by the concept of natural information may be so
elementary that tracking them by some means is indeed a precondition for any
perception, activity and knowledge. Hence, pace Kant, the uptake of natural information may be a factual, practical precondition for forming a concept of space.
On the account I presented in Part I, the possibility of tracking natural information allows for forming, but does not depend on the presence and operation of
concepts in the perceiving organism. Natural information is used for purposes
such as spatial orientation in organisms that cannot be expected to have concepts
of any sort, perhaps not even the most elementary practical concepts or “unicepts”
as proposed by Ruth Millikan (2004; 2017). These organisms do not have to be
in a position to perceive anything as something in order to be afforded with the
requisite activity by that information. In contrast, space, like time, may count
as a method of conceptually ordering relations thus picked up that is available
to organisms that are reliant on grasping objects and relations in their environments in complex spatio-temporal constellations, such as an object being behind,
beneath or above another, or a moving object reappearing after being occluded
by another. A concept of space also allows for abstracting from concrete relations
of this sort by using absolute measures, thereby moving from the use of intrinsic
to extrinsic information. If this naturalistic view is tenable, environment-bound
information comes first, and a concept of space later, so the latter will not be
accepted as being a priori.
If space is denied the status of being an a priori, experience-preceding, immutable concept, the concept of human nature is unlikely to fare better in this respect
under a naturalistic perspective. It is open to revision on the levels both of preferred methods and of general outlook: inquiries into human nature on the biological level might lead to, or be guided by, a change in general outlook on the
human condition, in an open-ended process of mutually informing each other.
This commitment to systematic openness of the naturalist’s quest has a corollary
a naturalistic view will depend on the concrete contents of scientific inquiries, in
Dewey’s case on inquiries into evolution and cognition. Still, a naturalist view
thus anchored in science does not need to amount to a scientistic philosophy –
at least not to a larger extent than any other philosophical doctrine in history that
relied on the state of scientific inquiry of its age.
Either way, scientific and philosophical concepts are likely to turn out to be
subject to change, so that the very notion of the existence of a priori justified
statements of any sort, synthetic or analytic, is called into question – with the
exception perhaps of logical constants and the tautological statements derivable
from them. Do we need an a priori concept of space to reasonably think and act
in this world in the first place, as Kant (1781, “Transzendentale Ästhetik”, § 1–3)
famously insisted and James Jerome Gibson (1979, 32) denied? As Gibson’s work
was rooted in the tradition of the American naturalists, we should naturally expect
him to cancel space from the list of a priori concepts, along with many others. But
then, do we need an a priori concept of natural information as a specification relation in order to explain perception? Hence, should we expel the concept of natural
information from the realm of a priori statements, too?
The relations singled out by the concept of natural information may be so
elementary that tracking them by some means is indeed a precondition for any
perception, activity and knowledge. Hence, pace Kant, the uptake of natural information may be a factual, practical precondition for forming a concept of space.
On the account I presented in Part I, the possibility of tracking natural information allows for forming, but does not depend on the presence and operation of
concepts in the perceiving organism. Natural information is used for purposes
such as spatial orientation in organisms that cannot be expected to have concepts
of any sort, perhaps not even the most elementary practical concepts or “unicepts”
as proposed by Ruth Millikan (2004; 2017). These organisms do not have to be
in a position to perceive anything as something in order to be afforded with the
requisite activity by that information. In contrast, space, like time, may count
as a method of conceptually ordering relations thus picked up that is available
to organisms that are reliant on grasping objects and relations in their environments in complex spatio-temporal constellations, such as an object being behind,
beneath or above another, or a moving object reappearing after being occluded
by another. A concept of space also allows for abstracting from concrete relations
of this sort by using absolute measures, thereby moving from the use of intrinsic
to extrinsic information. If this naturalistic view is tenable, environment-bound
information comes first, and a concept of space later, so the latter will not be
accepted as being a priori.
If space is denied the status of being an a priori, experience-preceding, immutable concept, the concept of human nature is unlikely to fare better in this respect
under a naturalistic perspective. It is open to revision on the levels both of preferred methods and of general outlook: inquiries into human nature on the biological level might lead to, or be guided by, a change in general outlook on the
human condition, in an open-ended process of mutually informing each other.
This commitment to systematic openness of the naturalist’s quest has a corollary