Conceptual analysis and human nature 189
view, a ‘hard’, physicalistic reductionism of explanations in the special sciences
to physical explanations prevails. The argument for this position, also known as
the “unity of science” argument (Carnap 1955; Oppenheim and Putnam 1958),
rests on the hypothesis that physics is the most basic science, for being concerned
with the most basic processes in the natural world – processes on which all other
phenomena rest. However, this claim is not entailed by the claim of a universality
of the methods of the natural sciences in Boyd et al. (1991), which is more plausibly read as a weaker claim: unless biology, psychology or sociology make claims
about an ontological specificity of their subject matter, their tenets and methods
are, although heterogeneous and dis-unified, fully compatible with the closure and
completeness of the causal order of nature.
Unless a metaphysical commitment to ontological naturalism and or a strictly
physicalistic reductionism about explanations are involved, epistemological naturalism will be a fairly broad and inclusive doctrine, amounting to the minimal
epistemological requirement that all knowledge is empirical knowledge and is
to be achieved by the methods of all varieties of the empirical sciences, defined
in the widest sense. This “broad church” interpretation was the hallmark of early
twentieth century American naturalism, notably John Dewey (1929) and Roy
Wood Sellars (1922; see the historical account in Keil 2008). However, apart from
denying the possibility of a priori knowledge, such a minimalist position will be
systematically, and possibly purposefully, vague – which does not mean that its
purpose is vague.
For Dewey in particular, philosophical naturalism has a therapeutic function,
albeit in a different, arguably more positive sense than Wittgenstein’s: we will
be better prepared to cope with the upsetting of traditional concepts, values
and modes of thinking by modernity if we employ an “empirical method which
remains true to nature”, so as to inspire “the mind with courage and vitality to
create new ideas in the face of the perplexities of a new world”, Dewey argues
in a paradigmatic statement of his naturalism, “The Influence of Darwinism on
Philosophy” (1910, iif ).
This philosophical-therapeutical argument cuts two ways, which are distinct
but related: one of general philosophical outlook and one of suitable philosophical
methods. Dewey argues that Darwin’s theory of evolution changed philosophy,
first, by opening philosophical reasoning about life, politics and morality to the
idea of change – an idea of change, however, that is clearly distinct from random
variance. Second, Darwin’s theory “emancipated, once and for all, genetic and
experimental ideas as an organon of asking questions and looking for explanations” (Dewey 1910, 9). Hence, on the first level, Dewey’s naturalism offers an
alternative route to the overcoming of metaphysics to what the conceptual analysts
proposed, in suggesting that the quest for ultimate, immutable truths, whether
metaphysical or conceptual, should be abandoned in favour of an open-minded
stance that allows for constant revision. On the second level, Dewey’s naturalism
amounts to the endeavour of modelling the resources and conduct of philosophical
reasoning primarily on the experimental, evidential and critical methods, and to
some extent also on the concrete contents, of the empirical sciences. On this level,
view, a ‘hard’, physicalistic reductionism of explanations in the special sciences
to physical explanations prevails. The argument for this position, also known as
the “unity of science” argument (Carnap 1955; Oppenheim and Putnam 1958),
rests on the hypothesis that physics is the most basic science, for being concerned
with the most basic processes in the natural world – processes on which all other
phenomena rest. However, this claim is not entailed by the claim of a universality
of the methods of the natural sciences in Boyd et al. (1991), which is more plausibly read as a weaker claim: unless biology, psychology or sociology make claims
about an ontological specificity of their subject matter, their tenets and methods
are, although heterogeneous and dis-unified, fully compatible with the closure and
completeness of the causal order of nature.
Unless a metaphysical commitment to ontological naturalism and or a strictly
physicalistic reductionism about explanations are involved, epistemological naturalism will be a fairly broad and inclusive doctrine, amounting to the minimal
epistemological requirement that all knowledge is empirical knowledge and is
to be achieved by the methods of all varieties of the empirical sciences, defined
in the widest sense. This “broad church” interpretation was the hallmark of early
twentieth century American naturalism, notably John Dewey (1929) and Roy
Wood Sellars (1922; see the historical account in Keil 2008). However, apart from
denying the possibility of a priori knowledge, such a minimalist position will be
systematically, and possibly purposefully, vague – which does not mean that its
purpose is vague.
For Dewey in particular, philosophical naturalism has a therapeutic function,
albeit in a different, arguably more positive sense than Wittgenstein’s: we will
be better prepared to cope with the upsetting of traditional concepts, values
and modes of thinking by modernity if we employ an “empirical method which
remains true to nature”, so as to inspire “the mind with courage and vitality to
create new ideas in the face of the perplexities of a new world”, Dewey argues
in a paradigmatic statement of his naturalism, “The Influence of Darwinism on
Philosophy” (1910, iif ).
This philosophical-therapeutical argument cuts two ways, which are distinct
but related: one of general philosophical outlook and one of suitable philosophical
methods. Dewey argues that Darwin’s theory of evolution changed philosophy,
first, by opening philosophical reasoning about life, politics and morality to the
idea of change – an idea of change, however, that is clearly distinct from random
variance. Second, Darwin’s theory “emancipated, once and for all, genetic and
experimental ideas as an organon of asking questions and looking for explanations” (Dewey 1910, 9). Hence, on the first level, Dewey’s naturalism offers an
alternative route to the overcoming of metaphysics to what the conceptual analysts
proposed, in suggesting that the quest for ultimate, immutable truths, whether
metaphysical or conceptual, should be abandoned in favour of an open-minded
stance that allows for constant revision. On the second level, Dewey’s naturalism
amounts to the endeavour of modelling the resources and conduct of philosophical
reasoning primarily on the experimental, evidential and critical methods, and to
some extent also on the concrete contents, of the empirical sciences. On this level,