188 Environments of intelligence
also be found in David Papineau (2007), who further subdivides epistemological
naturalism into, first, epistemological externalism, that is the view that all knowledge hinges on empirical factors and can thus be only reliable, never certain, and,
second, the assumption that philosophy should be continuous with the natural
sciences. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (2004, 4) refer to epistemological
naturalism as a “methodological theme” and to ontological naturalism as “a commitment to an exclusively scientific conception of nature.”
The ontological and the epistemological understanding of naturalism, although
appearing quite closely related at first sight, are not necessarily interdependent,
and they may or may not co-occur in naturalistic arguments and their critiques –
although ontological naturalism is explicitly or implicitly presupposed by many
epistemological naturalists. The key tenet of ontological naturalism is that the
causal order of nature is closed in the sense of ruling out the possibility of supernatural or extra-natural interventions. Two sub-clauses that follow by implicature
rather than entailment are that the causal order of nature is complete in the sense
of all physical phenomena being sufficiently explainable by physical causes, and
that it is uniform in the sense of the same laws of nature applying in all places at
all times. For most authors, closure and completeness are synonymous. It might
be worthwhile, however, to consider the distinction made by Eric Marcus (2005):
closure, like uniformity, is a genuinely metaphysical claim about how the world
stands above and beyond physics – namely that there is nothing that exists above
and beyond the physical realm, or that, if there exists some such thing, it does not
matter to the physical realm. Completeness, in turn, is a claim about explanations
in the first place, namely that physical explanations are sufficient; they might,
however, not be necessary. Completeness suggests closure but does not require it.
Ontological naturalism is at once the most general and sweeping and the least
provable of naturalistic tenets. It is a metaphysical claim that is supported – but
cannot be proven – by empirical evidence and philosophical argument. In conjunction, evidence and argument may demonstrate that assumptions of supernatural or extra-natural powers are not necessary to explain the causal order of nature
and the place of life, the human mind and other philosophically relevant phenomena therein. Accordingly, even those authors who actually provide explicit
arguments for ontological naturalism confine themselves to demonstrating that
the assumption of completeness is tenable and coherent, and probably compelling. They do not claim that this assumption is true by necessity, let alone that it
is strictly correlated with closure of the causal order of nature (see, e.g. Davidson
1980, Chapters 11 and 13; Papineau 1993, Chapter 1; or Smart 1963). One of the
main reasons behind the logical positivist’s reservations against naturalism, which
seem to contradict his or her commitment to a scientific world view, is just that:
the inevitably metaphysical and thus, on the view of logical analysis, nonsensical
nature of materialism as an ontological doctrine (Stoljar 2009).
Conversely, epistemological naturalism, in all its varieties, seeks to ground
knowledge in “human interactions with the natural world” (Giere 2009, 308) but
is not of one mind as to whether the natural sciences are one incarnation, the paradigm or even the exclusive domain of such knowledge. On the most restrictive
also be found in David Papineau (2007), who further subdivides epistemological
naturalism into, first, epistemological externalism, that is the view that all knowledge hinges on empirical factors and can thus be only reliable, never certain, and,
second, the assumption that philosophy should be continuous with the natural
sciences. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (2004, 4) refer to epistemological
naturalism as a “methodological theme” and to ontological naturalism as “a commitment to an exclusively scientific conception of nature.”
The ontological and the epistemological understanding of naturalism, although
appearing quite closely related at first sight, are not necessarily interdependent,
and they may or may not co-occur in naturalistic arguments and their critiques –
although ontological naturalism is explicitly or implicitly presupposed by many
epistemological naturalists. The key tenet of ontological naturalism is that the
causal order of nature is closed in the sense of ruling out the possibility of supernatural or extra-natural interventions. Two sub-clauses that follow by implicature
rather than entailment are that the causal order of nature is complete in the sense
of all physical phenomena being sufficiently explainable by physical causes, and
that it is uniform in the sense of the same laws of nature applying in all places at
all times. For most authors, closure and completeness are synonymous. It might
be worthwhile, however, to consider the distinction made by Eric Marcus (2005):
closure, like uniformity, is a genuinely metaphysical claim about how the world
stands above and beyond physics – namely that there is nothing that exists above
and beyond the physical realm, or that, if there exists some such thing, it does not
matter to the physical realm. Completeness, in turn, is a claim about explanations
in the first place, namely that physical explanations are sufficient; they might,
however, not be necessary. Completeness suggests closure but does not require it.
Ontological naturalism is at once the most general and sweeping and the least
provable of naturalistic tenets. It is a metaphysical claim that is supported – but
cannot be proven – by empirical evidence and philosophical argument. In conjunction, evidence and argument may demonstrate that assumptions of supernatural or extra-natural powers are not necessary to explain the causal order of nature
and the place of life, the human mind and other philosophically relevant phenomena therein. Accordingly, even those authors who actually provide explicit
arguments for ontological naturalism confine themselves to demonstrating that
the assumption of completeness is tenable and coherent, and probably compelling. They do not claim that this assumption is true by necessity, let alone that it
is strictly correlated with closure of the causal order of nature (see, e.g. Davidson
1980, Chapters 11 and 13; Papineau 1993, Chapter 1; or Smart 1963). One of the
main reasons behind the logical positivist’s reservations against naturalism, which
seem to contradict his or her commitment to a scientific world view, is just that:
the inevitably metaphysical and thus, on the view of logical analysis, nonsensical
nature of materialism as an ontological doctrine (Stoljar 2009).
Conversely, epistemological naturalism, in all its varieties, seeks to ground
knowledge in “human interactions with the natural world” (Giere 2009, 308) but
is not of one mind as to whether the natural sciences are one incarnation, the paradigm or even the exclusive domain of such knowledge. On the most restrictive