Conceptual analysis and human nature 187
that would first enter into that relation. Instead, it would be a product of that
relation. According to this image, the relation will first create the relata. Hence,
the notion of human nature would be subject to deconstruction, in that there is
nothing natural about human nature. This reading, however, amounts to a set of
metaphysical, synthetic a priori claims, too, albeit negative ones that are at risk
of falling victim to the paradoxes of epistemic perspective concomitant with any
radically constructivist claim.
I am hopeful that the preceding chapters have created an impression that sufficiently stands out against either of these two readings. The primary, foundational difference between H-5 and what the philosophical anthropologists claim
is that I am seeking to make an empirical claim about human beings as a species
and about salient properties of their environments as being closely coupled in a
dynamic relationship – without denying the possible deeper implications of these
claims but also without either assuming to have proven or promising to prove
them. Hence, the proper rephrasing of my statement in H-5 will be “It is a contingent empirical fact about human nature that it is mutable and artefact-dependent.”
This is a synthetic a posteriori statement that eschews metaphysical commitments
while suggesting a perspective on how human nature may be best conceived of in
extra-scientific, normative terms. This view of a partly self-made and changeable
human nature, I will now proceed to demonstrate, firmly stands in the tradition of
philosophical naturalism.
A naturalist’s view of human nature and machines
Contemporary philosophical naturalism has been concisely defined as “the view
that all phenomena are subject to natural laws, and/or that the methods of the
natural sciences are applicable in every area of inquiry” (Boyd et al. 1991, 778) –
which, as Hilary Putnam (2004) rightly observes, is a disjunctive definition or,
more precisely, two definitions of different content and scope that reflect the two
main understandings of naturalism in theoretical philosophy. A paradigmatic
description of these two main understandings reads as follows:
Ontologically, naturalism implies the rejection of supernaturalism. [. . .]
Positively, naturalists hold that reality, including human life and society, is
exhausted by what exists in the causal order of nature. [. . .]
Epistemologically, naturalism implies the rejection of all forms of a priori
knowledge, including that of higher level principles of epistemic validation.
Positively, naturalists claim that all knowledge derives from human interactions with the natural world.
(Giere 2009, 308)
This basic distinction is not uncommon and can be found in similar form in, for
example Quine (1969c, 26), who holds “that knowledge, mind, and meaning are
part of the same world that they have to do with, and that they are to be studied in
the same empirical spirit that animates natural science”. The same distinction can
that would first enter into that relation. Instead, it would be a product of that
relation. According to this image, the relation will first create the relata. Hence,
the notion of human nature would be subject to deconstruction, in that there is
nothing natural about human nature. This reading, however, amounts to a set of
metaphysical, synthetic a priori claims, too, albeit negative ones that are at risk
of falling victim to the paradoxes of epistemic perspective concomitant with any
radically constructivist claim.
I am hopeful that the preceding chapters have created an impression that sufficiently stands out against either of these two readings. The primary, foundational difference between H-5 and what the philosophical anthropologists claim
is that I am seeking to make an empirical claim about human beings as a species
and about salient properties of their environments as being closely coupled in a
dynamic relationship – without denying the possible deeper implications of these
claims but also without either assuming to have proven or promising to prove
them. Hence, the proper rephrasing of my statement in H-5 will be “It is a contingent empirical fact about human nature that it is mutable and artefact-dependent.”
This is a synthetic a posteriori statement that eschews metaphysical commitments
while suggesting a perspective on how human nature may be best conceived of in
extra-scientific, normative terms. This view of a partly self-made and changeable
human nature, I will now proceed to demonstrate, firmly stands in the tradition of
philosophical naturalism.
A naturalist’s view of human nature and machines
Contemporary philosophical naturalism has been concisely defined as “the view
that all phenomena are subject to natural laws, and/or that the methods of the
natural sciences are applicable in every area of inquiry” (Boyd et al. 1991, 778) –
which, as Hilary Putnam (2004) rightly observes, is a disjunctive definition or,
more precisely, two definitions of different content and scope that reflect the two
main understandings of naturalism in theoretical philosophy. A paradigmatic
description of these two main understandings reads as follows:
Ontologically, naturalism implies the rejection of supernaturalism. [. . .]
Positively, naturalists hold that reality, including human life and society, is
exhausted by what exists in the causal order of nature. [. . .]
Epistemologically, naturalism implies the rejection of all forms of a priori
knowledge, including that of higher level principles of epistemic validation.
Positively, naturalists claim that all knowledge derives from human interactions with the natural world.
(Giere 2009, 308)
This basic distinction is not uncommon and can be found in similar form in, for
example Quine (1969c, 26), who holds “that knowledge, mind, and meaning are
part of the same world that they have to do with, and that they are to be studied in
the same empirical spirit that animates natural science”. The same distinction can