186 Environments of intelligence
under them in order to provide him with a stable mode of existence. Plessner
(1928), like Gehlen but in markedly brighter colours, places human beings back
in the order of nature but attests to them a mode of existence that is at variance
with either plants, whom he considers “openly” organised, for their lack of central
organs, and other animals, whom he considers “centred” in organisation, for possessing central organs to regulate traffic with their environments, whereas human
beings are “excentrically” organised, in being able to self-reflexively refer to their
position in the world, which they, by virtue of that very nature, always access in
mediated fashion, through artefacts, culture and social practices. Cassirer (1944)
roots these human-specific modes of accessing the world in their nature as an
animal symbolicum, and thus an organism that is not merely capable of perceiving
and signalling immediately relevant conditions in its environment but endowed
with an ability to form symbolic representations and concepts, from which all
kinds of other abilities flow.
None of these characterisations of the human condition is contained in, or
strictly logically derivable from, a basic concept of a human being but only from
the various presupposition-rich conceptions devised by the authors. At the same
instance, none of these characterisations is an empirical claim that could be derived
from, or proven by, experience in general and biological science in particular. All
of them are unhappy-bachelor type statements but, at the same instance, they are
supposed to grasp something about human nature that is prior to, and in principle independent of, any human experiences or interaction, with partial exception
granted to Plessner. Above all, these characteristics are supposed to be immutable
at least in terms of being possessed by all beings known as humans, and only by
those beings. A living being not possessing those characteristics would then not,
not yet, or not anymore be a human being.
Hence, looking at H-5, the crucial difference between the claims made by the
philosophical anthropologists and my project seems to be that I consider the human
condition to be dynamic and historical. A rephrasing of my statement would be
“There is a human nature, but it is neither immutable nor artefact-independent.”
To be sure, such a claim would constitute a major departure from the tradition of
philosophical anthropology, as either predicate negates at least part of what the
philosophical anthropologists claim. I could then proceed to a set of metaphysical claims about how the essence of the human condition is our ability to change
ourselves and our environments, and happily sing along with the “our nature is
to change our nature” chorus (King Face 1987) – after explicating why this is not
paradoxical as an anthropological claim in the first place.
Alternatively, and more fundamentally, the difference to the philosophical
anthropologists could lie in an act of throwing out the concept of “human nature”
altogether and settling for a constructivist position. The corresponding rephrasing of my statement would then be “There is no human nature, so it could not
be immutable and artefact-independent either.” Nor could it be mutable and
artefact-dependent for that matter, as it is the subject term that is negated in this
rephrasing, so any further predications would be meaningless. The mutual shaping relations between humans and artefacts would not presuppose a human nature
under them in order to provide him with a stable mode of existence. Plessner
(1928), like Gehlen but in markedly brighter colours, places human beings back
in the order of nature but attests to them a mode of existence that is at variance
with either plants, whom he considers “openly” organised, for their lack of central
organs, and other animals, whom he considers “centred” in organisation, for possessing central organs to regulate traffic with their environments, whereas human
beings are “excentrically” organised, in being able to self-reflexively refer to their
position in the world, which they, by virtue of that very nature, always access in
mediated fashion, through artefacts, culture and social practices. Cassirer (1944)
roots these human-specific modes of accessing the world in their nature as an
animal symbolicum, and thus an organism that is not merely capable of perceiving
and signalling immediately relevant conditions in its environment but endowed
with an ability to form symbolic representations and concepts, from which all
kinds of other abilities flow.
None of these characterisations of the human condition is contained in, or
strictly logically derivable from, a basic concept of a human being but only from
the various presupposition-rich conceptions devised by the authors. At the same
instance, none of these characterisations is an empirical claim that could be derived
from, or proven by, experience in general and biological science in particular. All
of them are unhappy-bachelor type statements but, at the same instance, they are
supposed to grasp something about human nature that is prior to, and in principle independent of, any human experiences or interaction, with partial exception
granted to Plessner. Above all, these characteristics are supposed to be immutable
at least in terms of being possessed by all beings known as humans, and only by
those beings. A living being not possessing those characteristics would then not,
not yet, or not anymore be a human being.
Hence, looking at H-5, the crucial difference between the claims made by the
philosophical anthropologists and my project seems to be that I consider the human
condition to be dynamic and historical. A rephrasing of my statement would be
“There is a human nature, but it is neither immutable nor artefact-independent.”
To be sure, such a claim would constitute a major departure from the tradition of
philosophical anthropology, as either predicate negates at least part of what the
philosophical anthropologists claim. I could then proceed to a set of metaphysical claims about how the essence of the human condition is our ability to change
ourselves and our environments, and happily sing along with the “our nature is
to change our nature” chorus (King Face 1987) – after explicating why this is not
paradoxical as an anthropological claim in the first place.
Alternatively, and more fundamentally, the difference to the philosophical
anthropologists could lie in an act of throwing out the concept of “human nature”
altogether and settling for a constructivist position. The corresponding rephrasing of my statement would then be “There is no human nature, so it could not
be immutable and artefact-independent either.” Nor could it be mutable and
artefact-dependent for that matter, as it is the subject term that is negated in this
rephrasing, so any further predications would be meaningless. The mutual shaping relations between humans and artefacts would not presuppose a human nature