Conceptual analysis and human nature 191
that, although not being a metaphysical statement, constitutes a constraint on the
anthropological perspective to be reasonably adopted: man should be treated in
philosophical endeavours in the same way as in scientific inquiries, namely as a
natural being like any other, with cognitive capacities that are likely to be more
sophisticated in degree, but otherwise, in their functional roles, analogous to what
other animals accomplish in order to cope with their environments. Man should
also be taken to be a natural being like any other in terms of living in, and having
to cope with, changeable environments, where some of these changes are, intentionally or inadvertently, self-made.
Hence, the naturalistic anthropological claim to be defended here contrasts with
the philosophical anthropologists’ views as follows: it affirms the very the notion
of homo faber that Scheler disdained, and subtracts any residual metaphysics
from that notion. It affirms a deflated version of Plessner’s claim that artificiality is partly constitutive to human nature, subtracting his vitalist preconceptions
and proposing a deflationary, biologically more grounded reading of his notion
of positionality. It affirms Cassirer’s claim for the speciality of human abilities
of symbolising but views them as properly evolved and hence continuous with
animal signalling. It affirms Gehlen’s notion of man as an incomplete being but,
again, subtracts the metaphysics from it and dispenses with its negative normative
connotations. After all, if artefacts are constitutive to the shape and accomplishment of human abilities, and if a coupling with the environment is constitutive to
biological functions for all organisms, and the coupling with artefacts for some
organisms, there will be no incompleteness once the whole picture is taken into
consideration.
A naturalistic account as outlined here will have to accomplish two tasks that
the philosophical anthropologists were free to waive: first, it will have to show in
as much empirical detail as possible how human cognitive abilities are actually
and concretely coupled with the environment, and hence how they actually operate in such a coupling relationship. How does the uptake of natural information
work on the organic and neuronal level, and how does it map on activities? Where
and how precisely do representations come into play? This is a task for an ecologically minded cognitive science, as outlined in Chemero (2009). I freely admit
of having provided little in the way of such empirical detail on this level, instead
confining my account to reviewing some work that has been done in that field
and possibly offering some contributions to further concept- and theory-building
therein. Second, a naturalistic account will have to show in as much empirical
detail as possible how artefacts are dynamical constituents of environmentally
coupled cognitive abilities. On this level, I am hopeful to have escaped the philosopher’s chronic condition of armchair confinement with at least some success –
while risking putting myself in the position of one of the proverbial blind men
who try to collectively determine the nature of an elephant by each touching one
part of him. What I tried in order to avoid that epistemological problem was to
develop a good idea what the more capable men and women on the first level
are doing, and match my account of natural information and cognitive artefacts
against it.
that, although not being a metaphysical statement, constitutes a constraint on the
anthropological perspective to be reasonably adopted: man should be treated in
philosophical endeavours in the same way as in scientific inquiries, namely as a
natural being like any other, with cognitive capacities that are likely to be more
sophisticated in degree, but otherwise, in their functional roles, analogous to what
other animals accomplish in order to cope with their environments. Man should
also be taken to be a natural being like any other in terms of living in, and having
to cope with, changeable environments, where some of these changes are, intentionally or inadvertently, self-made.
Hence, the naturalistic anthropological claim to be defended here contrasts with
the philosophical anthropologists’ views as follows: it affirms the very the notion
of homo faber that Scheler disdained, and subtracts any residual metaphysics
from that notion. It affirms a deflated version of Plessner’s claim that artificiality is partly constitutive to human nature, subtracting his vitalist preconceptions
and proposing a deflationary, biologically more grounded reading of his notion
of positionality. It affirms Cassirer’s claim for the speciality of human abilities
of symbolising but views them as properly evolved and hence continuous with
animal signalling. It affirms Gehlen’s notion of man as an incomplete being but,
again, subtracts the metaphysics from it and dispenses with its negative normative
connotations. After all, if artefacts are constitutive to the shape and accomplishment of human abilities, and if a coupling with the environment is constitutive to
biological functions for all organisms, and the coupling with artefacts for some
organisms, there will be no incompleteness once the whole picture is taken into
consideration.
A naturalistic account as outlined here will have to accomplish two tasks that
the philosophical anthropologists were free to waive: first, it will have to show in
as much empirical detail as possible how human cognitive abilities are actually
and concretely coupled with the environment, and hence how they actually operate in such a coupling relationship. How does the uptake of natural information
work on the organic and neuronal level, and how does it map on activities? Where
and how precisely do representations come into play? This is a task for an ecologically minded cognitive science, as outlined in Chemero (2009). I freely admit
of having provided little in the way of such empirical detail on this level, instead
confining my account to reviewing some work that has been done in that field
and possibly offering some contributions to further concept- and theory-building
therein. Second, a naturalistic account will have to show in as much empirical
detail as possible how artefacts are dynamical constituents of environmentally
coupled cognitive abilities. On this level, I am hopeful to have escaped the philosopher’s chronic condition of armchair confinement with at least some success –
while risking putting myself in the position of one of the proverbial blind men
who try to collectively determine the nature of an elephant by each touching one
part of him. What I tried in order to avoid that epistemological problem was to
develop a good idea what the more capable men and women on the first level
are doing, and match my account of natural information and cognitive artefacts
against it.