The nature of cognitive artefacts 137
to serve our purposes. Tools and machines are mainly used to materially modify conditions in the environment, in the way outlined by Peter Godfrey-Smith
(1996a) as “causal construction” (see p. 87). In contrast, cognitive artefacts might
be found to have only modest effects in terms of materially modifying conditions
in the environment, but they will affect the information that is available in the
environment and the way in which it is available, and hence contribute to users’
“constitutive” relations to their environments.
Let us briefly recall that, although constitutive relations, as understood by
Godfrey-Smith (and thus, for purposes of disambiguation, referred to as “GSconstitutive”), are always informationally based, the distinction between the
construction and GS-constitution of features of the environment cuts across the
distinction between physical and informational properties of the environment.
After all, both constructive and GS-constitutive features might take part in furnishing information to the organism, or in placing additional physical interventions in the environment. Territorial markers are physical entities that serve an
informational purpose – one that will not, or not fully, be deducible from the physical nature of the marker. In a similar vein, cognitive artefacts, being artefacts that
have the function of supporting, augmenting and, in some cases, substituting their
users’ informational relations to their environments, incorporate both a constructive and a GS-constitutive aspect. However, the organism’s informational needs
and purposes will typically override the physical aspects.
On the argument on cognitive extensions in Chapter 7, the informational
accomplishments of the artefacts under consideration here typically are not mere
equivalents of, or functionally neutral additions to, natural human faculties of collecting and acting upon information. They are so for at least three related reasons:
(e 1) Cognitive artefacts introduce new mechanisms of collecting, structuring
and presenting information.
(e 2) The operation of cognitive artefacts might, as a secondary effect, affect the
purposes of their users.
(e 3) Cognitive artefacts may, purposefully or inadvertently, alter their users’
informational environments.
If the introduction of a cognitive artefact neither changed the mechanisms of collecting information that I have at my disposal nor affected the goals that I could
attain nor affected conditions in my informational environment, the use of the
artefact in question would be perfectly identical to the use of the natural, internally based cognitive resources they supposedly supplement, augment or substitute. However, this is a theoretical possibility that has little chance of being
borne out empirically. The three factors listed previously will individually or,
more probably, jointly affect the collection and provision of information by cognitive artefacts, in analogous fashion to what artefacts in general effect in terms of
providing new mechanisms and altering their users’ purposes and environments.
To begin with, one is not likely to find many artefacts that accomplish a task
in the same way as the unaided human organism will. A stick might qualify as
to serve our purposes. Tools and machines are mainly used to materially modify conditions in the environment, in the way outlined by Peter Godfrey-Smith
(1996a) as “causal construction” (see p. 87). In contrast, cognitive artefacts might
be found to have only modest effects in terms of materially modifying conditions
in the environment, but they will affect the information that is available in the
environment and the way in which it is available, and hence contribute to users’
“constitutive” relations to their environments.
Let us briefly recall that, although constitutive relations, as understood by
Godfrey-Smith (and thus, for purposes of disambiguation, referred to as “GSconstitutive”), are always informationally based, the distinction between the
construction and GS-constitution of features of the environment cuts across the
distinction between physical and informational properties of the environment.
After all, both constructive and GS-constitutive features might take part in furnishing information to the organism, or in placing additional physical interventions in the environment. Territorial markers are physical entities that serve an
informational purpose – one that will not, or not fully, be deducible from the physical nature of the marker. In a similar vein, cognitive artefacts, being artefacts that
have the function of supporting, augmenting and, in some cases, substituting their
users’ informational relations to their environments, incorporate both a constructive and a GS-constitutive aspect. However, the organism’s informational needs
and purposes will typically override the physical aspects.
On the argument on cognitive extensions in Chapter 7, the informational
accomplishments of the artefacts under consideration here typically are not mere
equivalents of, or functionally neutral additions to, natural human faculties of collecting and acting upon information. They are so for at least three related reasons:
(e 1) Cognitive artefacts introduce new mechanisms of collecting, structuring
and presenting information.
(e 2) The operation of cognitive artefacts might, as a secondary effect, affect the
purposes of their users.
(e 3) Cognitive artefacts may, purposefully or inadvertently, alter their users’
informational environments.
If the introduction of a cognitive artefact neither changed the mechanisms of collecting information that I have at my disposal nor affected the goals that I could
attain nor affected conditions in my informational environment, the use of the
artefact in question would be perfectly identical to the use of the natural, internally based cognitive resources they supposedly supplement, augment or substitute. However, this is a theoretical possibility that has little chance of being
borne out empirically. The three factors listed previously will individually or,
more probably, jointly affect the collection and provision of information by cognitive artefacts, in analogous fashion to what artefacts in general effect in terms of
providing new mechanisms and altering their users’ purposes and environments.
To begin with, one is not likely to find many artefacts that accomplish a task
in the same way as the unaided human organism will. A stick might qualify as