136 Environments of intelligence
helps the observer in seeing what is depicted and in doing something with, to or
about it, gets in the way of a coupling that would be at least similarly direct as in
visual perception of world affairs in a natural environment. If it is indeed a detour
for reality to explain itself through language (“Für die Realität ist es doch ein
Umweg, sich über die Sprache zu erklären”, Wittgenstein 1969, IV, 114), it may
be a necessary detour when it comes to fixing the content of a picture that does
happen not to speak to me in the same way as the familiar environment in which
I perceive and act would speak to me.
Pictorial forms, as I have tried to show, form an interesting example of a cognitive artefact that sits halfway between direct guidance by features of one’s
environment and the language-bound possibilities of decoupling, and thus for
abstracting from matters of immediate practical relevance or factual existence.
They share some of either’s merits and difficulties. At the same instance, they
might be the artificial cognitive resource that, despite the limitations discussed
earlier, displays the closest analogy to perception of natural objects and scenes
under natural conditions. Although it will remain difficult to prove that pictorial
forms are constitutive S to cognitive functions to the same extent as, arguably, language or tools are, they certainly will play a constitutive W role in many contexts of
interaction with and within human environments, and they, like language, will be
implied in the use of other cognitive artefacts.
Cognitive artefacts and informational environments
Arguably, the distinction between constitutiveness S and constitutiveness W of artefacts to cognitive functions admits of degrees. Even if an artefact is not constitutive S in a strict sense, the effects of its use are likely to feed back into the
constitution of cognitive traits and their functions. These effects will typically not
be direct, in terms of becoming selectively relevant to the reproduction of a cognitive trait, but manifest themselves in modifications of their users’ informational
environments.
There are several ways in which cognitive artefacts may have such modifying
effects on variables in informational environments – if these effects are persistent
and consistent. An artefact may, first, induce perceptions of things that are not
present in the environment, such as, for example, in the case of iconic pictures of
objects, as discussed in the previous section. Second, it may induce perceptions
of things that are present in the environment but not within the normal range of
human perception, such as in a variety of sensor technologies. Third, objects in an
environment might be arranged to appear different in certain respects from how
they are, such as in Gibson’s example of a glass-plate extension over a cliff, which
may be stepped and walked upon but which does not provide a stepping-on affordance. Fourth, objects might be arranged to appear largely indistinguishable from
natural, real-world objects within a simulated context. In all of these cases, part of
the make-up of R’s informational environment will have been altered.
Hence, with respect to the effects on the environment, the difference between
cognitive and other artefacts lies in the ways in which our environments are made
helps the observer in seeing what is depicted and in doing something with, to or
about it, gets in the way of a coupling that would be at least similarly direct as in
visual perception of world affairs in a natural environment. If it is indeed a detour
for reality to explain itself through language (“Für die Realität ist es doch ein
Umweg, sich über die Sprache zu erklären”, Wittgenstein 1969, IV, 114), it may
be a necessary detour when it comes to fixing the content of a picture that does
happen not to speak to me in the same way as the familiar environment in which
I perceive and act would speak to me.
Pictorial forms, as I have tried to show, form an interesting example of a cognitive artefact that sits halfway between direct guidance by features of one’s
environment and the language-bound possibilities of decoupling, and thus for
abstracting from matters of immediate practical relevance or factual existence.
They share some of either’s merits and difficulties. At the same instance, they
might be the artificial cognitive resource that, despite the limitations discussed
earlier, displays the closest analogy to perception of natural objects and scenes
under natural conditions. Although it will remain difficult to prove that pictorial
forms are constitutive S to cognitive functions to the same extent as, arguably, language or tools are, they certainly will play a constitutive W role in many contexts of
interaction with and within human environments, and they, like language, will be
implied in the use of other cognitive artefacts.
Cognitive artefacts and informational environments
Arguably, the distinction between constitutiveness S and constitutiveness W of artefacts to cognitive functions admits of degrees. Even if an artefact is not constitutive S in a strict sense, the effects of its use are likely to feed back into the
constitution of cognitive traits and their functions. These effects will typically not
be direct, in terms of becoming selectively relevant to the reproduction of a cognitive trait, but manifest themselves in modifications of their users’ informational
environments.
There are several ways in which cognitive artefacts may have such modifying
effects on variables in informational environments – if these effects are persistent
and consistent. An artefact may, first, induce perceptions of things that are not
present in the environment, such as, for example, in the case of iconic pictures of
objects, as discussed in the previous section. Second, it may induce perceptions
of things that are present in the environment but not within the normal range of
human perception, such as in a variety of sensor technologies. Third, objects in an
environment might be arranged to appear different in certain respects from how
they are, such as in Gibson’s example of a glass-plate extension over a cliff, which
may be stepped and walked upon but which does not provide a stepping-on affordance. Fourth, objects might be arranged to appear largely indistinguishable from
natural, real-world objects within a simulated context. In all of these cases, part of
the make-up of R’s informational environment will have been altered.
Hence, with respect to the effects on the environment, the difference between
cognitive and other artefacts lies in the ways in which our environments are made