138 Environments of intelligence
an extension of the arm in a straightforward, almost trivial manner that fits Ext I
(see p. 119 in Chapter 7), but still, it might be used in a variety of ways that are not
necessarily of the length-extension kind. At any rate, most tools and technological
artefacts will bear a more complex relation to human behaviours. Returning to
the Gunderson (1964) quotation in Chapter 1, the steam drill’s success in digging
railway tunnels did not prove that machines had muscles but only that there are
other ways of digging railway tunnels than by flexing muscles in an appropriate
way. When it comes to cognitive artefacts, there will be, as a matter of empirical fact, no such thing as an extension that is strictly instrumental in character,
although some such artefact might be conceivable. We should expect mechanisms
to be variant by default. Otherwise, we will be restricted to trivial cases, such as
spectacles or contact lenses. (Even hearing aids might not be a straightforward
Ext I case, to the extent that their sound processing mechanisms differ from what
happens in the human ear.)
As an implication of the variance in mechanisms involved, the use of artefacts
is found to affect the purposes of human action with reliable frequency. Continuing on the earlier example, if one can build railway tunnels more affordably and
more quickly using steam drills rather than mere manpower, the reach and use of
railway traffic is likely to grow, which, in turn, may produce an array of partly
unexpected effects on the purposes of railway travel. Such effects may expand the
scope of one’s activities, or they may turn out to undermine one’s purposes, in the
same fashion as the effects of an organism’s or population’s behaviours, according to the Lewontian view of constructing environments, may equally foster and
undermine the fulfilment their biological purposes.
On the analysis of informational environments presented in Chapter 6, there are
several possible ways in which technologies concerned with the provision and processing of information might affect informational environments. If an artefact provides me with information about conditions in my environment that are relevant to
my cognitive purposes, and if that information were practically impossible or more
difficult to obtain, less complete or less reliable without the use of that artefact, or
if it adds new kinds of information to that environment, that artefact’s operations,
under the condition of its normal functioning, will have changed my informational
environment in terms of enriching it or, to refer to Kim Sterelny’s previously quoted
terminology (2003), making it more “transparent”. Conversely, if an artefact interferes with my activities of information pickup so as to make signals persistently
less reliable or even unavailable, my informational environment will have changed,
too, namely in terms of being impoverished or becoming more “opaque”.
The positive vs. negative nature of a change in informational environments
is not correlated with the purposeful vs. accidental nature of that change. On
the understanding proposed here, modifications of informational environments,
although they might be purposefully created, do not always end up being conducive to human cognitive purposes, even if deception has not been the aim.
Conversely, although changes in informational environments might result in illusionary appearances, ambiguous perceptual situations or misperception of affordances, this does not mean that they are due to processes that involve deception or
an extension of the arm in a straightforward, almost trivial manner that fits Ext I
(see p. 119 in Chapter 7), but still, it might be used in a variety of ways that are not
necessarily of the length-extension kind. At any rate, most tools and technological
artefacts will bear a more complex relation to human behaviours. Returning to
the Gunderson (1964) quotation in Chapter 1, the steam drill’s success in digging
railway tunnels did not prove that machines had muscles but only that there are
other ways of digging railway tunnels than by flexing muscles in an appropriate
way. When it comes to cognitive artefacts, there will be, as a matter of empirical fact, no such thing as an extension that is strictly instrumental in character,
although some such artefact might be conceivable. We should expect mechanisms
to be variant by default. Otherwise, we will be restricted to trivial cases, such as
spectacles or contact lenses. (Even hearing aids might not be a straightforward
Ext I case, to the extent that their sound processing mechanisms differ from what
happens in the human ear.)
As an implication of the variance in mechanisms involved, the use of artefacts
is found to affect the purposes of human action with reliable frequency. Continuing on the earlier example, if one can build railway tunnels more affordably and
more quickly using steam drills rather than mere manpower, the reach and use of
railway traffic is likely to grow, which, in turn, may produce an array of partly
unexpected effects on the purposes of railway travel. Such effects may expand the
scope of one’s activities, or they may turn out to undermine one’s purposes, in the
same fashion as the effects of an organism’s or population’s behaviours, according to the Lewontian view of constructing environments, may equally foster and
undermine the fulfilment their biological purposes.
On the analysis of informational environments presented in Chapter 6, there are
several possible ways in which technologies concerned with the provision and processing of information might affect informational environments. If an artefact provides me with information about conditions in my environment that are relevant to
my cognitive purposes, and if that information were practically impossible or more
difficult to obtain, less complete or less reliable without the use of that artefact, or
if it adds new kinds of information to that environment, that artefact’s operations,
under the condition of its normal functioning, will have changed my informational
environment in terms of enriching it or, to refer to Kim Sterelny’s previously quoted
terminology (2003), making it more “transparent”. Conversely, if an artefact interferes with my activities of information pickup so as to make signals persistently
less reliable or even unavailable, my informational environment will have changed,
too, namely in terms of being impoverished or becoming more “opaque”.
The positive vs. negative nature of a change in informational environments
is not correlated with the purposeful vs. accidental nature of that change. On
the understanding proposed here, modifications of informational environments,
although they might be purposefully created, do not always end up being conducive to human cognitive purposes, even if deception has not been the aim.
Conversely, although changes in informational environments might result in illusionary appearances, ambiguous perceptual situations or misperception of affordances, this does not mean that they are due to processes that involve deception or