118 Environments of intelligence
whether that vindication is forthcoming. In terms of an epistemological economy,
the Extended Mind Hypothesis incurs the risk of investing into a transgression of
common sense whose returns are much less than certain.
The nature of extensions
One common denominator of all non-adaptationist theories discussed earlier is that
there will be no way of determining the goals and accomplishments of an organism without in some way considering his coupling with the environment, where
this coupling will have the nature of a two-way interaction rather than the organism either manipulating or being determined by the environment. Certain entities
and conditions in the environment are relevant to the organism in such a way that
he could not exist without them and that they would not exist without him, as the
very set of relevant conditions that they are. On this set of views, the coupling
between organism and environment plays, in a non-Godfrey-Smithean sense, a
constitutive role in either of two ways: without that coupling, a trait or behaviour
would not be possible at all, or it would have to rely on different means.
Organisms with a certain degree of adaptive plasticity, that is the ability to
respond in various and partly innovative ways to a given set of problems, can be
found to alternate between using internal means and one or a variety of external
objects or tools for the same purpose, each involving different organic and behavioural resources and, possibly, differential effects on reproductive chances. For
example geographically separate populations of wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have been observed to vary in using vs. not using tools and in the kinds
of tools they use for a certain purpose, in spite of identical biological constitution and ecological similarities between the respective populations’ habitats
(Boesch 1993; Boesch and Boesch 1990; Matsuzawa 2001, Chapter 1). It has
been suggested that cultural transmission of tool-using abilities is involved here.
8
Although there is an analogy of function in these cases, both the entities involved
and the mechanisms by which they are integrated in pursuit of that function
will be at variance. The constituents of the external and internal variants of the
processes cannot be expected to be mutually substitutable. This is the minimal
sense in which extensions may become constitutive to the accomplishment of
some biological function. They will be called “constitutive W ” where required for
disambiguation.
The situation will be different in cases where there are objects and artefacts
in the environment that enter into some coupling without which a particular, and
possibly vital, accomplishment for the organism could not be attained at all. Citing a famous example, without felling trees and constructing a dam from timber,
stones and mud, so as to impede the flow of a creek and create a water reservoir,
a beaver would neither be in the position to secure himself a sufficiently large territory for foraging nor be able to find a place for building lodges sufficiently protected from terrestrial predators (Dawkins 1999, 200, 209). There is no ‘internal’
alternative for the beaver to building a dam. He does so because this is the only
way available to him to secure the presence of some of the conditions on which
he vitally depends. This is the maximal sense in which extensions may become
whether that vindication is forthcoming. In terms of an epistemological economy,
the Extended Mind Hypothesis incurs the risk of investing into a transgression of
common sense whose returns are much less than certain.
The nature of extensions
One common denominator of all non-adaptationist theories discussed earlier is that
there will be no way of determining the goals and accomplishments of an organism without in some way considering his coupling with the environment, where
this coupling will have the nature of a two-way interaction rather than the organism either manipulating or being determined by the environment. Certain entities
and conditions in the environment are relevant to the organism in such a way that
he could not exist without them and that they would not exist without him, as the
very set of relevant conditions that they are. On this set of views, the coupling
between organism and environment plays, in a non-Godfrey-Smithean sense, a
constitutive role in either of two ways: without that coupling, a trait or behaviour
would not be possible at all, or it would have to rely on different means.
Organisms with a certain degree of adaptive plasticity, that is the ability to
respond in various and partly innovative ways to a given set of problems, can be
found to alternate between using internal means and one or a variety of external
objects or tools for the same purpose, each involving different organic and behavioural resources and, possibly, differential effects on reproductive chances. For
example geographically separate populations of wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have been observed to vary in using vs. not using tools and in the kinds
of tools they use for a certain purpose, in spite of identical biological constitution and ecological similarities between the respective populations’ habitats
(Boesch 1993; Boesch and Boesch 1990; Matsuzawa 2001, Chapter 1). It has
been suggested that cultural transmission of tool-using abilities is involved here.
8
Although there is an analogy of function in these cases, both the entities involved
and the mechanisms by which they are integrated in pursuit of that function
will be at variance. The constituents of the external and internal variants of the
processes cannot be expected to be mutually substitutable. This is the minimal
sense in which extensions may become constitutive to the accomplishment of
some biological function. They will be called “constitutive W ” where required for
disambiguation.
The situation will be different in cases where there are objects and artefacts
in the environment that enter into some coupling without which a particular, and
possibly vital, accomplishment for the organism could not be attained at all. Citing a famous example, without felling trees and constructing a dam from timber,
stones and mud, so as to impede the flow of a creek and create a water reservoir,
a beaver would neither be in the position to secure himself a sufficiently large territory for foraging nor be able to find a place for building lodges sufficiently protected from terrestrial predators (Dawkins 1999, 200, 209). There is no ‘internal’
alternative for the beaver to building a dam. He does so because this is the only
way available to him to secure the presence of some of the conditions on which
he vitally depends. This is the maximal sense in which extensions may become