The extension of the extended mind 119
constitutive to some biological function: extendedness will become essential to
an explanation of the presence, rather than the mode of accomplishment, of some
core functions – and, by implication, of the nature of the organisms to which those
functions pertain. Cases of this kind will be labelled “constitutive S ”.
The constitutive S and constitutive W types of case are clearly distinct from an
interpretation of cognitive extensions in which they appear as instruments of cognition: if the cognitive function in question could be equally performed by purely
internal means, their role would be similar to that of an artefact that produces a
behavioural output identical to that of some type of human action, and that does so
on the basis of at least similar mechanisms. Internal and external elements would
be mutually substitutable without any notable effects on the performance, and the
mode of performance, of the cognitive function. If (and only if ) extensions of the
mind were supposed to be understood in such a straightforwardly instrumentalist
fashion – which, to be sure, they are not – a central point of Adams and Aizawa’s
critique of extended cognition (2001) would become tenable. The authors maintain that the causal processes involved in the use of cognitive extensions would
have to be identical to those involved in internal or “intra-cranial” cognitive processes in order to count as functionally equivalent. Because the causal processes,
as a matter of empirical fact, will be at variance, functional equivalence is not
accomplished. If, however, the extensions Clark and Chalmers have in mind are
not instrumental in nature but constitutive W to cognitive processes, the mechanisms involved in extended vs. internally based cognitive processes can be freely
acknowledged to be at variance. Adams and Aizawa hence appear to miss the entire
point of functional analogy, which is precisely not determined on the grounds of a
homology between the structures that realise some function but on the grounds of
what purpose, in terms of selected effects, the respective structures serve.
To sum up
We are presented with four different possible interpretations of the Extended
Mind Hypothesis, on two partly interdependent levels:
(Ext C ) The constitutiveness claim: entities in the environment are constitutive W
or constitutive S to the function of some cognitive trait.
(Ext I ) The instrumentalist claim: entities in the environment are instruments
that are mutually substitutable with internally based cognitive traits.
(Int S ) The strong interpretation: the Extended Mind Hypothesis shall identify
part of the necessary conditions for the presence and function of the cognitive traits in question.
(Int W ) The weak interpretation: the Extended Mind Hypothesis suggests some
conditions under which cognitive processes are best viewed as including
entities in the environment.
When introducing their hypothesis, what Clark and Chalmers appear to do is this:
they present a set of theoretical claims that speak for an interpretation under which
objects and conditions in the environment are part of the necessary conditions for
constitutive to some biological function: extendedness will become essential to
an explanation of the presence, rather than the mode of accomplishment, of some
core functions – and, by implication, of the nature of the organisms to which those
functions pertain. Cases of this kind will be labelled “constitutive S ”.
The constitutive S and constitutive W types of case are clearly distinct from an
interpretation of cognitive extensions in which they appear as instruments of cognition: if the cognitive function in question could be equally performed by purely
internal means, their role would be similar to that of an artefact that produces a
behavioural output identical to that of some type of human action, and that does so
on the basis of at least similar mechanisms. Internal and external elements would
be mutually substitutable without any notable effects on the performance, and the
mode of performance, of the cognitive function. If (and only if ) extensions of the
mind were supposed to be understood in such a straightforwardly instrumentalist
fashion – which, to be sure, they are not – a central point of Adams and Aizawa’s
critique of extended cognition (2001) would become tenable. The authors maintain that the causal processes involved in the use of cognitive extensions would
have to be identical to those involved in internal or “intra-cranial” cognitive processes in order to count as functionally equivalent. Because the causal processes,
as a matter of empirical fact, will be at variance, functional equivalence is not
accomplished. If, however, the extensions Clark and Chalmers have in mind are
not instrumental in nature but constitutive W to cognitive processes, the mechanisms involved in extended vs. internally based cognitive processes can be freely
acknowledged to be at variance. Adams and Aizawa hence appear to miss the entire
point of functional analogy, which is precisely not determined on the grounds of a
homology between the structures that realise some function but on the grounds of
what purpose, in terms of selected effects, the respective structures serve.
To sum up
We are presented with four different possible interpretations of the Extended
Mind Hypothesis, on two partly interdependent levels:
(Ext C ) The constitutiveness claim: entities in the environment are constitutive W
or constitutive S to the function of some cognitive trait.
(Ext I ) The instrumentalist claim: entities in the environment are instruments
that are mutually substitutable with internally based cognitive traits.
(Int S ) The strong interpretation: the Extended Mind Hypothesis shall identify
part of the necessary conditions for the presence and function of the cognitive traits in question.
(Int W ) The weak interpretation: the Extended Mind Hypothesis suggests some
conditions under which cognitive processes are best viewed as including
entities in the environment.
When introducing their hypothesis, what Clark and Chalmers appear to do is this:
they present a set of theoretical claims that speak for an interpretation under which
objects and conditions in the environment are part of the necessary conditions for