The extension of the extended mind 117
conceived, relate to teleofunctional theories. Still, arguments from either tradition
might help to elucidate, and possibly achieve, Clark and Chalmers’s explanatory
aims, on two levels: the epistemological status of the hypothesis (discussed under
the short form Int) and the question of the nature of extensions (discussed under
the short form Ext).
The status of epistemic claims
Although the biological theories considered here figure as predictive theories
for the most part, developmental systems theory and the theory of extended phenotypes deliberately assume a different (separate or additional) role, namely as
challenges to seemingly commonsensical perspectives on their subject matter. As
such, they might ultimately but will not necessarily result in predictive theories.
7
This dual notion of theories may serve as a template for a strong and a weak interpretation of the Extended Mind Hypothesis respectively: if, at least in important
subclasses of cases, entities and processes in the environment are indispensable
for the accomplishment or presence of some cognitive function, the expectation
will be justified that the advocate of extended cognition shall identify the necessary conditions for those objects and processes to become part of that cognitive
function while remaining impartial to what common sense might tell us. Some of
Clark’s own works (in particular 2007) as well as some complementarity-based
accounts (most notably Kiverstein and Farina 2011; Sutton 2010) aim in this
direction, in looking for real-world cases where the assumption of environmental
extendedness of cognitive processes accomplishes tangible explanatory tasks. If,
however, it is a mere matter of perspective to view some objects in the environment as components of cognitive processes, the claim is considerably weaker: it
amounts to a suggestion to temporarily suspend common-sense beliefs in order to
help us to a better understanding of some aspects of cognition.
The critique in Adams and Aizawa (2001), although not intending to capture this
point, is diagnostic of what is at issue here. The authors explicitly mount a defence
of common sense, presuming that common-sense views, qua being commonsensical, provide good guidance to cognitive inquiries. If, as Adams and Aizawa argue
in alignment with a long-standing intellectual tradition (which includes, among
many others, Karl Popper 1959 and W.V.O. Quine 1957), science is a methodical refinement and extension of common-sense reasoning, mobilising it against
overambitious flights of imagination will be useful in itself. As, however, many
scientific findings happen to defy common-sense beliefs, and as, arguably, the
advancement of science sometimes even requires transgressions of the boundaries
of common sense (as has been prominently argued by Albert Einstein 1918, along
with other physicists whose theories indeed defy common sense, as well as by
philosophers as different as Ernest Nagel 1961 and Paul Feyerabend 1975), the
force of this argument will be limited to begin with. If there are defensible reasons
for adopting a counterintuitive image of how the world stands, and if evidence
collected under the guidance of that image turns out to advance inquiry, the transgression will be vindicated. It will be difficult though to determine in advance
conceived, relate to teleofunctional theories. Still, arguments from either tradition
might help to elucidate, and possibly achieve, Clark and Chalmers’s explanatory
aims, on two levels: the epistemological status of the hypothesis (discussed under
the short form Int) and the question of the nature of extensions (discussed under
the short form Ext).
The status of epistemic claims
Although the biological theories considered here figure as predictive theories
for the most part, developmental systems theory and the theory of extended phenotypes deliberately assume a different (separate or additional) role, namely as
challenges to seemingly commonsensical perspectives on their subject matter. As
such, they might ultimately but will not necessarily result in predictive theories.
7
This dual notion of theories may serve as a template for a strong and a weak interpretation of the Extended Mind Hypothesis respectively: if, at least in important
subclasses of cases, entities and processes in the environment are indispensable
for the accomplishment or presence of some cognitive function, the expectation
will be justified that the advocate of extended cognition shall identify the necessary conditions for those objects and processes to become part of that cognitive
function while remaining impartial to what common sense might tell us. Some of
Clark’s own works (in particular 2007) as well as some complementarity-based
accounts (most notably Kiverstein and Farina 2011; Sutton 2010) aim in this
direction, in looking for real-world cases where the assumption of environmental
extendedness of cognitive processes accomplishes tangible explanatory tasks. If,
however, it is a mere matter of perspective to view some objects in the environment as components of cognitive processes, the claim is considerably weaker: it
amounts to a suggestion to temporarily suspend common-sense beliefs in order to
help us to a better understanding of some aspects of cognition.
The critique in Adams and Aizawa (2001), although not intending to capture this
point, is diagnostic of what is at issue here. The authors explicitly mount a defence
of common sense, presuming that common-sense views, qua being commonsensical, provide good guidance to cognitive inquiries. If, as Adams and Aizawa argue
in alignment with a long-standing intellectual tradition (which includes, among
many others, Karl Popper 1959 and W.V.O. Quine 1957), science is a methodical refinement and extension of common-sense reasoning, mobilising it against
overambitious flights of imagination will be useful in itself. As, however, many
scientific findings happen to defy common-sense beliefs, and as, arguably, the
advancement of science sometimes even requires transgressions of the boundaries
of common sense (as has been prominently argued by Albert Einstein 1918, along
with other physicists whose theories indeed defy common sense, as well as by
philosophers as different as Ernest Nagel 1961 and Paul Feyerabend 1975), the
force of this argument will be limited to begin with. If there are defensible reasons
for adopting a counterintuitive image of how the world stands, and if evidence
collected under the guidance of that image turns out to advance inquiry, the transgression will be vindicated. It will be difficult though to determine in advance