116 Environments of intelligence
features of, the environment. What moves into focus in his gene-centric view are
replicating gene sequences within a population and their interactions with their
intra- or extra-somatic environment. Dawkins argues that the organism might not
always be the key unit to consider when explaining patterns of genetic replication.
Instead, he suggests, an organism’s interaction with objects or other organisms
within his environment will have to be counted into the explanation of whether
and how a gene succeeds in replicating.
However, Dawkins’s alternative, explicitly metaphorical proposal re-instantiates
the notion of a unitary, individual and individualistic agent who is clearly distinguished from his external environment, albeit with a substitution of the referent of
“individual”. In many relevant cases, the manifest aims of individual organisms
will end up subordinated to their genes’ hypothetical interests. Moreover, the systematic point of adopting this view within the context of evolutionary theorising is
to highlight a possible, and perhaps the most relevant, unit of natural selection – as
the main force in evolution and the source of any goal-directedness or progress
therein. The effects that the organism’s own traits and behaviours might have on
the course of evolutionary events will not figure prominently in such an account.
Wilson and Clark (2009) expressly endorse the continuum of constructionist, anti-adaptationist theories in biology that takes issue with these implications
of Dawkinsian view, as those theories might bear more profound analogies to
some of the central claims of extended cognition.
6
Their critique of Dawkinsian
adaptationism can be unpacked into three positively stated leitmotifs: a principled openness of both evolutionary and developmental pathways, an emphasis
on supra-individual factors as explanantia, rather than explananda, for the respective theories, and the acknowledgement of the interactive nature of the organismenvironment relationship. On a first level, the notion of principled openness is
expressed in the marked abstention from postulating some unifying force that
would govern phylogeny and ontogeny. Natural selection counts as just one among
other relevant factors in evolution, and it works on various levels, from genes to
populations. Genes are just one among other relevant factors in shaping organisms
and, possibly, transmitting information between generations of a population. On a
second level, there is no reason to assume that there is such a thing as evolutionary
progress or adaptive optima. What might seem like a perfect adaptation now may
turn out to be a disadvantageous solution later, and there is no way of knowing in
advance. Ecological change might always upset historically entrenched states of
affairs. Current evolutionary states of affairs are historically contingent facts, providing no guidance as to how things should stand or where they will go next. On a
third level, ecological change, both to the better and to the worse, might be brought
about by the organisms themselves, in intended and unintended ways.
The constitution of cognitive extensions
What do the observations in the preceding section tell us about the Extended Mind
Hypothesis? After all, all parallels to the debates within evolutionary theory were
identified only in retrospect. Nor did the Extended Mind Hypothesis, as originally
features of, the environment. What moves into focus in his gene-centric view are
replicating gene sequences within a population and their interactions with their
intra- or extra-somatic environment. Dawkins argues that the organism might not
always be the key unit to consider when explaining patterns of genetic replication.
Instead, he suggests, an organism’s interaction with objects or other organisms
within his environment will have to be counted into the explanation of whether
and how a gene succeeds in replicating.
However, Dawkins’s alternative, explicitly metaphorical proposal re-instantiates
the notion of a unitary, individual and individualistic agent who is clearly distinguished from his external environment, albeit with a substitution of the referent of
“individual”. In many relevant cases, the manifest aims of individual organisms
will end up subordinated to their genes’ hypothetical interests. Moreover, the systematic point of adopting this view within the context of evolutionary theorising is
to highlight a possible, and perhaps the most relevant, unit of natural selection – as
the main force in evolution and the source of any goal-directedness or progress
therein. The effects that the organism’s own traits and behaviours might have on
the course of evolutionary events will not figure prominently in such an account.
Wilson and Clark (2009) expressly endorse the continuum of constructionist, anti-adaptationist theories in biology that takes issue with these implications
of Dawkinsian view, as those theories might bear more profound analogies to
some of the central claims of extended cognition.
6
Their critique of Dawkinsian
adaptationism can be unpacked into three positively stated leitmotifs: a principled openness of both evolutionary and developmental pathways, an emphasis
on supra-individual factors as explanantia, rather than explananda, for the respective theories, and the acknowledgement of the interactive nature of the organismenvironment relationship. On a first level, the notion of principled openness is
expressed in the marked abstention from postulating some unifying force that
would govern phylogeny and ontogeny. Natural selection counts as just one among
other relevant factors in evolution, and it works on various levels, from genes to
populations. Genes are just one among other relevant factors in shaping organisms
and, possibly, transmitting information between generations of a population. On a
second level, there is no reason to assume that there is such a thing as evolutionary
progress or adaptive optima. What might seem like a perfect adaptation now may
turn out to be a disadvantageous solution later, and there is no way of knowing in
advance. Ecological change might always upset historically entrenched states of
affairs. Current evolutionary states of affairs are historically contingent facts, providing no guidance as to how things should stand or where they will go next. On a
third level, ecological change, both to the better and to the worse, might be brought
about by the organisms themselves, in intended and unintended ways.
The constitution of cognitive extensions
What do the observations in the preceding section tell us about the Extended Mind
Hypothesis? After all, all parallels to the debates within evolutionary theory were
identified only in retrospect. Nor did the Extended Mind Hypothesis, as originally