The extension of the extended mind 115
(3) This information should be endorsed automatically, that is without requiring
further reflection on its reliability.
(4) Present endorsement of this information should be based on conscious
endorsement in the past.
The authors add a footnote to this list in which the implication of the constancy
(3) and the past endorsement (4) criteria that history is co-constitutive of cognitive
processes is countered by the suggestion that the past endorsement criterion might
be dropped and the constancy criterion be given “a purely dispositional reading”:
one is found simply to endorse the information automatically; it is not asked why.
Although this might be a sensible tactical manoeuvre in terms of catering for the
broadest possible range of extensions of the mind, relativising the latter two criteria
amounts to skirting an inquiry into the normal mechanisms of cognitive coupling.
The past endorsement criterion in particular would assimilate the argument to a
teleofunctional one: the decisive condition for past endorsement being causally
relevant to present endorsement is that the former has been successful, although it
might also have been conscious. If endorsement had not been successful, although
it might still have been conscious, there would be no endorsement at present.
Beyond tactical considerations, one possible systematic reason why the proponents of the Extended Mind Hypothesis have been reluctant to adopt a historical
account of cognitive functions is detectable in Wheeler and Clark (2008) – a contribution that actually acknowledges arguments for the rooting of cognitive extensions in evolutionary history: the authors match the dyad of extended/embodied
cognition and cultural evolution hypotheses against the tenets of evolutionary
psychology. The latter is charged with a view of evolution that takes psychological and physiological adaptations alike to be temporally remotely anchored
solutions to a predetermined set of problems posed by the environment, where
these solutions will be uniformly distributed over a species while being expressly
domain specific. Moreover, Wheeler and Clark continue, the possibility of organisms modifying their environments to fit their specific needs is not considered by
evolutionary psychologists. The basic concern here appears to be that an anchoring of cognitive extensions in past states of affairs that are beyond present cognisers’ reach – especially if the past endorsement criterion concerns the evolutionary
past – would undermine the notion of a two-way interaction that is central to their
earlier cited coupled system claim. Adaptations and the conditions to which they
respond might be more malleable and more specific to sub-populations in the
here-and-now than evolutionary psychology appears to consider.
In order to get a clearer view of what is at issue here, a brief comparative look
at Richard Dawkins’s theory of the extended phenotype (1999) and other, more
constructionist biological cousins of extended cognition, as they have been presented in Chapter 5, might help: Lewontin’s environmental constructivism, niche
construction theories and developmental systems theory. Prima facie, the parallels
between extended phenotypes and extended cognition seem striking: Dawkins not
only highlights the importance of an organism’s interaction with the environment
but also promotes the notion of biological traits extending into, or incorporating
(3) This information should be endorsed automatically, that is without requiring
further reflection on its reliability.
(4) Present endorsement of this information should be based on conscious
endorsement in the past.
The authors add a footnote to this list in which the implication of the constancy
(3) and the past endorsement (4) criteria that history is co-constitutive of cognitive
processes is countered by the suggestion that the past endorsement criterion might
be dropped and the constancy criterion be given “a purely dispositional reading”:
one is found simply to endorse the information automatically; it is not asked why.
Although this might be a sensible tactical manoeuvre in terms of catering for the
broadest possible range of extensions of the mind, relativising the latter two criteria
amounts to skirting an inquiry into the normal mechanisms of cognitive coupling.
The past endorsement criterion in particular would assimilate the argument to a
teleofunctional one: the decisive condition for past endorsement being causally
relevant to present endorsement is that the former has been successful, although it
might also have been conscious. If endorsement had not been successful, although
it might still have been conscious, there would be no endorsement at present.
Beyond tactical considerations, one possible systematic reason why the proponents of the Extended Mind Hypothesis have been reluctant to adopt a historical
account of cognitive functions is detectable in Wheeler and Clark (2008) – a contribution that actually acknowledges arguments for the rooting of cognitive extensions in evolutionary history: the authors match the dyad of extended/embodied
cognition and cultural evolution hypotheses against the tenets of evolutionary
psychology. The latter is charged with a view of evolution that takes psychological and physiological adaptations alike to be temporally remotely anchored
solutions to a predetermined set of problems posed by the environment, where
these solutions will be uniformly distributed over a species while being expressly
domain specific. Moreover, Wheeler and Clark continue, the possibility of organisms modifying their environments to fit their specific needs is not considered by
evolutionary psychologists. The basic concern here appears to be that an anchoring of cognitive extensions in past states of affairs that are beyond present cognisers’ reach – especially if the past endorsement criterion concerns the evolutionary
past – would undermine the notion of a two-way interaction that is central to their
earlier cited coupled system claim. Adaptations and the conditions to which they
respond might be more malleable and more specific to sub-populations in the
here-and-now than evolutionary psychology appears to consider.
In order to get a clearer view of what is at issue here, a brief comparative look
at Richard Dawkins’s theory of the extended phenotype (1999) and other, more
constructionist biological cousins of extended cognition, as they have been presented in Chapter 5, might help: Lewontin’s environmental constructivism, niche
construction theories and developmental systems theory. Prima facie, the parallels
between extended phenotypes and extended cognition seem striking: Dawkins not
only highlights the importance of an organism’s interaction with the environment
but also promotes the notion of biological traits extending into, or incorporating