the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
5 Ukraine
requested ITLOS—successfully—to prescribe provisional measures (i.e. the Tribunal ordering Russia to the release vessels and crew), based on the sovereign
immunity of the Ukrainian naval vessels and the Ukrainian servicemen on board.
Ultimately, any future incidents of that kind could also cause immediate negative
effects on maritime trade in the region—with a significant potential for further
international repercussions.
Forming a part of Ukraine’s non-military countermeasures, on 16 June 2014, the
Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure issued Directive No. 255, which is entitled “On
Closure of Sea Ports”.
6 This Directive liquidated the administration of five (formerly
Ukrainian-controlled) ports located in the Russian-controlled Crimean territory.
7 In
particular, the Ukrainian act intends to cut those Crimean ports off from international
shipping. Vessel calls to the affected ports can make shipowners and crews potentially subject to legal proceedings and put vessels at risk of public detention.
However, Ukraine does not currently exercise effective political control over the
Crimean ports. Consequently, it can only enforce Directive No. 255 itself (e.g. via
public detention) if a vessel first calls at a “closed” Crimean (Russian controlled) port
and then afterwards at a Ukrainian-controlled port. Since 2014, it is unclear whether
the Ukrainian Directive and the resulting closure has any potential to generate further
legal effects in other countries because legal enforcement by other States would
depend on a domestic Court’s view on which State currently represents the legitimate public authority in Crimea. In that regard, Ukraine has started several legal
proceedings against Russia not only before ITLOS but also before the European
Court of Human Rights
8 and before the Permanent Court of Arbitration
9 the details
of which cannot, however, be discussed further in this paper.
Further sanctions regimes as applied both by the European Union (EU) and the
United States in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea complicate the current
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force
16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3.
6 The Directive had been adopted following Resolution No. 578-p of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine (April 30, 2014) covering issues of sea and river transportation and in pursuance of general
rules provided under the Law of Ukraine, No. 1207-VII “On Assurance of Rights and Freedoms and
Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine”; for further information see the
web-portal of the Ukrainian Government http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art_
id¼247438758.
7 The five closed ports are Kerch, Theodosia, Sevastopol, Yalta and Evpatoria.
8 Ukraine v. Russia (VIII) (application no. no. 55855/18) concerning events on the Kerch Strait in
November 2018; Ukraine v. Russia (VII) (application no. 38334/18) alleging the politically
motivated detention and prosecution of Ukrainian nationals on various criminal charges; Ukraine
v. Russia (re Crimea) (application no. 20958/14); Ukraine v. Russia (re Eastern Ukraine) (no. 8019/
16); Ukraine v. Russia (II) (application no. 43800/14) on the alleged abduction of three groups of
children in Eastern Ukraine and their temporary transfer to Russia on three occasions between June
and August 2014.
9 Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine
v. the Russian Federation), see https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/149/.
Sanctions Compliance Risks in International Shipping: Closure of Five. . .
291
5 Ukraine
requested ITLOS—successfully—to prescribe provisional measures (i.e. the Tribunal ordering Russia to the release vessels and crew), based on the sovereign
immunity of the Ukrainian naval vessels and the Ukrainian servicemen on board.
Ultimately, any future incidents of that kind could also cause immediate negative
effects on maritime trade in the region—with a significant potential for further
international repercussions.
Forming a part of Ukraine’s non-military countermeasures, on 16 June 2014, the
Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure issued Directive No. 255, which is entitled “On
Closure of Sea Ports”.
6 This Directive liquidated the administration of five (formerly
Ukrainian-controlled) ports located in the Russian-controlled Crimean territory.
7 In
particular, the Ukrainian act intends to cut those Crimean ports off from international
shipping. Vessel calls to the affected ports can make shipowners and crews potentially subject to legal proceedings and put vessels at risk of public detention.
However, Ukraine does not currently exercise effective political control over the
Crimean ports. Consequently, it can only enforce Directive No. 255 itself (e.g. via
public detention) if a vessel first calls at a “closed” Crimean (Russian controlled) port
and then afterwards at a Ukrainian-controlled port. Since 2014, it is unclear whether
the Ukrainian Directive and the resulting closure has any potential to generate further
legal effects in other countries because legal enforcement by other States would
depend on a domestic Court’s view on which State currently represents the legitimate public authority in Crimea. In that regard, Ukraine has started several legal
proceedings against Russia not only before ITLOS but also before the European
Court of Human Rights
8 and before the Permanent Court of Arbitration
9 the details
of which cannot, however, be discussed further in this paper.
Further sanctions regimes as applied both by the European Union (EU) and the
United States in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea complicate the current
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force
16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3.
6 The Directive had been adopted following Resolution No. 578-p of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine (April 30, 2014) covering issues of sea and river transportation and in pursuance of general
rules provided under the Law of Ukraine, No. 1207-VII “On Assurance of Rights and Freedoms and
Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine”; for further information see the
web-portal of the Ukrainian Government http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art_
id¼247438758.
7 The five closed ports are Kerch, Theodosia, Sevastopol, Yalta and Evpatoria.
8 Ukraine v. Russia (VIII) (application no. no. 55855/18) concerning events on the Kerch Strait in
November 2018; Ukraine v. Russia (VII) (application no. 38334/18) alleging the politically
motivated detention and prosecution of Ukrainian nationals on various criminal charges; Ukraine
v. Russia (re Crimea) (application no. 20958/14); Ukraine v. Russia (re Eastern Ukraine) (no. 8019/
16); Ukraine v. Russia (II) (application no. 43800/14) on the alleged abduction of three groups of
children in Eastern Ukraine and their temporary transfer to Russia on three occasions between June
and August 2014.
9 Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine
v. the Russian Federation), see https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/149/.
Sanctions Compliance Risks in International Shipping: Closure of Five. . .
291