trading and carrying goods by sea and of safeguarding commercial transactions from
political risks.
1 Introduction
In March 2014, followed by a short military intervention, the Russian Federation
annexed the peninsula of Crimea (a territory of about 27,000 km
2 inhabited by about
2.35 million people) and took control over the adjacent sea areas, both in the Black
Sea and in the Sea of Azov which are connected via the narrow, strategically
important, Kerch Strait (off eastern Crimea). Under sovereignty aspects, Crimea
indisputably represented a part of the Ukrainian territory before 2014. However,
Russia characterized the 2014 events rather as a “re-integration” of Crimea to the
mainland of the Russian Federation, in adherence of the principle of selfdetermination of peoples.
1 Since March 2014, Russia administers the Crimean
Federal District de facto as two federal subjects (i.e., the peninsula’s mainland as
the “Autonomous Republic of Crimea” and, politically separated, the city of
Sevastopol).
It is not the objective of this paper to delineate the sensitive legal lines between an
externally-forced “annexation” and a self-determined “integration” under public
international law.
2 Rather, the focus of the analysis is set on resulting practical
effects of the events of March 2014 for maritime trade and international shipping. It
has to be highlighted that both Ukrainian and Russian ports—some of them only
accessible through the narrow Kerch Strait—are important hubs for international
wheat, grain and corn trade as well as for trading commodities in bulk, such as metals
and minerals.
3 Four years after the events of 2014, an incident on 25 November 2018
evidenced once more a significant potential for eruptions of hostilities at sea in this
area: Russian Coast Guard patrol boats intercepted and seized three Ukrainian naval
ships, including their crew members.
4 In April 2019, this incident gave rise to Case
No. 26 of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): Ukraine
initiated a prompt release of vessel procedure pursuant to Article 290 para. 5 of
1 As embodied in Article 1, para. 2 of the Charter of United Nations, see generally Tomuschat
(2006), pp. 23–45.
2 Remarkably, the legally non-binding UN General Assembly Resolution of 27 March 2014 on the
“Territorial Integrity of Ukraine” eschews the term “annexation”, see UN Res. A/RES/68/262 of
1 April 2014 68/262. However, it calls upon all States “to desist and refrain from actions aimed at
the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including
any attempts to modify Ukraine’s borders through the threat or use of force or other unlawful
means.”
3 Ukraine’s two Sea of Azov ports handle (only) about 5% of total grain exports of the country,
while Russia handles a remarkable 40% of its grain exports through its Sea of Azov ports, the
biggest one being the port of Rostov, see Lloyds List of 26 November, 2018 (“Russia reopens
Kerch Strait to shipping after vessels seized”).
4 See a thorough discussion of the events by Kraska (2018).
290
H. Jessen
political risks.
1 Introduction
In March 2014, followed by a short military intervention, the Russian Federation
annexed the peninsula of Crimea (a territory of about 27,000 km
2 inhabited by about
2.35 million people) and took control over the adjacent sea areas, both in the Black
Sea and in the Sea of Azov which are connected via the narrow, strategically
important, Kerch Strait (off eastern Crimea). Under sovereignty aspects, Crimea
indisputably represented a part of the Ukrainian territory before 2014. However,
Russia characterized the 2014 events rather as a “re-integration” of Crimea to the
mainland of the Russian Federation, in adherence of the principle of selfdetermination of peoples.
1 Since March 2014, Russia administers the Crimean
Federal District de facto as two federal subjects (i.e., the peninsula’s mainland as
the “Autonomous Republic of Crimea” and, politically separated, the city of
Sevastopol).
It is not the objective of this paper to delineate the sensitive legal lines between an
externally-forced “annexation” and a self-determined “integration” under public
international law.
2 Rather, the focus of the analysis is set on resulting practical
effects of the events of March 2014 for maritime trade and international shipping. It
has to be highlighted that both Ukrainian and Russian ports—some of them only
accessible through the narrow Kerch Strait—are important hubs for international
wheat, grain and corn trade as well as for trading commodities in bulk, such as metals
and minerals.
3 Four years after the events of 2014, an incident on 25 November 2018
evidenced once more a significant potential for eruptions of hostilities at sea in this
area: Russian Coast Guard patrol boats intercepted and seized three Ukrainian naval
ships, including their crew members.
4 In April 2019, this incident gave rise to Case
No. 26 of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): Ukraine
initiated a prompt release of vessel procedure pursuant to Article 290 para. 5 of
1 As embodied in Article 1, para. 2 of the Charter of United Nations, see generally Tomuschat
(2006), pp. 23–45.
2 Remarkably, the legally non-binding UN General Assembly Resolution of 27 March 2014 on the
“Territorial Integrity of Ukraine” eschews the term “annexation”, see UN Res. A/RES/68/262 of
1 April 2014 68/262. However, it calls upon all States “to desist and refrain from actions aimed at
the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including
any attempts to modify Ukraine’s borders through the threat or use of force or other unlawful
means.”
3 Ukraine’s two Sea of Azov ports handle (only) about 5% of total grain exports of the country,
while Russia handles a remarkable 40% of its grain exports through its Sea of Azov ports, the
biggest one being the port of Rostov, see Lloyds List of 26 November, 2018 (“Russia reopens
Kerch Strait to shipping after vessels seized”).
4 See a thorough discussion of the events by Kraska (2018).
290
H. Jessen