legal situation significantly. All sanctions regimes combined—in respect of the
situation discussed here—have been initially characterised and criticised as
“opaque”.
10 Moreover, at least for the period of 2014 and 2016, valid statistics
evidenced that vessel calls to the “closed” (formerly Ukrainian-controlled) Crimean
ports had not slumped significantly.
11 One of the reasons for this rather surprising
assessment is the fact that enforcement of any applicable sanctions ultimately
depends on different legal perceptions of national States. A good example of
practical legal difficulties—arising partly also from the “bottleneck” geography in
the region—is the problem generated by vessels transiting the Kerch Strait and
paying pilotage fees to the local (Russian-controlled) port authority. This potentially
violates applicable sanctions regimes even if the affected vessels’ destination is
another port in the Sea of Azov which connects the Black Sea to ports of both
Ukraine and Russia.
Against this backdrop, this chapter will highlight some of the current legal and
practical problems for international shipping associated with the Ukraine sanctions
regime as it has been introduced since mid-2014 and as it seems to persist now for an
indefinite future. Because of the (unfortunate) fact that multilateral and unilateral
sanctions represent a global compliance challenge for any commercial activity, a
wider perspective is taken at the end of the paper which shall extend beyond the
situation of Crimea and the Sea of Azov. The author shall apply aspects of public
international law as well as a “compliance-oriented” view, i.e., from the perspective
of trading and carrying goods by sea and of safeguarding commercial transactions
from political risks.
2 The Public Law Dimension: Changing Face of Sanctions
2.1 Preliminary Remarks
Generally, the use of economic instruments—applied unilaterally by States or
multilaterally by the international community—as a reaction to political crises is
nothing new at all.
12 In fact, according to Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security
Council has the power to impose legally binding obligations on UN Member States
to take multilateral non-forcible measures in response to a threat to international
peace and security.
13 Quite often, these “non-forcible” countermeasures take the
10 See, e.g., the Lloyd’s List front page of 1 February 2016a: “Worth the Risk?”.
11 See the 2016b Lloyd’s List special report “Turning a blind eye on Crimea”, available online at
https://www.lloydslist.com/ll/topic/ukraine/.
12 This is despite the fact that the (non-binding) United Nations Friendly Relations Declaration
(2625 (XXV)) actually postulates that “[N]o State may use or encourage the use of economic,
political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.”
13 See generally, e.g., Delbrück (1977); Gasser (1996), p. 871.
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H. Jessen
situation discussed here—have been initially characterised and criticised as
“opaque”.
10 Moreover, at least for the period of 2014 and 2016, valid statistics
evidenced that vessel calls to the “closed” (formerly Ukrainian-controlled) Crimean
ports had not slumped significantly.
11 One of the reasons for this rather surprising
assessment is the fact that enforcement of any applicable sanctions ultimately
depends on different legal perceptions of national States. A good example of
practical legal difficulties—arising partly also from the “bottleneck” geography in
the region—is the problem generated by vessels transiting the Kerch Strait and
paying pilotage fees to the local (Russian-controlled) port authority. This potentially
violates applicable sanctions regimes even if the affected vessels’ destination is
another port in the Sea of Azov which connects the Black Sea to ports of both
Ukraine and Russia.
Against this backdrop, this chapter will highlight some of the current legal and
practical problems for international shipping associated with the Ukraine sanctions
regime as it has been introduced since mid-2014 and as it seems to persist now for an
indefinite future. Because of the (unfortunate) fact that multilateral and unilateral
sanctions represent a global compliance challenge for any commercial activity, a
wider perspective is taken at the end of the paper which shall extend beyond the
situation of Crimea and the Sea of Azov. The author shall apply aspects of public
international law as well as a “compliance-oriented” view, i.e., from the perspective
of trading and carrying goods by sea and of safeguarding commercial transactions
from political risks.
2 The Public Law Dimension: Changing Face of Sanctions
2.1 Preliminary Remarks
Generally, the use of economic instruments—applied unilaterally by States or
multilaterally by the international community—as a reaction to political crises is
nothing new at all.
12 In fact, according to Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security
Council has the power to impose legally binding obligations on UN Member States
to take multilateral non-forcible measures in response to a threat to international
peace and security.
13 Quite often, these “non-forcible” countermeasures take the
10 See, e.g., the Lloyd’s List front page of 1 February 2016a: “Worth the Risk?”.
11 See the 2016b Lloyd’s List special report “Turning a blind eye on Crimea”, available online at
https://www.lloydslist.com/ll/topic/ukraine/.
12 This is despite the fact that the (non-binding) United Nations Friendly Relations Declaration
(2625 (XXV)) actually postulates that “[N]o State may use or encourage the use of economic,
political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.”
13 See generally, e.g., Delbrück (1977); Gasser (1996), p. 871.
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H. Jessen