3.2 Theories of Conflict and Cooperation Over Transboundary Watercourses
23
3.2.4.2 Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Security
Countries often feel that cooperation over transboundary watercourses and lakes
affects core concerns of statehood such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and security (Dinar 2008). The sovereignty implications of the management of transboundary
waters, however, vary greatly with region and issue. In areas characterised by high
political tensions or a history of unilateralism, entering into legally regulated or institutionalised cooperation over shared rivers may give rise to a suspicion of external
intrusion or a concern to surrender decision-making power to a supranational entity
(Subramanian et al. 2014). Such complacency is more characteristic of upstream
states, especially, if they follow the concept of extreme territorial sovereignty over
natural resources or they perceive that a planned agreement would cede some control
over the flow of water to downstream users.
3 Interestingly, such strong sentiment of
exposure and vulnerability often emerges very intensely among the constituent units
of federal countries, rendering shared river basin management a major test of federal
systems of governance (Garrick et al. 2014).
Naturally, not all water-related issues have strong sovereignty or security implications. Empirical evidence suggests that many of the most prevalent transboundary
water challenges are relatively neutral or even “benign” in nature. Cooperation over
such issues as navigation or flood management is usually perceived by riparian states
as mutually beneficial. On the other hand, certain questions, especially those relating
to water quantity and water allocation have a very strong conflict potential, particularly in areas where water resources are scarce or under intensive human pressures.
Such “malign” water issues are therefore treated as highly relevant for national security, a factor that may weaken the prospects of effective cooperation.
3.2.4.3 The Geopolitical Setting and Non-water-Related Political
Integration
The aggregate political and economic power of the countries concerned may play a
crucial role in transboundary water relations too. Significant imbalances in regional
power relationships may impede or foster cooperation, depending on the position of
the hegemonic actor in the basin. The presence or the lack of major power asymmetries in the watershed and the behaviour of the regional hegemon is likely to
determine the nature and structure of the relevant hydropolitical regime (Zeitoun
and Warner 2006). Thus, where no major power asymmetries exist, states are likely
to create egalitarian basin-wide cooperation regimes. Such arrangements normally
emerge in wider political settings such as the European Union (Rees 2010). However, in regions dominated by a regional hegemon such parity may not be in the
interest of the hegemonic party, if it implies relinquishing existing control or influ3 E.g. in the Ganges basin signing an agreement that guaranteed flows of the river to Bangladesh
was perceived as a risk by India as it recognised the right of the downstream riparian to certain
flows from the Farakka dam (Subramanian et al. 2014).
23
3.2.4.2 Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Security
Countries often feel that cooperation over transboundary watercourses and lakes
affects core concerns of statehood such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and security (Dinar 2008). The sovereignty implications of the management of transboundary
waters, however, vary greatly with region and issue. In areas characterised by high
political tensions or a history of unilateralism, entering into legally regulated or institutionalised cooperation over shared rivers may give rise to a suspicion of external
intrusion or a concern to surrender decision-making power to a supranational entity
(Subramanian et al. 2014). Such complacency is more characteristic of upstream
states, especially, if they follow the concept of extreme territorial sovereignty over
natural resources or they perceive that a planned agreement would cede some control
over the flow of water to downstream users.
3 Interestingly, such strong sentiment of
exposure and vulnerability often emerges very intensely among the constituent units
of federal countries, rendering shared river basin management a major test of federal
systems of governance (Garrick et al. 2014).
Naturally, not all water-related issues have strong sovereignty or security implications. Empirical evidence suggests that many of the most prevalent transboundary
water challenges are relatively neutral or even “benign” in nature. Cooperation over
such issues as navigation or flood management is usually perceived by riparian states
as mutually beneficial. On the other hand, certain questions, especially those relating
to water quantity and water allocation have a very strong conflict potential, particularly in areas where water resources are scarce or under intensive human pressures.
Such “malign” water issues are therefore treated as highly relevant for national security, a factor that may weaken the prospects of effective cooperation.
3.2.4.3 The Geopolitical Setting and Non-water-Related Political
Integration
The aggregate political and economic power of the countries concerned may play a
crucial role in transboundary water relations too. Significant imbalances in regional
power relationships may impede or foster cooperation, depending on the position of
the hegemonic actor in the basin. The presence or the lack of major power asymmetries in the watershed and the behaviour of the regional hegemon is likely to
determine the nature and structure of the relevant hydropolitical regime (Zeitoun
and Warner 2006). Thus, where no major power asymmetries exist, states are likely
to create egalitarian basin-wide cooperation regimes. Such arrangements normally
emerge in wider political settings such as the European Union (Rees 2010). However, in regions dominated by a regional hegemon such parity may not be in the
interest of the hegemonic party, if it implies relinquishing existing control or influ3 E.g. in the Ganges basin signing an agreement that guaranteed flows of the river to Bangladesh
was perceived as a risk by India as it recognised the right of the downstream riparian to certain
flows from the Farakka dam (Subramanian et al. 2014).