24
3 Theories of Conflict and Cooperation Over …
ence over water resources (Newton 2014). Especially, where the regional hegemon
lays upstream (e.g. China → Mekong, India → Indus, Turkey → Tigris) the likelihood that it will unilaterally exploit its position remains high. In such basins the
regional hydropolitical regime is likely to be dominative with no pretence of equality.
On the other hand, where the regional power lays downstream, it may find it more
beneficial to become the engine of cooperation (e.g. South Africa in the framework
of the Southern African Development Community) (Dinar 2008).
It must be underlined, however, that the mere location of a hegemon in the basin is
not a necessary precursor to either conflict or cooperation. There are several examples
where the upstream regional power is a real driver of cooperation (e.g. in the USMexico context). Equally, experience shows that downstream hegemons can have
significant interests in blocking, rather than fostering broader transboundary cooperative arrangements so as to exploit upstream political division to its own benefit
(e.g. Egypt in the Nile basin) (Schmeier 2013). In any case, the lack of major power
imbalances in the basin tends to be conducive of creating resilient cooperation mechanisms even among a large number of riparian countries (Danube, Lower Mekong,
etc.).
3.2.4.4 The Level of Economic Development and the Economic
Importance of the River
Different levels and/or dynamics of national development in the same basin can
also become important drivers of tension or cooperation. The increasing water
demand of a fast developing riparian inevitably leads to stronger competition for the
same resource. Not surprisingly, as explained above, most water conflicts are therefore triggered by water allocation and infrastructure development (see Sect. 3.2.4).
On the other hand, more developed regions with limited or controllable urbanisation/developmental/population pressures tend to have better political and technological capabilities to manage a shared river basin (Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009).
The actual economic importance of the shared water resources at issue also influences the dynamics of co-riparian relations. Arid downstream countries whose supplies depend on the headwaters of large transboundary rivers (e.g. Nile → Egypt,
Tigris-Euphrates → Iraq) are particularly sensitive to any upstream manipulation of
river flow or water quality. The economic importance of a river is not necessarily
linked to its geographical position as peripheral rivers can also play vital roles in a
nation’s economy (e.g. the Republic of Moldova only controls 450(!) meters of the
shore of the Danube at the outermost corner of the country, yet it hosts the nation’s
only port accessible by seagoing vessels).
3.2.4.5 Domestic Issues
Internal issues, such as domestic political rivalry, identity or national values may
also hamper efforts of transboundary water cooperation. The strong political and
3 Theories of Conflict and Cooperation Over …
ence over water resources (Newton 2014). Especially, where the regional hegemon
lays upstream (e.g. China → Mekong, India → Indus, Turkey → Tigris) the likelihood that it will unilaterally exploit its position remains high. In such basins the
regional hydropolitical regime is likely to be dominative with no pretence of equality.
On the other hand, where the regional power lays downstream, it may find it more
beneficial to become the engine of cooperation (e.g. South Africa in the framework
of the Southern African Development Community) (Dinar 2008).
It must be underlined, however, that the mere location of a hegemon in the basin is
not a necessary precursor to either conflict or cooperation. There are several examples
where the upstream regional power is a real driver of cooperation (e.g. in the USMexico context). Equally, experience shows that downstream hegemons can have
significant interests in blocking, rather than fostering broader transboundary cooperative arrangements so as to exploit upstream political division to its own benefit
(e.g. Egypt in the Nile basin) (Schmeier 2013). In any case, the lack of major power
imbalances in the basin tends to be conducive of creating resilient cooperation mechanisms even among a large number of riparian countries (Danube, Lower Mekong,
etc.).
3.2.4.4 The Level of Economic Development and the Economic
Importance of the River
Different levels and/or dynamics of national development in the same basin can
also become important drivers of tension or cooperation. The increasing water
demand of a fast developing riparian inevitably leads to stronger competition for the
same resource. Not surprisingly, as explained above, most water conflicts are therefore triggered by water allocation and infrastructure development (see Sect. 3.2.4).
On the other hand, more developed regions with limited or controllable urbanisation/developmental/population pressures tend to have better political and technological capabilities to manage a shared river basin (Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009).
The actual economic importance of the shared water resources at issue also influences the dynamics of co-riparian relations. Arid downstream countries whose supplies depend on the headwaters of large transboundary rivers (e.g. Nile → Egypt,
Tigris-Euphrates → Iraq) are particularly sensitive to any upstream manipulation of
river flow or water quality. The economic importance of a river is not necessarily
linked to its geographical position as peripheral rivers can also play vital roles in a
nation’s economy (e.g. the Republic of Moldova only controls 450(!) meters of the
shore of the Danube at the outermost corner of the country, yet it hosts the nation’s
only port accessible by seagoing vessels).
3.2.4.5 Domestic Issues
Internal issues, such as domestic political rivalry, identity or national values may
also hamper efforts of transboundary water cooperation. The strong political and