3.2 Theories of Conflict and Cooperation Over Transboundary Watercourses
21
They argue that mutual interdependencies among basin states and the limited
chance of success through violence create powerful incentives for states to cooperate
even over the most difficult water-related issues. This is eloquently demonstrated
by the fact that riparian states of arid basins—particularly prone to clashes over
water according to the realist view—indeed display high level of cooperation under
institutional arrangements that tend to survive otherwise strained interstate relations
(Wolf 2009). Thus, the cooperative school of hydropolitics follows an institutionalist
approach in so far as it views the existence of formal basin arrangements (treaties,
institutions, mechanisms) as the main token of the stability of co-riparian relations
for they provide the platform to turn collective action problems into cooperation
(Schmeier 2013).
3.2.3.3 Moving Beyond the Conflict and Cooperation Divide
The institutionalist school of hydropolitics has been hugely successful in disproving
the water wars theory and in identifying the drivers of transboundary water cooperation. Yet, there are several large river basins in the world that experience a “no
war, no cooperation” phenomenon. These are where significant cooperation gaps
exist, yet the situation does not evolve into a serious conflict either. This paradox
has given rise to a new generation of hydropolitical research that relies on the observation that conflict and cooperation are not necessarily contradictory, but can occur
simultaneously (Schmeier 2013).
New approaches to transboundary water politics also emerge outside the traditional hydropolitical schools. Game theory and economic analyses of basin state
conduct have recently made important contributions to explaining why states choose
to cooperate over shared water resources. Several authors have analysed the cooperation of riparian states through their strategic interactions (i.e. the impact of basin
state behaviour on others) and come to the conclusion that states can maximise their
use of the shared nature resource (“pay-offs” in game theory jargon) only by way
of establishing cooperative arrangements (e.g. Dinar 2008; Dombrowsky 2009). For
an arrangement like that to be workable, however, it should be based on an incentive
structure and institutional design that guarantees that no party can gain by leaving
the agreement or by failing to comply. In other words, the success of cooperation is
based on the presumption that the participating states can maximise their collective
payoffs with regards to the shared river only together (Dinar 2008).
3.2.4 Geographical and Political Variables Influencing
Interstate Cooperation
The above theories explain state conduct with regards to shared water resources in
broad general terms. There exists, however, a number of variables that in specific
21
They argue that mutual interdependencies among basin states and the limited
chance of success through violence create powerful incentives for states to cooperate
even over the most difficult water-related issues. This is eloquently demonstrated
by the fact that riparian states of arid basins—particularly prone to clashes over
water according to the realist view—indeed display high level of cooperation under
institutional arrangements that tend to survive otherwise strained interstate relations
(Wolf 2009). Thus, the cooperative school of hydropolitics follows an institutionalist
approach in so far as it views the existence of formal basin arrangements (treaties,
institutions, mechanisms) as the main token of the stability of co-riparian relations
for they provide the platform to turn collective action problems into cooperation
(Schmeier 2013).
3.2.3.3 Moving Beyond the Conflict and Cooperation Divide
The institutionalist school of hydropolitics has been hugely successful in disproving
the water wars theory and in identifying the drivers of transboundary water cooperation. Yet, there are several large river basins in the world that experience a “no
war, no cooperation” phenomenon. These are where significant cooperation gaps
exist, yet the situation does not evolve into a serious conflict either. This paradox
has given rise to a new generation of hydropolitical research that relies on the observation that conflict and cooperation are not necessarily contradictory, but can occur
simultaneously (Schmeier 2013).
New approaches to transboundary water politics also emerge outside the traditional hydropolitical schools. Game theory and economic analyses of basin state
conduct have recently made important contributions to explaining why states choose
to cooperate over shared water resources. Several authors have analysed the cooperation of riparian states through their strategic interactions (i.e. the impact of basin
state behaviour on others) and come to the conclusion that states can maximise their
use of the shared nature resource (“pay-offs” in game theory jargon) only by way
of establishing cooperative arrangements (e.g. Dinar 2008; Dombrowsky 2009). For
an arrangement like that to be workable, however, it should be based on an incentive
structure and institutional design that guarantees that no party can gain by leaving
the agreement or by failing to comply. In other words, the success of cooperation is
based on the presumption that the participating states can maximise their collective
payoffs with regards to the shared river only together (Dinar 2008).
3.2.4 Geographical and Political Variables Influencing
Interstate Cooperation
The above theories explain state conduct with regards to shared water resources in
broad general terms. There exists, however, a number of variables that in specific