20
3 Theories of Conflict and Cooperation Over …
may augment tensions among riparian states. These include the relative power of
basin states and their respective location, the presence of negative transboundary
impacts (other than unsatisfactory allocation) or interlinkages between water and
other issues (Schmeier 2013). Psychological factors, such (the perceived) exposure
to unilateral overexploitation or degradation of the resource by another riparian also
make countries more prone to conflict (Elhance 1999).
Despite its popular appeal, however, the water war thesis has turned out to be
largely unfounded. While the potential for conflict undeniably exists, water war theorists have been rightly criticised as alarmists whose conclusions have been based
more on speculation than examination of how water relates to conflict. Empirical
research by Aaron Wolf and his team at the Oregon State University have unambiguously demonstrated that water wars are neither prevalent, nor inevitable. Water
war theorists wrongly based their arguments on a number of conflicts confined to the
Middle East which displays a rare and particularly flammable combination of water
scarcity and political instability. In reality, cooperative engagements among riparian
states grossly outnumber water-related incidents worldwide. Armed conflicts triggered directly by water are even less common, with the last recorded hostility having
ended in the 1970s (Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009).
Theoretical arguments also support cooperation, rather than conflict over shared
water resources. Wolf contends that launching military action for water would only
make sense by a downstream regional hegemon against a weaker upstream riparian.
There are only a few river basins in the world where such a scenario may become
plausible at all (e.g. Nile, La Plata). Even in such cases, however, the political,
economic and human costs of an armed intervention would be disproportionately
high for a natural resource that, in many cases, is relatively cheap to obtain through
other methods, e.g. seawater desalination (Delli Perscoli and Wolf 2009).
2
3.2.3.2 Institutionalism and the Cooperation Imperative
The prevalence of the water wars thesis throughout the 1980s and 1990s has given
rise to a new school of hydropolitical research focusing on the cooperative potential
of international rivers. The cooperation school significantly expanded the empirical
research base of the water wars theorists, focusing on legal and institutional arrangements that bode for the stability of riparian relations. The large body of qualitative
analyses carried out by Aaron Wolf, Arun Elhance, Anthony Turton, etc. has led to
the development of a number of theoretical conclusions that provide an explanation
as to why cooperation, rather than conflict, dominates co-riparian relations in most
parts of the world.
2 “Why go to war over water? For the price of one week’s fighting, you could build five desalination
plants. No loss of life, no international pressure, and a reliable supply you don’t have to defend
in hostile territory” (Israeli Defence Forces analyst responsible for long-term planning during the
1982 invasion of Lebanon). Quoted in Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009.
3 Theories of Conflict and Cooperation Over …
may augment tensions among riparian states. These include the relative power of
basin states and their respective location, the presence of negative transboundary
impacts (other than unsatisfactory allocation) or interlinkages between water and
other issues (Schmeier 2013). Psychological factors, such (the perceived) exposure
to unilateral overexploitation or degradation of the resource by another riparian also
make countries more prone to conflict (Elhance 1999).
Despite its popular appeal, however, the water war thesis has turned out to be
largely unfounded. While the potential for conflict undeniably exists, water war theorists have been rightly criticised as alarmists whose conclusions have been based
more on speculation than examination of how water relates to conflict. Empirical
research by Aaron Wolf and his team at the Oregon State University have unambiguously demonstrated that water wars are neither prevalent, nor inevitable. Water
war theorists wrongly based their arguments on a number of conflicts confined to the
Middle East which displays a rare and particularly flammable combination of water
scarcity and political instability. In reality, cooperative engagements among riparian
states grossly outnumber water-related incidents worldwide. Armed conflicts triggered directly by water are even less common, with the last recorded hostility having
ended in the 1970s (Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009).
Theoretical arguments also support cooperation, rather than conflict over shared
water resources. Wolf contends that launching military action for water would only
make sense by a downstream regional hegemon against a weaker upstream riparian.
There are only a few river basins in the world where such a scenario may become
plausible at all (e.g. Nile, La Plata). Even in such cases, however, the political,
economic and human costs of an armed intervention would be disproportionately
high for a natural resource that, in many cases, is relatively cheap to obtain through
other methods, e.g. seawater desalination (Delli Perscoli and Wolf 2009).
2
3.2.3.2 Institutionalism and the Cooperation Imperative
The prevalence of the water wars thesis throughout the 1980s and 1990s has given
rise to a new school of hydropolitical research focusing on the cooperative potential
of international rivers. The cooperation school significantly expanded the empirical
research base of the water wars theorists, focusing on legal and institutional arrangements that bode for the stability of riparian relations. The large body of qualitative
analyses carried out by Aaron Wolf, Arun Elhance, Anthony Turton, etc. has led to
the development of a number of theoretical conclusions that provide an explanation
as to why cooperation, rather than conflict, dominates co-riparian relations in most
parts of the world.
2 “Why go to war over water? For the price of one week’s fighting, you could build five desalination
plants. No loss of life, no international pressure, and a reliable supply you don’t have to defend
in hostile territory” (Israeli Defence Forces analyst responsible for long-term planning during the
1982 invasion of Lebanon). Quoted in Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009.