56 Laura Sembritzki
in assisting the regional government to ensure radiation safety within the
contaminated areas along the Techa and within the area that were affected
by the accident in 1957. Nevertheless, the regional government also sought
advice from the ChLenNIIRG with respect to the need to resettle several
villages as in the case of the villages Tatarskaia Karabolka and Bagariak.
Both villages, Tatarskaia Karabolka and Bagariak, are located in areas
affected by radioactivity. Tatarskaia Karabolka, as the name indicates, lies on
the river Karabolka within the government district of Kunashakskii with an
above-average population of Tatars. Bagariak lies in the government district
Bagariakskii, the area affected by the accident in 1957. Medical and dosimetric staff monitored the health and living conditions repeatedly in both
villages after the release of radioactivity in the environment. 34 Their reports
caused E. Rask, the main engineer of the special (de)construction department on February 6, 1960, to send E.V. Mamontov, the deputy chairman of
the Chelyabinsk regional executive committee, a request for more money:
according to this letter, Churin, the deputy minister of Sredmash, should
provide more money for the evacuation of the villages Tatarskaia Karabolka
and Bagariak. 35
For his enquiry, Rask relied heavily on recommendations issued by the
ChLenNIIRG. According to their analysis, high concentrations of radioactivity in the villages, meadows, and the river “K” [Karabolka] would
make the continuation of living there dangerous. Cases of radiation sickness occurred among the villagers and requests about evacuation reached
the local authorities. Therefore, the ChLenNIIRG had recommended the
immediate evacuation of both villages, and, in addition, for the village
Nizhne-Petropavlovskoe. 36
Rask further pointed out that despite a Postanovlenie by the Council of
Ministers released in November 1957, 37 the USSR Ministry of Public Health,
Sredmash, and the USSR Academy of Sciences should have indicated the
further possibility to live in the territory of the river “K” [Karabolka]
and “T” [Techa] within a year. However, since then – about two and a
half years later – there was from not one of the named authorities a single
recommendation on this specific issue. Accordingly, the regional executive committee had to rely completely on the recommendations issued by
ChLenNIIRG. 38
Eventually, no resettlements were carried out. However, the regional
administration used the radiation expertise of the ChLenNIIRG to confront Moscow and to request that actions be taken to prevent further harm.
However, in this case, recommendations issued by the ChLenNIIRG were
ignored in Moscow and not realized respectively. The whole issue is the
subject of current discussion. Inhabitants from affected villages in the Oblast’
Chelyabinsk, after becoming aware of their exposure in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, organized human rights activist groups to become informed
about the scope and severity of exposure in the past, health effects, and (the
lack of ) evacuations. 39
in assisting the regional government to ensure radiation safety within the
contaminated areas along the Techa and within the area that were affected
by the accident in 1957. Nevertheless, the regional government also sought
advice from the ChLenNIIRG with respect to the need to resettle several
villages as in the case of the villages Tatarskaia Karabolka and Bagariak.
Both villages, Tatarskaia Karabolka and Bagariak, are located in areas
affected by radioactivity. Tatarskaia Karabolka, as the name indicates, lies on
the river Karabolka within the government district of Kunashakskii with an
above-average population of Tatars. Bagariak lies in the government district
Bagariakskii, the area affected by the accident in 1957. Medical and dosimetric staff monitored the health and living conditions repeatedly in both
villages after the release of radioactivity in the environment. 34 Their reports
caused E. Rask, the main engineer of the special (de)construction department on February 6, 1960, to send E.V. Mamontov, the deputy chairman of
the Chelyabinsk regional executive committee, a request for more money:
according to this letter, Churin, the deputy minister of Sredmash, should
provide more money for the evacuation of the villages Tatarskaia Karabolka
and Bagariak. 35
For his enquiry, Rask relied heavily on recommendations issued by the
ChLenNIIRG. According to their analysis, high concentrations of radioactivity in the villages, meadows, and the river “K” [Karabolka] would
make the continuation of living there dangerous. Cases of radiation sickness occurred among the villagers and requests about evacuation reached
the local authorities. Therefore, the ChLenNIIRG had recommended the
immediate evacuation of both villages, and, in addition, for the village
Nizhne-Petropavlovskoe. 36
Rask further pointed out that despite a Postanovlenie by the Council of
Ministers released in November 1957, 37 the USSR Ministry of Public Health,
Sredmash, and the USSR Academy of Sciences should have indicated the
further possibility to live in the territory of the river “K” [Karabolka]
and “T” [Techa] within a year. However, since then – about two and a
half years later – there was from not one of the named authorities a single
recommendation on this specific issue. Accordingly, the regional executive committee had to rely completely on the recommendations issued by
ChLenNIIRG. 38
Eventually, no resettlements were carried out. However, the regional
administration used the radiation expertise of the ChLenNIIRG to confront Moscow and to request that actions be taken to prevent further harm.
However, in this case, recommendations issued by the ChLenNIIRG were
ignored in Moscow and not realized respectively. The whole issue is the
subject of current discussion. Inhabitants from affected villages in the Oblast’
Chelyabinsk, after becoming aware of their exposure in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, organized human rights activist groups to become informed
about the scope and severity of exposure in the past, health effects, and (the
lack of ) evacuations. 39