Radiation Expertise 55
comprehensive regulations concerning the use of radioactive materials
simultaneously giving occupational permissible doses. In accordance with
the health regulations, the recommendation included a medical entry
checkup as well as regularly conducted medical examinations, education
campaign on personal prevention, and the apparel with protective clothing
(spetsotdeshda). In the case that an illness was diagnosed that excluded an
individual from working with radioactive materials, the person should be
immediately transferred to another task without any contacts with radioactive materials. Furthermore, workforces that lived in villages along the
river Techa should be provided with food products which did not originate
from the affected area to prevent the intake of radioactive particles by consuming locally produced food products. 28 The last recommendation goes
beyond the union-wide health regulation № 233-57 but was still in accordance with it. Thus, it becomes clear that workers should be prevented from
accumulating unnecessarily high doses by eating local products and therefore
adding internal exposure on the external.
Considering that the first general permissible doses were released in 1960,
the question arises if the workforce was better protected than local residents
in the affected area. To prevent an increased intake of radioactive particles,
temporary limits for certain products (milk, grain etc.) were established. The
enforcement of those limits was problematic due to the lack of a specialized monitoring infrastructure and dosimetric laboratories in the region.
Therefore, it was not possible to guarantee a comprehensive control of contaminated products after the accident in 1957. 29 However, radiation sickness
occurred among Techa residents and the workforce. 30 The established limits raise the question on which ground risks assessment was performed and
which reference values were applied in the contaminated areas.
In other cases, the institute issued recommendations with a more advisory
nature. In March 1959, the ChLenNIIRG prepared a report about how the
work could be continued in the contaminated area of government district
Bagariakskii. They considered it possible that the logging of trees could be
allowed if the wood would be used only as sellable wood (delovoi drevesiny).
They explicitly excluded the wood as construction timber. 31 In this case, no
health regulation existed.
Furthermore, the institute was involved in dosimetric inspection and monitoring: in 1959, the institute in cooperation with the oblast’ Sanitary and
Epidemiological Station conducted dosimetric inspections of sheep wool in
the affected kolkhoz in the government districts Kunashakskii, Kaslinskii,
and Bagariakskii. In 1958, more than 80 tons of wool with a value of 5 million rubles were destroyed. The sheep were so heavily contaminated that
according to the recommendation of the ChLenNIIRG, neither the wool
nor the meat were usable. 32 The results of the dosimetric inspection and the
resulting recommendation prompted the authorities to release the Reshenie
№ 462s on the prohibition of sheep farming in particular farms in the named
government districts. 33 In this capacity, the institute played an important role
comprehensive regulations concerning the use of radioactive materials
simultaneously giving occupational permissible doses. In accordance with
the health regulations, the recommendation included a medical entry
checkup as well as regularly conducted medical examinations, education
campaign on personal prevention, and the apparel with protective clothing
(spetsotdeshda). In the case that an illness was diagnosed that excluded an
individual from working with radioactive materials, the person should be
immediately transferred to another task without any contacts with radioactive materials. Furthermore, workforces that lived in villages along the
river Techa should be provided with food products which did not originate
from the affected area to prevent the intake of radioactive particles by consuming locally produced food products. 28 The last recommendation goes
beyond the union-wide health regulation № 233-57 but was still in accordance with it. Thus, it becomes clear that workers should be prevented from
accumulating unnecessarily high doses by eating local products and therefore
adding internal exposure on the external.
Considering that the first general permissible doses were released in 1960,
the question arises if the workforce was better protected than local residents
in the affected area. To prevent an increased intake of radioactive particles,
temporary limits for certain products (milk, grain etc.) were established. The
enforcement of those limits was problematic due to the lack of a specialized monitoring infrastructure and dosimetric laboratories in the region.
Therefore, it was not possible to guarantee a comprehensive control of contaminated products after the accident in 1957. 29 However, radiation sickness
occurred among Techa residents and the workforce. 30 The established limits raise the question on which ground risks assessment was performed and
which reference values were applied in the contaminated areas.
In other cases, the institute issued recommendations with a more advisory
nature. In March 1959, the ChLenNIIRG prepared a report about how the
work could be continued in the contaminated area of government district
Bagariakskii. They considered it possible that the logging of trees could be
allowed if the wood would be used only as sellable wood (delovoi drevesiny).
They explicitly excluded the wood as construction timber. 31 In this case, no
health regulation existed.
Furthermore, the institute was involved in dosimetric inspection and monitoring: in 1959, the institute in cooperation with the oblast’ Sanitary and
Epidemiological Station conducted dosimetric inspections of sheep wool in
the affected kolkhoz in the government districts Kunashakskii, Kaslinskii,
and Bagariakskii. In 1958, more than 80 tons of wool with a value of 5 million rubles were destroyed. The sheep were so heavily contaminated that
according to the recommendation of the ChLenNIIRG, neither the wool
nor the meat were usable. 32 The results of the dosimetric inspection and the
resulting recommendation prompted the authorities to release the Reshenie
№ 462s on the prohibition of sheep farming in particular farms in the named
government districts. 33 In this capacity, the institute played an important role