Radiation Expertise 57
A group from Musliumovo, another village in the contaminated area of
the river Techa from which the Bashkir-Tatar population was not evacuated,
called themselves “White Mice” and claimed to be used as human subjects
in secret state biomedical experimental research. 40 Fauzia Baimarova, a Tatar
nationalist leader, claimed that the Tatar and Bashkir population were particularly targeted by the Soviet authorities. Afraid of the high costs, the Soviet
authorities shied away from the resettlement of the comparatively large villages Tatarskaia Karabolka and Bagariak. 41 Garb and Komarova pointed out
that there was no particular discrimination against Tatars by Soviet authorities, but rather a general contempt for all people. 42
However, the case of the villages Tatarskaia Karabolka and Bagariak
seems to demonstrate that the regional government, with the support of the
ChLenNIIRG, tried to convince Moscow of the need to resettlement. In
addition, the regional executive committee issued the decision to resettle
both villages. 43 Ultimately Moscow disagreed – unfortunately these documents are still classified, and the reasons why Moscow did not decide to
resettle these villages remain unknown. It seems that a mixture of different
factors had been the basis for the decision, including economic as well as risk
assessment. To the present day, a resettlement of Tatarskaia Karabolka has not
been planned despite the fact of the heavily contaminated environment. 44
These cases highlight the importance of new approaches in the science of
history, such as environmental justice that develop a long-term view beyond
political watersheds.
The ChLenNIIRG became a source of regional radiation expertise, and
their recommendations played a significant role in an area where no regulation existed. Thus, the regional authorities asked for guidelines in cases
where no regulation or best practices were known, and risk assessment was
necessary. Furthermore, the cases of the villages Tatarskaia Karabolka and
Bagariak show how the regional government used radiation expertise to
pressure Moscow for action. However, the examples give no indication on
which criterion decisions in Moscow or in the Oblast’ were eventually based.
Documents that could answer these questions are still undisclosed and therefore the public, academic, and political discussion is open to expressions of
opinion covering the whole spectrum from the denial of different treatment
of villages 45 to the allegation of ethnic genocide. 46
In 1962, the dispensary № 1 and the Chelyabinsk branch of the LenNIIRG
united to create the fourth branch of the Institute of Biophysics of the USSR
Ministry of Health (henceforth referred to by its Russian acronym FIB-4). 47
With the establishment of the FIB-4, not only a shift in affiliation but also in
tasks and responsibilities took place. Hence, as a research institute under the
umbrella of the secret 3rd Main Directorate of the USSR, additional topics
such as research on public health effects of peaceful nuclear explosion were
pursued. 48 This became even more apparent when Dibobes left for a post in
Moscow and Shvedov, with a career path within the 3rd Main Directorate
and became the new director of the FIB-4. 49
A group from Musliumovo, another village in the contaminated area of
the river Techa from which the Bashkir-Tatar population was not evacuated,
called themselves “White Mice” and claimed to be used as human subjects
in secret state biomedical experimental research. 40 Fauzia Baimarova, a Tatar
nationalist leader, claimed that the Tatar and Bashkir population were particularly targeted by the Soviet authorities. Afraid of the high costs, the Soviet
authorities shied away from the resettlement of the comparatively large villages Tatarskaia Karabolka and Bagariak. 41 Garb and Komarova pointed out
that there was no particular discrimination against Tatars by Soviet authorities, but rather a general contempt for all people. 42
However, the case of the villages Tatarskaia Karabolka and Bagariak
seems to demonstrate that the regional government, with the support of the
ChLenNIIRG, tried to convince Moscow of the need to resettlement. In
addition, the regional executive committee issued the decision to resettle
both villages. 43 Ultimately Moscow disagreed – unfortunately these documents are still classified, and the reasons why Moscow did not decide to
resettle these villages remain unknown. It seems that a mixture of different
factors had been the basis for the decision, including economic as well as risk
assessment. To the present day, a resettlement of Tatarskaia Karabolka has not
been planned despite the fact of the heavily contaminated environment. 44
These cases highlight the importance of new approaches in the science of
history, such as environmental justice that develop a long-term view beyond
political watersheds.
The ChLenNIIRG became a source of regional radiation expertise, and
their recommendations played a significant role in an area where no regulation existed. Thus, the regional authorities asked for guidelines in cases
where no regulation or best practices were known, and risk assessment was
necessary. Furthermore, the cases of the villages Tatarskaia Karabolka and
Bagariak show how the regional government used radiation expertise to
pressure Moscow for action. However, the examples give no indication on
which criterion decisions in Moscow or in the Oblast’ were eventually based.
Documents that could answer these questions are still undisclosed and therefore the public, academic, and political discussion is open to expressions of
opinion covering the whole spectrum from the denial of different treatment
of villages 45 to the allegation of ethnic genocide. 46
In 1962, the dispensary № 1 and the Chelyabinsk branch of the LenNIIRG
united to create the fourth branch of the Institute of Biophysics of the USSR
Ministry of Health (henceforth referred to by its Russian acronym FIB-4). 47
With the establishment of the FIB-4, not only a shift in affiliation but also in
tasks and responsibilities took place. Hence, as a research institute under the
umbrella of the secret 3rd Main Directorate of the USSR, additional topics
such as research on public health effects of peaceful nuclear explosion were
pursued. 48 This became even more apparent when Dibobes left for a post in
Moscow and Shvedov, with a career path within the 3rd Main Directorate
and became the new director of the FIB-4. 49