technology adoption does not represent a barrier
in terms of innovation or the investment costs
(Maffioli et al. 2011).
2.3 General Water Law, Principles
and Institutional
Organization
The main policies and institutional settings that
shape the political economy of the water-energy
nexus for agricultural producers are explained in
this section. Mendoza belongs to the most arid
area in Argentina, and the use of water is relevant
for every economic activity. The historical relevance of water regulation is represented by the
General Water Law (Ley General de Aguas),
which was issued prior to the provincial constitution (Bermejo 1884). This legislation is the
foundation for economic development in the
region and further influences the policy design of
economic and agricultural tools.
Considered as the foremost legislation on
water management, the General Water Law regulates the use, distribution rules, payments and
quality (DGI 2016b; Silanes 2013). Water was
declared to be an asset of the public domain and
three main water-use principles are represented in
the General Water Law: inheritance, nonprejudice clause, and specificity. The inheritance
principle determines the permanent attachment of
water rights with the land property, which avoids
the potential to divide and commercialize rights
individually. The non-prejudice clause looks after
the common welfare of water users since it considers the effects of certain actions or new activities on individuals. Finally, the specificity
principle ensures the nullity of contracts that use
water for purposes other than those agreed upon
(Pinto et al. 2006). The water authority is entitled
to provide temporary use of water through the
permit instrument known as precarious right,
which can be revoked at any time, even without
just cause and without the right to prior compensation. Drilling permits constitute the allowance
to extract groundwater resources (Reta 2002).
In 1916, the provincial constitution rectified
the former water law and constituted the General
Irrigation Department (DGI, according to the
name in Spanish) as the institutional body to
execute the police power. This autonomous body
makes its own decisions in terms of administration, resource allocation, and investments. Representation of stakeholders is promoted within
the irrigation system as shown in Fig. 2. Consequently, the DGI acts as the major irrigation
body within the province and works similarly as
a parallel state in terms of water management.
The
Honorable
Administrative
Tribunal
(HTA) controls the actions of water bodies and
privates towards the common welfare of irrigators. Throughout the province, there are 17 Irrigation Associations that conglomerate 135
organizations of water users, here referred to as
Watershed Inspections (Inspecciones de Cauce).
The former are public, non-state-owned organizations that manage and distribute water through
the secondary networks represented by the
Watershed Inspections. The latter is “ministry
legis” by Law 5302 and Law 6405. Their purpose is to engage in the administration and distribution of the water, and the maintenance of
secondary networks and derivatives. Officials
within the department are elected democratically
and they have their own budget (Maccari 2004;
Pinto et al. 2006). As a relevant agglomeration of
water users, the watershed inspections are composed by producers and enterprises (mostly from
agroindustry) that may be consulted by members
of the parliament to express their needs in the
provincial Congress.
Ideally, the organization of water management
should not be static and should respond to the
ever-evolving interests of farmers determined by
agricultural demand (Jofré 2010). Minor changes
in the irrigation system directly result in strategic
behavior and the design of complimentary wateruse tools. Therefore, any potential changes
should be announced in a clear and transparent
manner (Erice 2013).
2.3.1 Current Conditions of Irrigation
Efficiency
Different definitions of efficiency exist in the
field of water management. In general terms,
irrigation efficiency is measured as the ratio of
132
F. S. Riera and B. Brümmer
in terms of innovation or the investment costs
(Maffioli et al. 2011).
2.3 General Water Law, Principles
and Institutional
Organization
The main policies and institutional settings that
shape the political economy of the water-energy
nexus for agricultural producers are explained in
this section. Mendoza belongs to the most arid
area in Argentina, and the use of water is relevant
for every economic activity. The historical relevance of water regulation is represented by the
General Water Law (Ley General de Aguas),
which was issued prior to the provincial constitution (Bermejo 1884). This legislation is the
foundation for economic development in the
region and further influences the policy design of
economic and agricultural tools.
Considered as the foremost legislation on
water management, the General Water Law regulates the use, distribution rules, payments and
quality (DGI 2016b; Silanes 2013). Water was
declared to be an asset of the public domain and
three main water-use principles are represented in
the General Water Law: inheritance, nonprejudice clause, and specificity. The inheritance
principle determines the permanent attachment of
water rights with the land property, which avoids
the potential to divide and commercialize rights
individually. The non-prejudice clause looks after
the common welfare of water users since it considers the effects of certain actions or new activities on individuals. Finally, the specificity
principle ensures the nullity of contracts that use
water for purposes other than those agreed upon
(Pinto et al. 2006). The water authority is entitled
to provide temporary use of water through the
permit instrument known as precarious right,
which can be revoked at any time, even without
just cause and without the right to prior compensation. Drilling permits constitute the allowance
to extract groundwater resources (Reta 2002).
In 1916, the provincial constitution rectified
the former water law and constituted the General
Irrigation Department (DGI, according to the
name in Spanish) as the institutional body to
execute the police power. This autonomous body
makes its own decisions in terms of administration, resource allocation, and investments. Representation of stakeholders is promoted within
the irrigation system as shown in Fig. 2. Consequently, the DGI acts as the major irrigation
body within the province and works similarly as
a parallel state in terms of water management.
The
Honorable
Administrative
Tribunal
(HTA) controls the actions of water bodies and
privates towards the common welfare of irrigators. Throughout the province, there are 17 Irrigation Associations that conglomerate 135
organizations of water users, here referred to as
Watershed Inspections (Inspecciones de Cauce).
The former are public, non-state-owned organizations that manage and distribute water through
the secondary networks represented by the
Watershed Inspections. The latter is “ministry
legis” by Law 5302 and Law 6405. Their purpose is to engage in the administration and distribution of the water, and the maintenance of
secondary networks and derivatives. Officials
within the department are elected democratically
and they have their own budget (Maccari 2004;
Pinto et al. 2006). As a relevant agglomeration of
water users, the watershed inspections are composed by producers and enterprises (mostly from
agroindustry) that may be consulted by members
of the parliament to express their needs in the
provincial Congress.
Ideally, the organization of water management
should not be static and should respond to the
ever-evolving interests of farmers determined by
agricultural demand (Jofré 2010). Minor changes
in the irrigation system directly result in strategic
behavior and the design of complimentary wateruse tools. Therefore, any potential changes
should be announced in a clear and transparent
manner (Erice 2013).
2.3.1 Current Conditions of Irrigation
Efficiency
Different definitions of efficiency exist in the
field of water management. In general terms,
irrigation efficiency is measured as the ratio of
132
F. S. Riera and B. Brümmer