7
serious tanker accidents have declined substantially both in terms of the number of
accidents and the number of barrels of spilled oil. With the advent of ultra-deep exploration and production, however, the risks of another serious blowout remain essentially
incalculable because of the myriad of factors that influence the integrity of deep subsurface technologies, operations, ocean and formation conditions, and the degree of
training of operators to deal with unique and rapidly changing situations. The industry,
and society in general, can ill-afford another ultra-deep blowout of the magnitude of
DWH (Lubchenco et al. 2012). That single accident resulted in approximately $60 billion in cleanup costs, fines and penalties, and compensation payments (Bomey 2016).
The DWH accident likewise shook people’s faith in the ability of engineering solutions
to solve environmental problems quickly with minimal damage to people and wildlife.
That the equipment to cap and contain such a catastrophic blowout had never been
developed or tested prior to the accident is a monumental failure to anticipate and prepare for a truly “worst case” scenario (National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011; Boebert and Blossom 2016). Subsequent
to the DWH accident, billions of dollars have been invested in technology and scientific
research to better understand the conditions and environmental consequences of DWH
and, by inference, ultra-deep regions of the world that are likely targets for frontier oil
and gas development (Global Industry Response Group 2011).
In addition to the DWH spill, there are a number of deepwater blowouts and other
spills that can provide relevant lessons learned bearing upon strategic planning for
spill prevention and response strategies. The Ixtoc 1 spill off Campeche, Mexico,
occurred in 1979–1980 and ran unchecked for 9 months before being shut down (Soto
et al. 2014). While only at 54 m water depth, it was, prior to DWH, the largest unintentional marine oil spill in history (about 2/3 the volume of DWH). It is relevant to
these discussions because of the extended spatial footprint of the spill, the use of massive quantities of Corexit® dispersant, and because large quantities of Ixtoc 1 oil came
to rest in ultra-deep waters (Chap. 13). In 2000 a unique set of controlled release
experiments – called DeepSpill – occurred off the Norwegian coast in 844 m of water
(Johansen et al. 2003). DeepSpill is elucidating because of the intensive monitoring of
fuel oil and natural gas from this series of releases, the results of which were subsequently used to calibrate models of spill behavior. In 2009 the Montara spill in the
Timor Sea was uncontrolled for 10 weeks before a relief well successfully controlled
oil releases. Similarly, in November of 2011, Chevron had a deep well control failure
off Brazil resulting in releases through the underlying rock formations. This volume
makes use of research following accidents and investigative reviews in their aftermath. Thus, there are a series of field-scale experiments and monitoring studies, laboratory-based experiments, and monitoring of accidental releases of oil and gas, from
which significant research has been generated and summarized in this volume.
We consider the physics, chemistry, and ecological characteristics surrounding deep
frontier oil and gas operations, with special emphasis on information obtained from the
multiple spill sources of information listed above. From all of these spills, the appropriateness of mitigation techniques and lessons learned from them bear on the seminal
question of whether the inherent risks are balanced by the rewards of ultra-deep oil and
gas production. After the DWH well was capped, we initiated a scoping effort to characterize factors bearing on deep spill dynamics and how they would impact various
1 Introduction to the Volume
serious tanker accidents have declined substantially both in terms of the number of
accidents and the number of barrels of spilled oil. With the advent of ultra-deep exploration and production, however, the risks of another serious blowout remain essentially
incalculable because of the myriad of factors that influence the integrity of deep subsurface technologies, operations, ocean and formation conditions, and the degree of
training of operators to deal with unique and rapidly changing situations. The industry,
and society in general, can ill-afford another ultra-deep blowout of the magnitude of
DWH (Lubchenco et al. 2012). That single accident resulted in approximately $60 billion in cleanup costs, fines and penalties, and compensation payments (Bomey 2016).
The DWH accident likewise shook people’s faith in the ability of engineering solutions
to solve environmental problems quickly with minimal damage to people and wildlife.
That the equipment to cap and contain such a catastrophic blowout had never been
developed or tested prior to the accident is a monumental failure to anticipate and prepare for a truly “worst case” scenario (National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011; Boebert and Blossom 2016). Subsequent
to the DWH accident, billions of dollars have been invested in technology and scientific
research to better understand the conditions and environmental consequences of DWH
and, by inference, ultra-deep regions of the world that are likely targets for frontier oil
and gas development (Global Industry Response Group 2011).
In addition to the DWH spill, there are a number of deepwater blowouts and other
spills that can provide relevant lessons learned bearing upon strategic planning for
spill prevention and response strategies. The Ixtoc 1 spill off Campeche, Mexico,
occurred in 1979–1980 and ran unchecked for 9 months before being shut down (Soto
et al. 2014). While only at 54 m water depth, it was, prior to DWH, the largest unintentional marine oil spill in history (about 2/3 the volume of DWH). It is relevant to
these discussions because of the extended spatial footprint of the spill, the use of massive quantities of Corexit® dispersant, and because large quantities of Ixtoc 1 oil came
to rest in ultra-deep waters (Chap. 13). In 2000 a unique set of controlled release
experiments – called DeepSpill – occurred off the Norwegian coast in 844 m of water
(Johansen et al. 2003). DeepSpill is elucidating because of the intensive monitoring of
fuel oil and natural gas from this series of releases, the results of which were subsequently used to calibrate models of spill behavior. In 2009 the Montara spill in the
Timor Sea was uncontrolled for 10 weeks before a relief well successfully controlled
oil releases. Similarly, in November of 2011, Chevron had a deep well control failure
off Brazil resulting in releases through the underlying rock formations. This volume
makes use of research following accidents and investigative reviews in their aftermath. Thus, there are a series of field-scale experiments and monitoring studies, laboratory-based experiments, and monitoring of accidental releases of oil and gas, from
which significant research has been generated and summarized in this volume.
We consider the physics, chemistry, and ecological characteristics surrounding deep
frontier oil and gas operations, with special emphasis on information obtained from the
multiple spill sources of information listed above. From all of these spills, the appropriateness of mitigation techniques and lessons learned from them bear on the seminal
question of whether the inherent risks are balanced by the rewards of ultra-deep oil and
gas production. After the DWH well was capped, we initiated a scoping effort to characterize factors bearing on deep spill dynamics and how they would impact various
1 Introduction to the Volume