6
applicable state “trustee” agencies, and the responsible parties, using authorities
granted to them under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90). None of these regulatory regimes were crafted, nor did their congressional or administration framers
anticipate, the rapid development of ultra-deep exploration and production, and the
unique issues associated with them. In the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez tanker spill
in Prince William Sound, Alaska (Peterson et al. 2003), new regulations were forthcoming the following year – OPA-90. In contrast, in the 9-plus years following
DWH, no new federal legislation specifically addressing the unique issues associated
with ultra-deep drilling oversight, production, and spill response has been forthcoming. Administratively, the then Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the
Department of the Interior was subsequently split into two agencies following
DWH – the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). The stated goal of the reorganization was
to separate “… conflicting missions of promoting resource development, enforcing
safety regulations, and maximizing revenues from offshore operations.”
1
Under these
new agencies, a brief moratorium on additional new drilling permits for the Gulf of
Mexico was enacted (and has since been lifted) and additional requirements for BOP
design and inspection promulgated (Krupnick and Echarte 2018). The essential question that remains, however, is: Has enough been done both by the industry on its own
volition, and through regulatory processes, to lower the risk of another catastrophic
ultra-deep well failure, and if such a spill occurs again, have the lessons learned from
previous spills been incorporated into spill response to minimize impacts on humans
and the environment both from the spill itself and the mitigation measures employed?
Globally, the landscape for fossil-derived energy sources is changing rapidly.
Notwithstanding the effects of burning fossil fuels on the global climate system, maintaining and expanding the use of hydrocarbon-based fuels for transportation, home
heating, and industrial purposes has resulted in novel applications of science and technologies to produce from “tight” formations by the use of hydraulic fracturing of shale
rock (“fracking”) to free natural gas. Injection of fluids and gasses has allowed once
abandoned oil and gas sources to yet again yield economically recoverable quantities.
The quest for hydrocarbons to supply the ever-growing human population of the earth
(>7.5 billion) has increased the urgency to explore new frontier areas where oil and gas
might exist. Thus, marine oil and gas operations now extend to water depths >3000 m
(2 miles) and will likely to continue into yet deeper waters. Recent industry projections
are that exploration and ultimately production from deep frontier operations will occur
off six continents (Murawski et al. 2020b), with the most likely finds in the “golden
triangle” between West Africa, Brazil, and the Gulf of Mexico. Other areas will also be
explored, including the Arctic, which presents yet other unique challenges.
The number of marine oil and gas-related tanker accidents has declined steadily for
several decades following several catastrophic and highly publicized groundings and
collisions (Ramseur 2010). The decline in tanker accidents resulted from more stringent vessel construction standards, development of more precise global positioning,
navigation and tracking aids, and a concomitant rise in the use of pipelines and offshore
unloading facilities minimizing tanker traffic close to shores. Resultantly, the risks of
1 https://www.boem.gov/Reorganization.
S. A. Murawski et al.
applicable state “trustee” agencies, and the responsible parties, using authorities
granted to them under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90). None of these regulatory regimes were crafted, nor did their congressional or administration framers
anticipate, the rapid development of ultra-deep exploration and production, and the
unique issues associated with them. In the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez tanker spill
in Prince William Sound, Alaska (Peterson et al. 2003), new regulations were forthcoming the following year – OPA-90. In contrast, in the 9-plus years following
DWH, no new federal legislation specifically addressing the unique issues associated
with ultra-deep drilling oversight, production, and spill response has been forthcoming. Administratively, the then Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the
Department of the Interior was subsequently split into two agencies following
DWH – the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). The stated goal of the reorganization was
to separate “… conflicting missions of promoting resource development, enforcing
safety regulations, and maximizing revenues from offshore operations.”
1
Under these
new agencies, a brief moratorium on additional new drilling permits for the Gulf of
Mexico was enacted (and has since been lifted) and additional requirements for BOP
design and inspection promulgated (Krupnick and Echarte 2018). The essential question that remains, however, is: Has enough been done both by the industry on its own
volition, and through regulatory processes, to lower the risk of another catastrophic
ultra-deep well failure, and if such a spill occurs again, have the lessons learned from
previous spills been incorporated into spill response to minimize impacts on humans
and the environment both from the spill itself and the mitigation measures employed?
Globally, the landscape for fossil-derived energy sources is changing rapidly.
Notwithstanding the effects of burning fossil fuels on the global climate system, maintaining and expanding the use of hydrocarbon-based fuels for transportation, home
heating, and industrial purposes has resulted in novel applications of science and technologies to produce from “tight” formations by the use of hydraulic fracturing of shale
rock (“fracking”) to free natural gas. Injection of fluids and gasses has allowed once
abandoned oil and gas sources to yet again yield economically recoverable quantities.
The quest for hydrocarbons to supply the ever-growing human population of the earth
(>7.5 billion) has increased the urgency to explore new frontier areas where oil and gas
might exist. Thus, marine oil and gas operations now extend to water depths >3000 m
(2 miles) and will likely to continue into yet deeper waters. Recent industry projections
are that exploration and ultimately production from deep frontier operations will occur
off six continents (Murawski et al. 2020b), with the most likely finds in the “golden
triangle” between West Africa, Brazil, and the Gulf of Mexico. Other areas will also be
explored, including the Arctic, which presents yet other unique challenges.
The number of marine oil and gas-related tanker accidents has declined steadily for
several decades following several catastrophic and highly publicized groundings and
collisions (Ramseur 2010). The decline in tanker accidents resulted from more stringent vessel construction standards, development of more precise global positioning,
navigation and tracking aids, and a concomitant rise in the use of pipelines and offshore
unloading facilities minimizing tanker traffic close to shores. Resultantly, the risks of
1 https://www.boem.gov/Reorganization.
S. A. Murawski et al.