315
(Pálsson 2006), thereby undermining the local place and its importance, whereas
both are complex and diverse (Sampson 2013; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009).
For Johnson (2006), governance is a process that should reinforce the ties among
different stakeholders and foster dialogue, debate, and collaboration through interaction. McGoodwin (1990) criticises the capitalist way of governing resources by
underpinning the exclusion of social and cultural considerations. However, the
interactive governance theory merges the existing governing system and the system
to be governed to a common platform where they interact to manage fisheries
(Johnson 2010; Jentoft 2007), while paying attention to all the societal and cultural
values of place (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009).
The government of Malawi adopted the community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) initiative under a co-management arrangement, guided by the
co-management of natural resources policy, which is currently operational.
Co-management is aimed at increasing user communities’ partnerships in managing
resources that they depend on for livelihoods, to yield better management outcomes
(Ngochera et al. 2017). This is appropriately aligned to the decentralisation policy
and legislation (GoM 1998a, b), based on principles of bottom-up planning. This
means that communities decide and prioritise issues and aspects of development
directly impacting their livelihoods in their local areas. Co-management was also
adopted because government lacked the capacity to manage natural resources across
the country. The benefits of CBNRMs are nonfinancial: ‘the empowerment of people in rural areas, conservation of biodiversity, and the development of more secure
livelihoods and the reduction of risk’ (Fabricius 2004: 3).
Like other natural resource-based sectors, the implementation of co-management
regimes in the fisheries sector was assumed to benefit the resources and their users
(Ngochera et al. 2017). However, recent empirical studies (Weyl 2008; Béné et al.
2009; Njaya et al. 2011; Hara, Donda, and Njaya 2002) highlight the potential problems that may arise from such natural resource governance reforms, due to lack of
capacity and resources. These studies analysed co-management arrangements of
fisheries in Malawi as having problems that arise particularly around power distribution, how to determine the responsibilities of the various role players in comanagement arrangements, such as Beach Village Committees (BVCs). The
prevalence of such problems is quite understandable, considering that BVCs consist
of different community members, who represent their communities in various fisheries and related activities.
Thus, equally important are the relational interactions between levels of resource
management in decision-making and in carrying out co-management prescriptions.
Cleaver (2002) coins the term ‘bricolage’ which she defines as ‘how mechanisms for
resource management and collective action are borrowed or constructed from existing
institutions, styles of thinking and sanctioned social relationships’. Caution is needed
in ensuring that institutional vestiges relating to centralised management regimes do
not conspire to frustrate mechanisms promoting participatory, co- management
approaches. For instance, while the government has moved away from a top-bottom
to bottom-up approach to natural resource management, there still are traits of topbottom interactions between local organisations and resource users. At the same time,
Of ‘White Elephant’ in Fisheries: A Conflict Resolution Model Around the Usage…
(Pálsson 2006), thereby undermining the local place and its importance, whereas
both are complex and diverse (Sampson 2013; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009).
For Johnson (2006), governance is a process that should reinforce the ties among
different stakeholders and foster dialogue, debate, and collaboration through interaction. McGoodwin (1990) criticises the capitalist way of governing resources by
underpinning the exclusion of social and cultural considerations. However, the
interactive governance theory merges the existing governing system and the system
to be governed to a common platform where they interact to manage fisheries
(Johnson 2010; Jentoft 2007), while paying attention to all the societal and cultural
values of place (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009).
The government of Malawi adopted the community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) initiative under a co-management arrangement, guided by the
co-management of natural resources policy, which is currently operational.
Co-management is aimed at increasing user communities’ partnerships in managing
resources that they depend on for livelihoods, to yield better management outcomes
(Ngochera et al. 2017). This is appropriately aligned to the decentralisation policy
and legislation (GoM 1998a, b), based on principles of bottom-up planning. This
means that communities decide and prioritise issues and aspects of development
directly impacting their livelihoods in their local areas. Co-management was also
adopted because government lacked the capacity to manage natural resources across
the country. The benefits of CBNRMs are nonfinancial: ‘the empowerment of people in rural areas, conservation of biodiversity, and the development of more secure
livelihoods and the reduction of risk’ (Fabricius 2004: 3).
Like other natural resource-based sectors, the implementation of co-management
regimes in the fisheries sector was assumed to benefit the resources and their users
(Ngochera et al. 2017). However, recent empirical studies (Weyl 2008; Béné et al.
2009; Njaya et al. 2011; Hara, Donda, and Njaya 2002) highlight the potential problems that may arise from such natural resource governance reforms, due to lack of
capacity and resources. These studies analysed co-management arrangements of
fisheries in Malawi as having problems that arise particularly around power distribution, how to determine the responsibilities of the various role players in comanagement arrangements, such as Beach Village Committees (BVCs). The
prevalence of such problems is quite understandable, considering that BVCs consist
of different community members, who represent their communities in various fisheries and related activities.
Thus, equally important are the relational interactions between levels of resource
management in decision-making and in carrying out co-management prescriptions.
Cleaver (2002) coins the term ‘bricolage’ which she defines as ‘how mechanisms for
resource management and collective action are borrowed or constructed from existing
institutions, styles of thinking and sanctioned social relationships’. Caution is needed
in ensuring that institutional vestiges relating to centralised management regimes do
not conspire to frustrate mechanisms promoting participatory, co- management
approaches. For instance, while the government has moved away from a top-bottom
to bottom-up approach to natural resource management, there still are traits of topbottom interactions between local organisations and resource users. At the same time,
Of ‘White Elephant’ in Fisheries: A Conflict Resolution Model Around the Usage…