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1 Introduction
This study develops and analyses the process of a conflict resolution model adapted
for the community of Chipala village in Nkhotakota district, Malawi. The study was
conducted as a result of the failure of a fisheries postharvest technologies project,
where the project was rejected by the community and therefore deeming it a ‘white
elephant’. Failure of development interventions to meet their intended objectives
has been researched since the Marshall Plan (Hogan 1989). However common,
similar mistakes in development initiatives continue to be made. Development
might fail due to failure to respect and recognise the local settings and mistargeting
of participants among others (Klausen 1964), which are also the reasons for the
conflicts in Chipala district.
Participation of local communities in identifying their pressing needs builds
ownership and legitimacy. However, participation on its own is not enough, because
there is also a tendency by local communities to jump into initiatives, which yield
short-term and fast gains. Samndong (2018) highlights the importance of participation in forest governance as a tool to achieve REDD+ compliance status. However,
even though the local communities participated, it was mostly tokenism.
The solar fish dryer intervention is one of the Capacity Building for Managing
Climate Change in Malawi (CABMACC) funded projects in Malawi, implemented
between 2015 and 2017. Under the project, a solar tent dryer and two improved
smoking kilns were constructed in Chipala. Its overall objective was to improve
incomes of rural communities through improved fisheries management and enterprise development for enhanced resilient livelihoods to climate change. This paper
asks and answers questions related to participation: how conflicts resulted and how
they could have been avoided to promote adoption and community participation.
Data were collected in Chipala village among project implementers, fish processors (FPs), the Beach Village Committee (BVC), district assembly officials, members of the area, and village development committees. Data were primarily collected
by qualitative methods, using CARE International’s community scorecard, which
included focus group discussions and key informant interviews.
In a traditional sense, governance has been related to the government and its
activities. However, interactive governance theory and other approaches to governance in fisheries argue that governance includes other actors besides government
(Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). In Iceland, an individual transfer quota system
(ITQ) was introduced to achieve ecological stewardship, economic efficiency, and
safety at sea (Sampson 2013). The system is a neoliberal solution to the control of
fisheries resources. Furthermore, Pálsson (2006) finds that ITQs, a high modern
regime, mostly benefit capital and boat owners and scientific experts while
marginalising the small fishers, crews, and local knowledge. The emphasis on
recovering fish stocks across the globe has seen economic and ecological components at the centre of policy and governance, while the sociocultural domain is
either completely ignored or not prioritised (Urquhart and Acott 2013; Reed et al.
2013). Modernist governance often fails to consider nature and society together
F. W. Kayamba-Phiri et al.
1 Introduction
This study develops and analyses the process of a conflict resolution model adapted
for the community of Chipala village in Nkhotakota district, Malawi. The study was
conducted as a result of the failure of a fisheries postharvest technologies project,
where the project was rejected by the community and therefore deeming it a ‘white
elephant’. Failure of development interventions to meet their intended objectives
has been researched since the Marshall Plan (Hogan 1989). However common,
similar mistakes in development initiatives continue to be made. Development
might fail due to failure to respect and recognise the local settings and mistargeting
of participants among others (Klausen 1964), which are also the reasons for the
conflicts in Chipala district.
Participation of local communities in identifying their pressing needs builds
ownership and legitimacy. However, participation on its own is not enough, because
there is also a tendency by local communities to jump into initiatives, which yield
short-term and fast gains. Samndong (2018) highlights the importance of participation in forest governance as a tool to achieve REDD+ compliance status. However,
even though the local communities participated, it was mostly tokenism.
The solar fish dryer intervention is one of the Capacity Building for Managing
Climate Change in Malawi (CABMACC) funded projects in Malawi, implemented
between 2015 and 2017. Under the project, a solar tent dryer and two improved
smoking kilns were constructed in Chipala. Its overall objective was to improve
incomes of rural communities through improved fisheries management and enterprise development for enhanced resilient livelihoods to climate change. This paper
asks and answers questions related to participation: how conflicts resulted and how
they could have been avoided to promote adoption and community participation.
Data were collected in Chipala village among project implementers, fish processors (FPs), the Beach Village Committee (BVC), district assembly officials, members of the area, and village development committees. Data were primarily collected
by qualitative methods, using CARE International’s community scorecard, which
included focus group discussions and key informant interviews.
In a traditional sense, governance has been related to the government and its
activities. However, interactive governance theory and other approaches to governance in fisheries argue that governance includes other actors besides government
(Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). In Iceland, an individual transfer quota system
(ITQ) was introduced to achieve ecological stewardship, economic efficiency, and
safety at sea (Sampson 2013). The system is a neoliberal solution to the control of
fisheries resources. Furthermore, Pálsson (2006) finds that ITQs, a high modern
regime, mostly benefit capital and boat owners and scientific experts while
marginalising the small fishers, crews, and local knowledge. The emphasis on
recovering fish stocks across the globe has seen economic and ecological components at the centre of policy and governance, while the sociocultural domain is
either completely ignored or not prioritised (Urquhart and Acott 2013; Reed et al.
2013). Modernist governance often fails to consider nature and society together
F. W. Kayamba-Phiri et al.