226
9
from institutions such as the UK Department for International Development (Dfid),
USAID and UNDP among others (Oakland Institute 2015). Moreover, KPL is also
partnering with corporate giants such as the Norwegian fertilizer company Yara and
the Swiss seed and agro-chemical company Syngenta to strengthen rice value chains
in the Kilombero area (Grow Africa 2014).
As with GR, Agrica, through its KPL project, is keen to market itself as a socially
responsible investor, which is able to combine profits with caring for communities
and the planet. However, critical reports argue that there is a mismatch between this
framing of KPL and the experiences of surrounding villagers. These reports show
that there are strong contestations around both land and environmental issues, as
well as around the outgrower scheme (Oakland Institute 2015; Chachage 2010;
Greco 2015).
The area where KPL is located (the Mngeta farm) was originally established in
1986 as a government joint venture between the North Korean and Tanzanian governments (KOTACO). However, after farming only parts of the area KOTACO never
became a success and operations ended in 1993. In the period before the establishment
of KPL in 2008, local farmers moved in to farm. Some also settled in the area. In addition, pastoralists grazed their livestock on the Mngeta farm. Villagers and pastoralists
had, however, also used this land before the arrival of KOTACO. Archival information
indicates that the area was cultivated by local farmers as early as the 1920s, while aerial
photographs from the 1940s also testify the historical use of this area (Bergius forthcoming). After the arrival of KOTACO in 1986, most of the settled families managed
to stay on the land due to the company’s limited land-use. Evictions therefore only
started in 2007 preparing for KPL’s investments (Chachage 2010). To justify these evictions, the company labelled local farmers as ‘invaders’ and ‘squatters’ (KPL 2009).
The company agreed, however, to compensate evicted farmers as a ‘goodwill gesture’ to maintain good relations with local communities. In deciding on the compensation level, KPL claims to have followed World Bank guidelines for social and
environmental sustainability. These guidelines promise to improve, or restore, livelihoods of affected persons to levels prevailing prior to the re-establishment of the
plantation. However, these guidelines failed to safeguard local interests (Oakland
Institute 2015; Bergius forthcoming). Many of the 381 families did not receive any
compensation at all, while those who did receive new housing discovered that the
compensation houses were built on land that was flooded every rainy season
(Oakland Institute 2015; Bergius forthcoming).
In addition, land-use conflicts have increased in the surrounding villages following KPL’s investment (Greco 2015). Finally, smallholders surrounding the plantation also complain of crop damage on their farms as a result of the company’s
spaying of crops by airplane, since sprayed herbicide tended to drift to neighbouring
local farms (Oakland Institute 2015). Finally, the replacement of African smallholder farming with British and Norwegian investments to establish a large-scale
mechanized farm is a clear example of accumulation by dispossession (see 7 Chap.
2). Or, at least the dispossession is very clear, although capital accumulation part has
not been very successful, since KPL has been struggling as an economically sustainable business investment leading to economic losses for the investors.
Chapter 9 · Population Growth, Markets and Sustainable Land-Use in Africa
9
from institutions such as the UK Department for International Development (Dfid),
USAID and UNDP among others (Oakland Institute 2015). Moreover, KPL is also
partnering with corporate giants such as the Norwegian fertilizer company Yara and
the Swiss seed and agro-chemical company Syngenta to strengthen rice value chains
in the Kilombero area (Grow Africa 2014).
As with GR, Agrica, through its KPL project, is keen to market itself as a socially
responsible investor, which is able to combine profits with caring for communities
and the planet. However, critical reports argue that there is a mismatch between this
framing of KPL and the experiences of surrounding villagers. These reports show
that there are strong contestations around both land and environmental issues, as
well as around the outgrower scheme (Oakland Institute 2015; Chachage 2010;
Greco 2015).
The area where KPL is located (the Mngeta farm) was originally established in
1986 as a government joint venture between the North Korean and Tanzanian governments (KOTACO). However, after farming only parts of the area KOTACO never
became a success and operations ended in 1993. In the period before the establishment
of KPL in 2008, local farmers moved in to farm. Some also settled in the area. In addition, pastoralists grazed their livestock on the Mngeta farm. Villagers and pastoralists
had, however, also used this land before the arrival of KOTACO. Archival information
indicates that the area was cultivated by local farmers as early as the 1920s, while aerial
photographs from the 1940s also testify the historical use of this area (Bergius forthcoming). After the arrival of KOTACO in 1986, most of the settled families managed
to stay on the land due to the company’s limited land-use. Evictions therefore only
started in 2007 preparing for KPL’s investments (Chachage 2010). To justify these evictions, the company labelled local farmers as ‘invaders’ and ‘squatters’ (KPL 2009).
The company agreed, however, to compensate evicted farmers as a ‘goodwill gesture’ to maintain good relations with local communities. In deciding on the compensation level, KPL claims to have followed World Bank guidelines for social and
environmental sustainability. These guidelines promise to improve, or restore, livelihoods of affected persons to levels prevailing prior to the re-establishment of the
plantation. However, these guidelines failed to safeguard local interests (Oakland
Institute 2015; Bergius forthcoming). Many of the 381 families did not receive any
compensation at all, while those who did receive new housing discovered that the
compensation houses were built on land that was flooded every rainy season
(Oakland Institute 2015; Bergius forthcoming).
In addition, land-use conflicts have increased in the surrounding villages following KPL’s investment (Greco 2015). Finally, smallholders surrounding the plantation also complain of crop damage on their farms as a result of the company’s
spaying of crops by airplane, since sprayed herbicide tended to drift to neighbouring
local farms (Oakland Institute 2015). Finally, the replacement of African smallholder farming with British and Norwegian investments to establish a large-scale
mechanized farm is a clear example of accumulation by dispossession (see 7 Chap.
2). Or, at least the dispossession is very clear, although capital accumulation part has
not been very successful, since KPL has been struggling as an economically sustainable business investment leading to economic losses for the investors.
Chapter 9 · Population Growth, Markets and Sustainable Land-Use in Africa