200
8
hand weapons (e.g. Kalashnikovs) and RPG grenade launchers. It also allowed Dana
Amassagou to set up several training camps.
The aim of Dana Amassagou also seems to have changed over time from defending Dogon villages to actively attacking Fulani villages. In 2018, the militia reportedly started to systematically attack Fulani villages through setting fire to buildings
and chasing the civilian Fulani away. Since Fulani are widely regarded as associated
with jihadism, this operation may be seen as a state-supported form of counterinsurgency. Several thousand Fulani have, as a result, crossed the border to Burkina Faso
to seek refuge.
Hence, while jihadists generally kill individuals who oppose them or who cooperate with the army or state administration, but do not attack the civilian population
in general, the strategy of the pro-government militia ‘is not to confront the jihadists
who are responsible for the attack but rather to aim at soft targets—in this case, Peul
(Fulani) civilians. Also, sometimes armed groups take advantage of the context of
conflicts to settle old accounts and disputes, including conflicts over natural
resources’ (Ibrahim 2017: 18).
The active state support to Dana Amassagou continued until April 2019 when
public criticism and demonstrations in Bamako led former President Keita to
appoint a new prime minister.
Hence, to sum up this case study, what drives pastoralists to join ‘jihadist’ groups
is not primarily religious conviction. It is to end the domination by traditional elites
in collusion with the state administration, and to resist the army’s violence and
human rights abuse against pastoral communities. There are numerous reports that
the army has arrested and even executed many Fulani men accused of being
‘ jihadists’.
Farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel tend to be presented by external observers
as either driven by ethnicity or by increasing resource scarcity caused by climate
change or population growth—or a combination of these factors. While these elements may be relevant and play a role, which we also see in the case of Fulani-Dogon
violence in Mali, narratives about ethnicity or scarcity also serve to simplify explanations of conflicts and to gloss over their more complex root causes linked to historical and contemporary land relations.
We therefore argue that in order to more fully understand such land struggles
that escalate into violence, it is necessary to study the material politics and political
ecology of land governance in a historical context. This will lead to explanations
that move beyond simple causal chains where the Sahel is seen as an arena with
decreasing resource scarcity affecting livelihoods that again trigger migrations or
conflicts.
In addition to demonstrating the complex background to the current crisis in
Mali and how simplistic narratives about its causes are not helpful for understanding
this crisis, the case also shows how views in a military intervention of the enemy as
‘terrorists’ or ‘jihadists’ are also dangerous and able to further fuel violent conflicts.
Chapter 8 · Climate Change, Scarcity and Conflicts in the Sahel
8
hand weapons (e.g. Kalashnikovs) and RPG grenade launchers. It also allowed Dana
Amassagou to set up several training camps.
The aim of Dana Amassagou also seems to have changed over time from defending Dogon villages to actively attacking Fulani villages. In 2018, the militia reportedly started to systematically attack Fulani villages through setting fire to buildings
and chasing the civilian Fulani away. Since Fulani are widely regarded as associated
with jihadism, this operation may be seen as a state-supported form of counterinsurgency. Several thousand Fulani have, as a result, crossed the border to Burkina Faso
to seek refuge.
Hence, while jihadists generally kill individuals who oppose them or who cooperate with the army or state administration, but do not attack the civilian population
in general, the strategy of the pro-government militia ‘is not to confront the jihadists
who are responsible for the attack but rather to aim at soft targets—in this case, Peul
(Fulani) civilians. Also, sometimes armed groups take advantage of the context of
conflicts to settle old accounts and disputes, including conflicts over natural
resources’ (Ibrahim 2017: 18).
The active state support to Dana Amassagou continued until April 2019 when
public criticism and demonstrations in Bamako led former President Keita to
appoint a new prime minister.
Hence, to sum up this case study, what drives pastoralists to join ‘jihadist’ groups
is not primarily religious conviction. It is to end the domination by traditional elites
in collusion with the state administration, and to resist the army’s violence and
human rights abuse against pastoral communities. There are numerous reports that
the army has arrested and even executed many Fulani men accused of being
‘ jihadists’.
Farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel tend to be presented by external observers
as either driven by ethnicity or by increasing resource scarcity caused by climate
change or population growth—or a combination of these factors. While these elements may be relevant and play a role, which we also see in the case of Fulani-Dogon
violence in Mali, narratives about ethnicity or scarcity also serve to simplify explanations of conflicts and to gloss over their more complex root causes linked to historical and contemporary land relations.
We therefore argue that in order to more fully understand such land struggles
that escalate into violence, it is necessary to study the material politics and political
ecology of land governance in a historical context. This will lead to explanations
that move beyond simple causal chains where the Sahel is seen as an arena with
decreasing resource scarcity affecting livelihoods that again trigger migrations or
conflicts.
In addition to demonstrating the complex background to the current crisis in
Mali and how simplistic narratives about its causes are not helpful for understanding
this crisis, the case also shows how views in a military intervention of the enemy as
‘terrorists’ or ‘jihadists’ are also dangerous and able to further fuel violent conflicts.
Chapter 8 · Climate Change, Scarcity and Conflicts in the Sahel