199
8
However, the administration was bribed by Dogon farmers not to implement the
court’s decision.
One Dogon even continued to cultivate in the interior of the harima, and one day
(in August 2002), he was found assassinated. In the night after his body had been
discovered, Dogon in the area met, and the next morning they killed the pastoral
leader and seven other people.
After this attack, local Fulani mobilized to evict all Dogon from the Tolodié
area, which was accepted by the local administration at the time. But in the following
years, Dogon managed to gradually move back again to farm in the area.
A few years later, in 2017, some Dogon, without the authorization of the local
Dogon village chief, started to demand fees from Fulani herders for grazing around
their hamlets. One Dogon also encroached on the harima with his fields. On 17 June
2017, when visiting the local market with his son, he was killed by some Fulani (others refer to them as ‘jihadists’).
This led a group of Dogon to organise an act of revenge, which resulted in the
burning down of Fulani hamlets and the killing of 40 Fulani in the Tolodié area. The
next day, Fulani burned down Dogon hamlets and killed six Dogon.
This violence in Tolodié in 2002 and 2017 are considered key events leading to
the subsequent escalation of Fulani-Dogon violent conflicts. Another key event was
the Dogon attack on Sari on 22 May 2012, which is a village situated between Koro
and the border to Burkina Faso. In this attack, 350 huts were burnt, 774 cattle taken
and 21 Fulani villagers killed in addition to several injured.
This conflict, which is about a cattle corridor being blocked by farming, has also
for several years been dealt with by the courts, in this case the primary court in Koro
and the appeal court in Sévaré, without any resolution although judgments have
been in favour of the Fulani, because they are acknowledged as the first-comers in
that area.
The conflict continued with the Dogon associated with and supported by the
army, while Fulani pastoralists have joined different jihadist groups in large numbers.
In Mali, militias have often been used by the state in times of crisis to support the
armed forces. The army has occasionally acknowledged that it has provided training
and logistical support to these militias (Boisvert 2015). According to Charbonneau
(2020), the French Barkhane force also works with various pro-government militias
in their anti-terrorism efforts in Mali. This has provided the various militias with
increased power and further exacerbated inter-community tensions.
Dana Amassagou is the latest addition to pro-government militias in Mali. It is
usually referred to as a Dogon militia consisting of traditional Dogon hunters as
well as former army officers and soldiers of Dogon ethnicity, but also mixed with
some combatants who are of Bambara ethnicity.
This militia was established in December 2016 to protect the Dogon population
against jihadist attacks. In 2018, Dana Amassagou experienced a boost in its operational power when it started to receive support from the state after an initiative from
the prime minister at the time. The support included the provision of automatic
8.2 · Pastoralism, Marginalization and Conflicts in Mali
8
However, the administration was bribed by Dogon farmers not to implement the
court’s decision.
One Dogon even continued to cultivate in the interior of the harima, and one day
(in August 2002), he was found assassinated. In the night after his body had been
discovered, Dogon in the area met, and the next morning they killed the pastoral
leader and seven other people.
After this attack, local Fulani mobilized to evict all Dogon from the Tolodié
area, which was accepted by the local administration at the time. But in the following
years, Dogon managed to gradually move back again to farm in the area.
A few years later, in 2017, some Dogon, without the authorization of the local
Dogon village chief, started to demand fees from Fulani herders for grazing around
their hamlets. One Dogon also encroached on the harima with his fields. On 17 June
2017, when visiting the local market with his son, he was killed by some Fulani (others refer to them as ‘jihadists’).
This led a group of Dogon to organise an act of revenge, which resulted in the
burning down of Fulani hamlets and the killing of 40 Fulani in the Tolodié area. The
next day, Fulani burned down Dogon hamlets and killed six Dogon.
This violence in Tolodié in 2002 and 2017 are considered key events leading to
the subsequent escalation of Fulani-Dogon violent conflicts. Another key event was
the Dogon attack on Sari on 22 May 2012, which is a village situated between Koro
and the border to Burkina Faso. In this attack, 350 huts were burnt, 774 cattle taken
and 21 Fulani villagers killed in addition to several injured.
This conflict, which is about a cattle corridor being blocked by farming, has also
for several years been dealt with by the courts, in this case the primary court in Koro
and the appeal court in Sévaré, without any resolution although judgments have
been in favour of the Fulani, because they are acknowledged as the first-comers in
that area.
The conflict continued with the Dogon associated with and supported by the
army, while Fulani pastoralists have joined different jihadist groups in large numbers.
In Mali, militias have often been used by the state in times of crisis to support the
armed forces. The army has occasionally acknowledged that it has provided training
and logistical support to these militias (Boisvert 2015). According to Charbonneau
(2020), the French Barkhane force also works with various pro-government militias
in their anti-terrorism efforts in Mali. This has provided the various militias with
increased power and further exacerbated inter-community tensions.
Dana Amassagou is the latest addition to pro-government militias in Mali. It is
usually referred to as a Dogon militia consisting of traditional Dogon hunters as
well as former army officers and soldiers of Dogon ethnicity, but also mixed with
some combatants who are of Bambara ethnicity.
This militia was established in December 2016 to protect the Dogon population
against jihadist attacks. In 2018, Dana Amassagou experienced a boost in its operational power when it started to receive support from the state after an initiative from
the prime minister at the time. The support included the provision of automatic
8.2 · Pastoralism, Marginalization and Conflicts in Mali