248 Fabien Girard and Manohisoa Rakotondrabe
familiarity and simplicity evaporates. The script is in fact Janus-faced and offers
two different, albeit interrelated, versions of the function of ABS in biodiversity
conservation. The tension stems from this duality.
Something familiar remains, though, as foundational in both cases is the
notion that ABS is a “win-win” scenario whereby advanced economies (the
“gene-poor North”) can maintain their access to plant genetic resources (PGRs)
located in the tropics, while the Global South, through the benefits flowing
from intellectual property rights (IPRs) on “biodiscovery”, is supposedly better
equipped to tackle the erosion of biodiversity. Key to this is the understanding,
based on economic attributes (low excludability and high rivalry), of PGRs as
“impure public goods” (Halewood, 2013; Halewood et al., 2021).
12 In the reports
submitted to the funding agency, this idea features prominently in the theoretical
underpinnings, along with scattered, but strong references to New Institutional
Economics, collective action and the “Commons”. The main threat to the conservation of PGRs is underuse, not overexploitation (Schmietow, 2012, p. 82). In
addition, while the biodiversity maintained and enriched by farmers and IPLCs
generates positive externalities (in the form of “use value” or “option value”, Jarvis et al., 2016), none of these values are appropriated on the local level by those
responsible for its maintenance due to the lack of “property rights associated with
the public good genetic resources” (Sedjo, 1992, p. 200). It follows from this that,
in order to ensure that farmers and local communities continue to use, trade in
and access their seeds and plants, economic incentives need to be developed.
Here, the first version of the script begins to materialise: ABS agreements and
BCPs are tools to incentivise
13 and drive changes in IPLCs’ attitudes towards the
conservation of PGRs, building on the rather narrow and contested premise that
farmers and IPLCs have always “operationalized the management of [PGRs]”
(Eyzaguirre & Dennis, 2007, p. 1492) and make decisions regarding their lands
and the maintenance of diversity according to wealth maximisation criteria (or
economic efficiency) alone.
14 We refer to this as the “economic incentives”
script.
In its second version, the script continues to be about designing appropriate
incentives, i.e. on ways to change how “humans interact with their environment
and how they use natural resources”, as well as “patterns of behaviour and traditions that have emerged over long periods of time, and have, as a result, become
enshrined in law or social custom”.
15 However, in the wake of North’s work on
institutional changes (North, 1990), incentives are more broadly conceived of
as a blend of “formal constraints” (economic and legal instruments, regulations
and public investment), “social constraints” (such as cultural norms and social
conventions) and “levels of compliance”, all of which constitute “institutional
incentives”. We refer to this script as the “institutional incentives” script.
In its institutional version, the script takes on very distinctive features: incentives are no longer about fine-tuned property rights over resources or knowledge,
16 or Coasean contracts (Sedjo, 1992, p. 204),
17 as is the case of the economic
incentive script, but rather about acting on local institutions and social norms in
familiarity and simplicity evaporates. The script is in fact Janus-faced and offers
two different, albeit interrelated, versions of the function of ABS in biodiversity
conservation. The tension stems from this duality.
Something familiar remains, though, as foundational in both cases is the
notion that ABS is a “win-win” scenario whereby advanced economies (the
“gene-poor North”) can maintain their access to plant genetic resources (PGRs)
located in the tropics, while the Global South, through the benefits flowing
from intellectual property rights (IPRs) on “biodiscovery”, is supposedly better
equipped to tackle the erosion of biodiversity. Key to this is the understanding,
based on economic attributes (low excludability and high rivalry), of PGRs as
“impure public goods” (Halewood, 2013; Halewood et al., 2021).
12 In the reports
submitted to the funding agency, this idea features prominently in the theoretical
underpinnings, along with scattered, but strong references to New Institutional
Economics, collective action and the “Commons”. The main threat to the conservation of PGRs is underuse, not overexploitation (Schmietow, 2012, p. 82). In
addition, while the biodiversity maintained and enriched by farmers and IPLCs
generates positive externalities (in the form of “use value” or “option value”, Jarvis et al., 2016), none of these values are appropriated on the local level by those
responsible for its maintenance due to the lack of “property rights associated with
the public good genetic resources” (Sedjo, 1992, p. 200). It follows from this that,
in order to ensure that farmers and local communities continue to use, trade in
and access their seeds and plants, economic incentives need to be developed.
Here, the first version of the script begins to materialise: ABS agreements and
BCPs are tools to incentivise
13 and drive changes in IPLCs’ attitudes towards the
conservation of PGRs, building on the rather narrow and contested premise that
farmers and IPLCs have always “operationalized the management of [PGRs]”
(Eyzaguirre & Dennis, 2007, p. 1492) and make decisions regarding their lands
and the maintenance of diversity according to wealth maximisation criteria (or
economic efficiency) alone.
14 We refer to this as the “economic incentives”
script.
In its second version, the script continues to be about designing appropriate
incentives, i.e. on ways to change how “humans interact with their environment
and how they use natural resources”, as well as “patterns of behaviour and traditions that have emerged over long periods of time, and have, as a result, become
enshrined in law or social custom”.
15 However, in the wake of North’s work on
institutional changes (North, 1990), incentives are more broadly conceived of
as a blend of “formal constraints” (economic and legal instruments, regulations
and public investment), “social constraints” (such as cultural norms and social
conventions) and “levels of compliance”, all of which constitute “institutional
incentives”. We refer to this script as the “institutional incentives” script.
In its institutional version, the script takes on very distinctive features: incentives are no longer about fine-tuned property rights over resources or knowledge,
16 or Coasean contracts (Sedjo, 1992, p. 204),
17 as is the case of the economic
incentive script, but rather about acting on local institutions and social norms in