BCPs and Boundary Work in Madagascar 249
order to reinforce enabling social constraints and drive necessary changes. In
other words, risks of underuse are not to be blamed on the lack of economic
incentives (benefit sharing) but, as the project holder for Bioversity International
recently put it, on institutional and capacity weaknesses that prevent farmers
from taking advantage “of the technological and organizational developments
that have changed the shape and functioning of the global crop commons over
recent decades” (Halewood et al., 2021, p. 12).
19 Here, the function of the BCP
is radically different, and appears to make plenty of sense in the context of Analavory. Indeed, although Madagascar is a biodiversity hotspot, other than a very
few crops, it is not a centre of crop diversity (see Table 18.1 in Kamau, 2013,
pp. 380–381).
20 As a consequence, for farming communities, such as that in
Analavory, endowed only with PGRFA, by nature of little interest to potential
bioprospectors, the BCP can hardly be conceived of as anything other than a tool
for accessing PGRFA through the MLS or other sources, as well as including
landraces in the MLS.
21
For Bioversity International, it was clearly the second version of the script
(“institutional incentives”) which supported the development of the BCP. The
goal was, unquestionably, to roll out a new institutional framework for communities to engage in transnational germplasm transfers, test new cultivars through
participatory plant breeding and adopt new varieties (see Halewood et al., 2021).
Yet, nothing was more at odds with the agenda of Natural Justice and with
the facilitator’s professional habitus. The facilitator therefore clung on to the
first script (“economic incentives”) and pushed to shift the protocol away from
PGRFA and to rearticulate it around genetic resources and the Nagoya Protocol.
There seems little doubt that the facilitator believed that, with greater time and
effort spent on bioprospection, the BCP would deliver. This would, furthermore,
only be fair from the peasants’ perspective – in that he clearly claimed to be able
to decipher their will and cater to their needs. And yet, he was all too aware of
having been “recruited” (just as much as the farmers) (Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 13)
into a separate script – linking the BCP with ITPGRFA and achieving exchanges
of germplasm with centres of research and partner communities. As one of our
semi-directed interviews with the facilitator shows, the BCP, in relation to ABS,
only exists because he overstepped the limits set for his mission, something which,
as he is keenly aware, injects a first level of precariousness into the BCP:
18
That’s something that was a little bit difficult for us, as Natural Justice
that actually facilitated the whole process, and that I think is something
that we’re going to really incorporate into the overall community protocols guide. It’s this relationship, well, this mediation between the local
communities on the one hand and those who fund the whole project on
the other. Because the institutions that are involved, like for example the
Darwin project, they get into their head “here we are going to develop
a community protocol for such and such an end!” […] and on the other
hand, there are the communities that have their own priorities, which may
order to reinforce enabling social constraints and drive necessary changes. In
other words, risks of underuse are not to be blamed on the lack of economic
incentives (benefit sharing) but, as the project holder for Bioversity International
recently put it, on institutional and capacity weaknesses that prevent farmers
from taking advantage “of the technological and organizational developments
that have changed the shape and functioning of the global crop commons over
recent decades” (Halewood et al., 2021, p. 12).
19 Here, the function of the BCP
is radically different, and appears to make plenty of sense in the context of Analavory. Indeed, although Madagascar is a biodiversity hotspot, other than a very
few crops, it is not a centre of crop diversity (see Table 18.1 in Kamau, 2013,
pp. 380–381).
20 As a consequence, for farming communities, such as that in
Analavory, endowed only with PGRFA, by nature of little interest to potential
bioprospectors, the BCP can hardly be conceived of as anything other than a tool
for accessing PGRFA through the MLS or other sources, as well as including
landraces in the MLS.
21
For Bioversity International, it was clearly the second version of the script
(“institutional incentives”) which supported the development of the BCP. The
goal was, unquestionably, to roll out a new institutional framework for communities to engage in transnational germplasm transfers, test new cultivars through
participatory plant breeding and adopt new varieties (see Halewood et al., 2021).
Yet, nothing was more at odds with the agenda of Natural Justice and with
the facilitator’s professional habitus. The facilitator therefore clung on to the
first script (“economic incentives”) and pushed to shift the protocol away from
PGRFA and to rearticulate it around genetic resources and the Nagoya Protocol.
There seems little doubt that the facilitator believed that, with greater time and
effort spent on bioprospection, the BCP would deliver. This would, furthermore,
only be fair from the peasants’ perspective – in that he clearly claimed to be able
to decipher their will and cater to their needs. And yet, he was all too aware of
having been “recruited” (just as much as the farmers) (Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 13)
into a separate script – linking the BCP with ITPGRFA and achieving exchanges
of germplasm with centres of research and partner communities. As one of our
semi-directed interviews with the facilitator shows, the BCP, in relation to ABS,
only exists because he overstepped the limits set for his mission, something which,
as he is keenly aware, injects a first level of precariousness into the BCP:
18
That’s something that was a little bit difficult for us, as Natural Justice
that actually facilitated the whole process, and that I think is something
that we’re going to really incorporate into the overall community protocols guide. It’s this relationship, well, this mediation between the local
communities on the one hand and those who fund the whole project on
the other. Because the institutions that are involved, like for example the
Darwin project, they get into their head “here we are going to develop
a community protocol for such and such an end!” […] and on the other
hand, there are the communities that have their own priorities, which may