BCPs and Boundary Work in Madagascar 247
Consequently, they need to go through various “chain aids” (Sharma, 2016),
and it is exactly this which opens the way to alternative scripts, destabilises the
“enrolment” process and puts a strain on the boundary work.
There is little doubt that all this competition between scripts creates a new
political space on the ground which benefits some community members. It
remains to be seen, however, whether it stands as a “mobile space” of empowerment and emancipation (Tsing, 1999, p. 157) or, on the contrary, as an “elite
capture” phenomenon which is potentially disruptive of group’s cohesion in the
long run.
In the next section, we offer an overview of the two competing public scripts
that the Darwin project brought in its wake. It then goes on to show the tension
that this competition created, allowing notably the Ministry of Agriculture to
push for a hidden script and some community members to exploit the competition between scripts. The final section investigates the effect that the competing
scripts and the hindered boundary work which resulted had on the content of
the BCP itself.
Two Competing Public Scripts
Quite apart from the establishment of an ABS legal framework in Benin and
Madagascar, the Darwin project pursued the development of BCPs within several communities in these same countries. To this end, two communities with
different profiles were to be selected within each country: first, a community
living in high diversity area that would act as providers of resources under ABS
agreements; and second, a community that would be selected on the basis of
its possible need for adapted germplasm (Bioversity International, 2014). In
Madagascar, farmers in the rural commune of Analavory fell within the second
category, while the Fokontany (a basic administrative subdivision covering several villages) of Ampangalantsary fell within the first. In total, four BCPs were
developed and consultants from Natural Justice acted as facilitators (Bioversity
International, 2018).
Turning now to the development of the Analavory BCP, the case study
shows a seeming tension, if not competition, between two scripts that is discernible throughout the working documents and internal reports produced
over the lifespan of the project, a tension that we were able to confirm through
semi-directed interviews with the project leader, the facilitator from Natural
Justice, staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and public officials from the Ministry
of Agriculture’s decentralised departments.
To understand this tension, we need to refer back to the Darwin project as it
was designed and submitted by Bioversity International. Immediately striking to
any reader versed in international biodiversity governance is the project’s alignment with the “Grand Bargain” narrative (Wynberg & Laird, 2009) and adherence to the “ILPCs as small entrepreneurs” script which is analysed at length
in Chapter 11 of this volume. On closer examination, however, this sense of
Consequently, they need to go through various “chain aids” (Sharma, 2016),
and it is exactly this which opens the way to alternative scripts, destabilises the
“enrolment” process and puts a strain on the boundary work.
There is little doubt that all this competition between scripts creates a new
political space on the ground which benefits some community members. It
remains to be seen, however, whether it stands as a “mobile space” of empowerment and emancipation (Tsing, 1999, p. 157) or, on the contrary, as an “elite
capture” phenomenon which is potentially disruptive of group’s cohesion in the
long run.
In the next section, we offer an overview of the two competing public scripts
that the Darwin project brought in its wake. It then goes on to show the tension
that this competition created, allowing notably the Ministry of Agriculture to
push for a hidden script and some community members to exploit the competition between scripts. The final section investigates the effect that the competing
scripts and the hindered boundary work which resulted had on the content of
the BCP itself.
Two Competing Public Scripts
Quite apart from the establishment of an ABS legal framework in Benin and
Madagascar, the Darwin project pursued the development of BCPs within several communities in these same countries. To this end, two communities with
different profiles were to be selected within each country: first, a community
living in high diversity area that would act as providers of resources under ABS
agreements; and second, a community that would be selected on the basis of
its possible need for adapted germplasm (Bioversity International, 2014). In
Madagascar, farmers in the rural commune of Analavory fell within the second
category, while the Fokontany (a basic administrative subdivision covering several villages) of Ampangalantsary fell within the first. In total, four BCPs were
developed and consultants from Natural Justice acted as facilitators (Bioversity
International, 2018).
Turning now to the development of the Analavory BCP, the case study
shows a seeming tension, if not competition, between two scripts that is discernible throughout the working documents and internal reports produced
over the lifespan of the project, a tension that we were able to confirm through
semi-directed interviews with the project leader, the facilitator from Natural
Justice, staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and public officials from the Ministry
of Agriculture’s decentralised departments.
To understand this tension, we need to refer back to the Darwin project as it
was designed and submitted by Bioversity International. Immediately striking to
any reader versed in international biodiversity governance is the project’s alignment with the “Grand Bargain” narrative (Wynberg & Laird, 2009) and adherence to the “ILPCs as small entrepreneurs” script which is analysed at length
in Chapter 11 of this volume. On closer examination, however, this sense of