54
J. A. GULLAND AND J. E. CARROZ
The alternative methods of taking the net economic yield proposed
earlier (tax or licences, or a single operating body) would both involve
a managing body with very much greater powers than the present
commissions. Only in special circumstances would it be feasible for the
operations to be carried out directly by the managing authority, and
it would be more practicakde for control to be by tax or licence. Since
the purposes of such licences would be to reduce the difficulties of
allocation of the share of the quota, and of discouraging new entries, by
making fishing only moderately attractive, i.e. to ensure that the value
of the catch is not much greater than the cost of catching plus the
licence fee, as regulation becomes effective the licence fee should become
substantial. The question of how this large income from licence fees is
used will then become very important.
Since an immediate redistribution of all the net yield from licence
fees among participating countries would not reduce the attractions
(and hence also the problems) for new entrants-except for the losses
due to administrative costs-a considerable portion of the profits
should be shared more widely. The first call on the income might then
be to finance all the costs of management, including the closely related
research. The profits could also be used for more widely ranging
research, not only into the population dynamics of the stocks immediately concerned, and of other stocks in the area, including the
development of fisheries on hitherto unexploited stocks, but also more
fundamental biological and oceanographic research into more efficient
ways of catching and utilizing the potential natural production of fish
(at present any improvement in catching techniques only adds to the
difficulties of regulation, and in some regulated fisheries is positively
discouraged, which is economic nonsense) and into positive methods of
increasing the natural production-" farming the sea ".
Another part of the profits might go to those actually engaged in
fishing, assuming that the managing body did not carry out its own
operations directly. If the management of a particular stock was part
of a more widespread agreement on fishing (possibly world-wide) then
another part of the profits could be shared among all the parties to the
agreement. This would give even those not at present fishing in an
area some direct interest in the proper management of that area, and
hence make the abstention principle more generally appealing.
Finally, the managing body itself might be able to use a share
outside the immediate field of fisheries. Thus perhaps on the continental
shelf it might be the coastal state and the money would go to the national
treasury, or, especially in the open oceans, the body might be an
agency of the United Nations, with the money going to the central
J. A. GULLAND AND J. E. CARROZ
The alternative methods of taking the net economic yield proposed
earlier (tax or licences, or a single operating body) would both involve
a managing body with very much greater powers than the present
commissions. Only in special circumstances would it be feasible for the
operations to be carried out directly by the managing authority, and
it would be more practicakde for control to be by tax or licence. Since
the purposes of such licences would be to reduce the difficulties of
allocation of the share of the quota, and of discouraging new entries, by
making fishing only moderately attractive, i.e. to ensure that the value
of the catch is not much greater than the cost of catching plus the
licence fee, as regulation becomes effective the licence fee should become
substantial. The question of how this large income from licence fees is
used will then become very important.
Since an immediate redistribution of all the net yield from licence
fees among participating countries would not reduce the attractions
(and hence also the problems) for new entrants-except for the losses
due to administrative costs-a considerable portion of the profits
should be shared more widely. The first call on the income might then
be to finance all the costs of management, including the closely related
research. The profits could also be used for more widely ranging
research, not only into the population dynamics of the stocks immediately concerned, and of other stocks in the area, including the
development of fisheries on hitherto unexploited stocks, but also more
fundamental biological and oceanographic research into more efficient
ways of catching and utilizing the potential natural production of fish
(at present any improvement in catching techniques only adds to the
difficulties of regulation, and in some regulated fisheries is positively
discouraged, which is economic nonsense) and into positive methods of
increasing the natural production-" farming the sea ".
Another part of the profits might go to those actually engaged in
fishing, assuming that the managing body did not carry out its own
operations directly. If the management of a particular stock was part
of a more widespread agreement on fishing (possibly world-wide) then
another part of the profits could be shared among all the parties to the
agreement. This would give even those not at present fishing in an
area some direct interest in the proper management of that area, and
hence make the abstention principle more generally appealing.
Finally, the managing body itself might be able to use a share
outside the immediate field of fisheries. Thus perhaps on the continental
shelf it might be the coastal state and the money would go to the national
treasury, or, especially in the open oceans, the body might be an
agency of the United Nations, with the money going to the central