MANAGEMENT O F FISHERY RESOURCES
53
of the catch, but a large proportion of the net yield. Some of the failures
to achieve the potential benefits of management may be ascribed to the
lack of consideration of the net economic yield, as opposed to the gross
catch. M'ithout a more or less explicit decision concerning how the net
yield should be taken and distributed, it is almost certain that the
potential net yield will be dissipated in excess costs of one kind or
another .
C. International marmgement
The net yield can be taken explicitly if there is a single managing
authority either carrying out operations itself (e.g. the U.S. Government
for the Pribilof fur seals) or charging a tax or licence fee. For most
commissions, however, the assumption seems to be that the benefit will
accrue directly to the fishermen, who will be able to reduce their costs
in proportion to the reduction in the amount of fishing. But this
desirable state of affairs is unlikely to continue if there is no restriction
of entry into the fishery. If fishing becomes as attractive as it should,
then new countries will want to join in, and those already participating
will want to increase their share. Initially, agreement on the shares of
the participating countries may be reached reasonably objectively on
the basis of existing catches and plans for the immediate future, but
later such a basis will become less and less firm. Again the fur seal is
an exception, since the allocation of 15% of the gross take to the
potentially pelagic countries, and the rest to the owners of the breeding
islands, represents something like the shares of the catch under freefor-all conditions where the land-based operations will have advantages.
The so-called abstention principle, whereby a country will abstain from
entering any fishery which is being properly managed, is one attempt
to restrict new entrants, but is attractive only to the countries with
established fisheries. Unless the amount a country considers it stands
to lose by being kept out of one fishery is balanced by what it gains in
an established fishery in another area, or there is some other incentive
for abstaining, it may not become an effective principle. Both the
problem of new entrants, and of the shares of established participants
may be lessened if the shares can be transferred, as was done in fact,
though not in form, through the sale and transfer of factory ships under
the Agreement on Antarctic Whaling. This would probably work for
countries wishing to increase their share, and who would prefer to pay
for an increased share rather than lose their existing share of the
benefits of proper management through breakdown of agreements.
This constraint would be less effective for countries entering a fishery
for the first time.
53
of the catch, but a large proportion of the net yield. Some of the failures
to achieve the potential benefits of management may be ascribed to the
lack of consideration of the net economic yield, as opposed to the gross
catch. M'ithout a more or less explicit decision concerning how the net
yield should be taken and distributed, it is almost certain that the
potential net yield will be dissipated in excess costs of one kind or
another .
C. International marmgement
The net yield can be taken explicitly if there is a single managing
authority either carrying out operations itself (e.g. the U.S. Government
for the Pribilof fur seals) or charging a tax or licence fee. For most
commissions, however, the assumption seems to be that the benefit will
accrue directly to the fishermen, who will be able to reduce their costs
in proportion to the reduction in the amount of fishing. But this
desirable state of affairs is unlikely to continue if there is no restriction
of entry into the fishery. If fishing becomes as attractive as it should,
then new countries will want to join in, and those already participating
will want to increase their share. Initially, agreement on the shares of
the participating countries may be reached reasonably objectively on
the basis of existing catches and plans for the immediate future, but
later such a basis will become less and less firm. Again the fur seal is
an exception, since the allocation of 15% of the gross take to the
potentially pelagic countries, and the rest to the owners of the breeding
islands, represents something like the shares of the catch under freefor-all conditions where the land-based operations will have advantages.
The so-called abstention principle, whereby a country will abstain from
entering any fishery which is being properly managed, is one attempt
to restrict new entrants, but is attractive only to the countries with
established fisheries. Unless the amount a country considers it stands
to lose by being kept out of one fishery is balanced by what it gains in
an established fishery in another area, or there is some other incentive
for abstaining, it may not become an effective principle. Both the
problem of new entrants, and of the shares of established participants
may be lessened if the shares can be transferred, as was done in fact,
though not in form, through the sale and transfer of factory ships under
the Agreement on Antarctic Whaling. This would probably work for
countries wishing to increase their share, and who would prefer to pay
for an increased share rather than lose their existing share of the
benefits of proper management through breakdown of agreements.
This constraint would be less effective for countries entering a fishery
for the first time.