MANAGEMENT O F FISHERY RESOURCES
55
U.N. budget as suggested by Christy and Scott (1965); for instance,
the Ninth General Assembly of the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources approved a resolut.ion
urging the early development of a specialized agency under the United
Nations for the management and conservation of whales. The possibility that the coastal state should, with international agreement,
have some degree of managerial authority over part of a high seas
fishery is a quite different concept from a simple extension of exclusive
fishery limits. A wide extension of such limits would at first sight
ease the problems of management by removing them from the international to the national sphere. However, it does not seem a practicable solution for many reasons-politically it would be unacceptable
t o many countries, and biologically many stocks range over wide areas
and cannot be effectively managed by unilateral action in one area.
Also, if the fishery limits were applied in the most usual manner of
excluding all foreign fishing vessels, possibly with temporary exceptions
for nations with traditional rights, many coastal states might not have
the economic or technical capacity to harvest the full potential of the
stocks. The potential of such stocks would therefore be wasted by
under-exploitation just as much as the potential of some stocks is a t
present wasted by over-exploitation. Fuller use in such situations
might be achieved by something less than complete banning of foreign
fishing, e.g. by charging a licence fee for fishing within the limits.
The concept of having to pay to fish on the high seas, even to an
international body, is not one that will be accepted lightly. The
preceding discussion suggests very strongly that without this or some
other fundamentally new approach to management, the full potential
net economic yield of the fish stocks of the world will not be attained.
The present type of commission is probably capable, given good scientific advice, and a reasonable attitude among its members, of maintaining the stocks with which they are concerned and the catches from
these stocks, but not capable of ensuring that the catches are taken at
as low a cost as possible. The wastage involved, and the benefits from
proper management, are very large; even at present the resources
wasted in excessive costs of capture in just two groups of stocks-the
salmon in the North Pacific and the cod of the north-east Atlanticcould, if rationally utilized, increase the total world catch of fish by
perhaps 5%. The present catches of cod in the area could probably be
taken with around half the present costs, while, whatever the merits in
terms of total catch of taking salmon on the high seas or in coastal
waters, none of the methods a t present used seem an efficient way of
harvesting an animal which could be persuaded to swim almost inside
A.DI.B.-6
3
55
U.N. budget as suggested by Christy and Scott (1965); for instance,
the Ninth General Assembly of the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources approved a resolut.ion
urging the early development of a specialized agency under the United
Nations for the management and conservation of whales. The possibility that the coastal state should, with international agreement,
have some degree of managerial authority over part of a high seas
fishery is a quite different concept from a simple extension of exclusive
fishery limits. A wide extension of such limits would at first sight
ease the problems of management by removing them from the international to the national sphere. However, it does not seem a practicable solution for many reasons-politically it would be unacceptable
t o many countries, and biologically many stocks range over wide areas
and cannot be effectively managed by unilateral action in one area.
Also, if the fishery limits were applied in the most usual manner of
excluding all foreign fishing vessels, possibly with temporary exceptions
for nations with traditional rights, many coastal states might not have
the economic or technical capacity to harvest the full potential of the
stocks. The potential of such stocks would therefore be wasted by
under-exploitation just as much as the potential of some stocks is a t
present wasted by over-exploitation. Fuller use in such situations
might be achieved by something less than complete banning of foreign
fishing, e.g. by charging a licence fee for fishing within the limits.
The concept of having to pay to fish on the high seas, even to an
international body, is not one that will be accepted lightly. The
preceding discussion suggests very strongly that without this or some
other fundamentally new approach to management, the full potential
net economic yield of the fish stocks of the world will not be attained.
The present type of commission is probably capable, given good scientific advice, and a reasonable attitude among its members, of maintaining the stocks with which they are concerned and the catches from
these stocks, but not capable of ensuring that the catches are taken at
as low a cost as possible. The wastage involved, and the benefits from
proper management, are very large; even at present the resources
wasted in excessive costs of capture in just two groups of stocks-the
salmon in the North Pacific and the cod of the north-east Atlanticcould, if rationally utilized, increase the total world catch of fish by
perhaps 5%. The present catches of cod in the area could probably be
taken with around half the present costs, while, whatever the merits in
terms of total catch of taking salmon on the high seas or in coastal
waters, none of the methods a t present used seem an efficient way of
harvesting an animal which could be persuaded to swim almost inside
A.DI.B.-6
3