226
The Last Resource
of how marine ‘spoils’ of the kind described in this book should be
shared. Such a solution must consider the military as well as the
commercial role of the oceans. International accord is difcult
enough to achieve in the regulation of shing, an activity which dates
back almost to antiquity, but it is even more illusive where the
military interests of the technologically advanced nations are
involved or threatened. A mistakc made now in these formative
years of ocean development could lead one day to open conflict
between powerful factions, as well as frustrate the hopes of those
who look to the oceans for food, fresh water and national wealth.
The rst signicant deve10pment came in 1945 when the United
States made a unilateral proclamation laying claim to the resources
on its continental shelf down to the IOO-fath0l (zoo—metre) mark.
Other countries followed suit with further claims to areas of the sea
and ocean—oor well beyond their territorial waters. Ïn spite of some
protests, it seemed generally agreed that this was entirely reasonable,
provided that some kind of uniformity existed over what a country
could realistically claim as its own. And, at the request of the United
Nations, an International Commission was set up to study the
problem. The ndings of this Commission led to the Convention on
the Continental Shelf of April 29, 1958 which came into force on
]une 10, 1964—thirty days after its ratication by the United
Kingdom.
The Convention recognized the right of the coastal state to exer—
cise sovereign rights over the continental Shelf dened as ‘the sea—
bed and sub-soil adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit to where
the depth of the superiacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas’. These rights were to be inde—
pendent of ‘occupation, effective or notional’ or of ‘any express
proclamation’. Thus the Convention placed a seal of approval on
most of the underwater territories already acquired unilaterally but,
by introducing the ambiguity of depths permitting exploitation,
it became an ‘open—ended’ document which placed virtually no
restrictions on technologically advanced nations. Indeed, the
United States leased tracts of land, situated under water several
hundred fathoms deep, basing this on the assumption that the
country’s authority ‘extends as far seawards as technological ability
can cope with the water depth . . . in accord with the Convention of
the Sea adopted at Geneva’.
The Last Resource
of how marine ‘spoils’ of the kind described in this book should be
shared. Such a solution must consider the military as well as the
commercial role of the oceans. International accord is difcult
enough to achieve in the regulation of shing, an activity which dates
back almost to antiquity, but it is even more illusive where the
military interests of the technologically advanced nations are
involved or threatened. A mistakc made now in these formative
years of ocean development could lead one day to open conflict
between powerful factions, as well as frustrate the hopes of those
who look to the oceans for food, fresh water and national wealth.
The rst signicant deve10pment came in 1945 when the United
States made a unilateral proclamation laying claim to the resources
on its continental shelf down to the IOO-fath0l (zoo—metre) mark.
Other countries followed suit with further claims to areas of the sea
and ocean—oor well beyond their territorial waters. Ïn spite of some
protests, it seemed generally agreed that this was entirely reasonable,
provided that some kind of uniformity existed over what a country
could realistically claim as its own. And, at the request of the United
Nations, an International Commission was set up to study the
problem. The ndings of this Commission led to the Convention on
the Continental Shelf of April 29, 1958 which came into force on
]une 10, 1964—thirty days after its ratication by the United
Kingdom.
The Convention recognized the right of the coastal state to exer—
cise sovereign rights over the continental Shelf dened as ‘the sea—
bed and sub-soil adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit to where
the depth of the superiacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas’. These rights were to be inde—
pendent of ‘occupation, effective or notional’ or of ‘any express
proclamation’. Thus the Convention placed a seal of approval on
most of the underwater territories already acquired unilaterally but,
by introducing the ambiguity of depths permitting exploitation,
it became an ‘open—ended’ document which placed virtually no
restrictions on technologically advanced nations. Indeed, the
United States leased tracts of land, situated under water several
hundred fathoms deep, basing this on the assumption that the
country’s authority ‘extends as far seawards as technological ability
can cope with the water depth . . . in accord with the Convention of
the Sea adopted at Geneva’.