achieved corn self-sufficiency by temporarily canceling or reducing imports’’
(Fritscher 1999, p. 148).
In addition, Government protection of this crop in the international arena had
positive effects, since initially corn was kept away from the policies of price
liberalization. Within the country, guaranteed prices were maintained in institutions such as CONASUPO [National Company for Popular Subsistence], which
made large acquisitions ‘‘purchasing 45 % of the total production by the beginning
of the 1990s’’ (Fritscher 1999, p. 149).
However, it is important to note that the support provided to the country’s corn
growth was designed specifically for agriculture companies or producers that
possessed large quantities of hectares of farmland. This support consisted of
technological packages, business plans, and a very important element: water. For
small producers that had less than 5 ha and whose agriculture was seasonal, other
support was created, but it was limited to the provision of few resources justified
by lost harvest, which encouraged low productivity, mostly destined for personal
consumption.
In 1994, legislative conditions and market conditions were categorically
transformed. The corn market was liberalized, subsidies were reduced, tariff
protection on imports was withdrawn, and the United States (the leading producer
and distributor of corn worldwide) created a foundation for the debacle of the
cultivation of this crop in many parts of the world.
The sum of these facts has resulted in the fact that, today, the Mexican
Government has increased the amount of corn it imports that is produced by the
United States. This, according to various authors (Fritscher 1999; Rubio 1999; Bartra
1999; among others) and various social movements (Sin maíz no hay país [Without
corn there is no country], Unión Nacional de Productores de Maíz [National Union of
Corn Producers], La Vía Campesina [The Peasants’ Way],
5 among others), is
considered one of the major failures of the Mexican Government’s agricultural
policy. Paradoxically, this occurred in a country in which corn had been, for generations and in numerous regions, the main source of energy (carbohydrates and
proteins), as well as a food that provided a strong sense of identity.
From the mid-1990s to the early years of the third millennium, the trade reforms
continued at the global level, the transnational companies and especially those
related to the field of foods (Cargill and Continental)
6 being the main mobilizers.
One of the reforms took place in 1994 (in addition to Mexico’s signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement): the creation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) which ‘‘is not only an agent of trade liberalization, but also a tribunal for
enforcing corporate rights to manage consumption’’ (McMichael 1999, p. 23). The
national implications of the creation of the WTO can be understood on multiple
levels and in various dimensions. Some implications, for example, were the generation of various agri-food products, the use of high productivity technologies, the
5 For more information see Gasparello and Quintana (2009).
6 Kehman and Krebs (1996, pp. 122–130).
16 When Modernity is Not Enough
465
(Fritscher 1999, p. 148).
In addition, Government protection of this crop in the international arena had
positive effects, since initially corn was kept away from the policies of price
liberalization. Within the country, guaranteed prices were maintained in institutions such as CONASUPO [National Company for Popular Subsistence], which
made large acquisitions ‘‘purchasing 45 % of the total production by the beginning
of the 1990s’’ (Fritscher 1999, p. 149).
However, it is important to note that the support provided to the country’s corn
growth was designed specifically for agriculture companies or producers that
possessed large quantities of hectares of farmland. This support consisted of
technological packages, business plans, and a very important element: water. For
small producers that had less than 5 ha and whose agriculture was seasonal, other
support was created, but it was limited to the provision of few resources justified
by lost harvest, which encouraged low productivity, mostly destined for personal
consumption.
In 1994, legislative conditions and market conditions were categorically
transformed. The corn market was liberalized, subsidies were reduced, tariff
protection on imports was withdrawn, and the United States (the leading producer
and distributor of corn worldwide) created a foundation for the debacle of the
cultivation of this crop in many parts of the world.
The sum of these facts has resulted in the fact that, today, the Mexican
Government has increased the amount of corn it imports that is produced by the
United States. This, according to various authors (Fritscher 1999; Rubio 1999; Bartra
1999; among others) and various social movements (Sin maíz no hay país [Without
corn there is no country], Unión Nacional de Productores de Maíz [National Union of
Corn Producers], La Vía Campesina [The Peasants’ Way],
5 among others), is
considered one of the major failures of the Mexican Government’s agricultural
policy. Paradoxically, this occurred in a country in which corn had been, for generations and in numerous regions, the main source of energy (carbohydrates and
proteins), as well as a food that provided a strong sense of identity.
From the mid-1990s to the early years of the third millennium, the trade reforms
continued at the global level, the transnational companies and especially those
related to the field of foods (Cargill and Continental)
6 being the main mobilizers.
One of the reforms took place in 1994 (in addition to Mexico’s signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement): the creation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) which ‘‘is not only an agent of trade liberalization, but also a tribunal for
enforcing corporate rights to manage consumption’’ (McMichael 1999, p. 23). The
national implications of the creation of the WTO can be understood on multiple
levels and in various dimensions. Some implications, for example, were the generation of various agri-food products, the use of high productivity technologies, the
5 For more information see Gasparello and Quintana (2009).
6 Kehman and Krebs (1996, pp. 122–130).
16 When Modernity is Not Enough
465