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4 Social Justice in the Context of Fisheries – A Governability Challenge
Sometimes several and con fl icting justice principles apply to the same situation.
This situation is explored as a case of “legal pluralism” (Bavinck 2001 ; Jentoft et al.
2009 ) . Legal pluralism confronts individuals with the dif fi cult choice of which principles and rules to follow. The complexity of the governance issue is enhanced when
user groups disagree on which principles and rules they should support. In such a
situation governability is assumed to be low. Even if, for instance, fi shers should
agree that rights, desert, equality and need are all relevant as allocation principles,
they often value them differently. Interactive governance as a normative theory
recommends a process through which stakeholders can possibly reach some agreement on which values are paramount, how they should be weighted, and which
solutions follow from them. According to this theory, these are issues that should
ideally be raised prior to the actual implementation of policies; they are step-zero
issues in the governance process (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2007 ) . How principles
are communicated and deliberated, and how this process may affect governability at
some later stage, is an obvious topic for research.
Justice as a quality of the social system-to-be-governed is about the relations that
determine the distribution of costs and bene fi ts among its constituent members.
Property rights are examples of such a relationship, as they determine who is entitled to what, and who has the right to exclude others from the gains arising from a
particular property. Following Schattschneider’s idea that “organization is bias,”
governance modes determine who is eligible to sit at the decision-making table and
who is not. When interacting with the system-to-be-governed, the governing system
engages with those relations. While it may help to correct for relations that produce
injustice, it also risks entrenching or exacerbating such injustice. The latter is the
basis for the criticism raised against property rights as a fi sheries governance instrument from among small-scale fi shing groups and the request that property rights be
calibrated to broader human rights principles, as described above. Similar criticisms
can also be leveled at co-governance.
Governability is about the capacity of the governance system to impose principles and instruments that correct for differences in justice within the system-to-begoverned. It is fundamentally about the restricting and enabling role of power. Does
the governing system have the muscle it needs to control the power that rules the
system-to-be-governed? In some instances the answer is no, and governability will
consequently be low. In other instances, the governing system has the power, but
refrains from using it. In situations like the case of the Raw Fish Act that was introduced in Norway in 1938, it can radically empower small-scale fi shers vis-à-vis
fi sh-buyers (Jentoft 2011 ) .
Regardless of power differentials, interactive governance theory advocates a
participatory process characterized by transparency, accountability, cohesiveness
and inclusiveness. These governance principles are also about social justice, i.e.
the right to be recognized and to have a say in the decision-making on issues
within which people have things at stake. Thus, for enhancing governability,
procedural justice is as much about governability as it is about distributional
justice, and procedural justice is as important as the institutional design of
governance systems.
4 Social Justice in the Context of Fisheries – A Governability Challenge
Sometimes several and con fl icting justice principles apply to the same situation.
This situation is explored as a case of “legal pluralism” (Bavinck 2001 ; Jentoft et al.
2009 ) . Legal pluralism confronts individuals with the dif fi cult choice of which principles and rules to follow. The complexity of the governance issue is enhanced when
user groups disagree on which principles and rules they should support. In such a
situation governability is assumed to be low. Even if, for instance, fi shers should
agree that rights, desert, equality and need are all relevant as allocation principles,
they often value them differently. Interactive governance as a normative theory
recommends a process through which stakeholders can possibly reach some agreement on which values are paramount, how they should be weighted, and which
solutions follow from them. According to this theory, these are issues that should
ideally be raised prior to the actual implementation of policies; they are step-zero
issues in the governance process (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2007 ) . How principles
are communicated and deliberated, and how this process may affect governability at
some later stage, is an obvious topic for research.
Justice as a quality of the social system-to-be-governed is about the relations that
determine the distribution of costs and bene fi ts among its constituent members.
Property rights are examples of such a relationship, as they determine who is entitled to what, and who has the right to exclude others from the gains arising from a
particular property. Following Schattschneider’s idea that “organization is bias,”
governance modes determine who is eligible to sit at the decision-making table and
who is not. When interacting with the system-to-be-governed, the governing system
engages with those relations. While it may help to correct for relations that produce
injustice, it also risks entrenching or exacerbating such injustice. The latter is the
basis for the criticism raised against property rights as a fi sheries governance instrument from among small-scale fi shing groups and the request that property rights be
calibrated to broader human rights principles, as described above. Similar criticisms
can also be leveled at co-governance.
Governability is about the capacity of the governance system to impose principles and instruments that correct for differences in justice within the system-to-begoverned. It is fundamentally about the restricting and enabling role of power. Does
the governing system have the muscle it needs to control the power that rules the
system-to-be-governed? In some instances the answer is no, and governability will
consequently be low. In other instances, the governing system has the power, but
refrains from using it. In situations like the case of the Raw Fish Act that was introduced in Norway in 1938, it can radically empower small-scale fi shers vis-à-vis
fi sh-buyers (Jentoft 2011 ) .
Regardless of power differentials, interactive governance theory advocates a
participatory process characterized by transparency, accountability, cohesiveness
and inclusiveness. These governance principles are also about social justice, i.e.
the right to be recognized and to have a say in the decision-making on issues
within which people have things at stake. Thus, for enhancing governability,
procedural justice is as much about governability as it is about distributional
justice, and procedural justice is as important as the institutional design of
governance systems.