62
S. Jentoft
for each system one should start by detecting who embraces which justice principles.
Governance theory sees this as a matter of diversity. Complexity, on the other hand,
is about how these principles relate to each other, and how they add up in a way that
provides consistency in guiding individual or collective choice. The less they do so,
the harder the choices and the greater the governability problem. This is because the
choices that are made would be risky from a legitimacy perspective. With respect to
dynamics, governance theory assumes that principles are unstable, and that they
may change over time as a consequence of the shifting system components, relationships, interactions and boundaries (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, Chap. 18 , this
volume). How and why they change, what kind of social interactions they derive
from and lead to, is an interesting governability research issue. Finally, the issue of
scale invites questions with regard to the orders of governance and how they cut
across system boundaries. The governing system and system-to-be governed do not
exist in isolation, but are part of the society at large. Thus, although one would
expect to fi nd justice principles that are speci fi c to fi sheries, one would not expect
to fi nd justice principles that con fl ict, at least not radically, with those that work for
society as a whole. In other words, what constitute good governance principles in
the fi sheries sector would largely be in harmony with those that exist for society, as
major discrepancies would not be sustainable. If not for anything else, national or
international legislation would ensure it. This is what happens when the human
rights principles agreed to by the UN are written into national legislation and made
obligatory for the ways in which governments deal with the fi shing rights of indigenous peoples. It should then be discerned if there is inconsistency between justice
principles applied at different orders.
Conclusion
Social justice is among those qualities of governance systems that have value in and
of themselves. It is an intrinsic condition taken for granted and pursued for its own
sake. Still, it has governability implications, and therefore retains a functional purpose. Unavoidably, when missing, a governance system would suffer from a legitimacy de fi cit. Stakeholders will question its design and operation. They will take
offence and voice their opposition to those governors who they hold accountable for
it. They will also be less willing to abide by the rules and regulations. In some
instances, they prefer the latter response to the former. Thus, one may conclude that
for governance systems to be governable, they must ascribe to values, norms and
principles that stakeholders support. Social justice is no doubt one of these values,
perhaps even the most basic one, whose derived principles, applications and outcomes will always come under scrutiny. Stakeholders are likely to oppose governance mechanisms that they consider unfair to them, regardless of the positive
merits these mechanisms may otherwise have. Conversely, they may be willing to
make major sacri fi ces, like accepting strict regulatory measures that may hurt them
economically, if the burden the restrictions impose is fairly shared.
S. Jentoft
for each system one should start by detecting who embraces which justice principles.
Governance theory sees this as a matter of diversity. Complexity, on the other hand,
is about how these principles relate to each other, and how they add up in a way that
provides consistency in guiding individual or collective choice. The less they do so,
the harder the choices and the greater the governability problem. This is because the
choices that are made would be risky from a legitimacy perspective. With respect to
dynamics, governance theory assumes that principles are unstable, and that they
may change over time as a consequence of the shifting system components, relationships, interactions and boundaries (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, Chap. 18 , this
volume). How and why they change, what kind of social interactions they derive
from and lead to, is an interesting governability research issue. Finally, the issue of
scale invites questions with regard to the orders of governance and how they cut
across system boundaries. The governing system and system-to-be governed do not
exist in isolation, but are part of the society at large. Thus, although one would
expect to fi nd justice principles that are speci fi c to fi sheries, one would not expect
to fi nd justice principles that con fl ict, at least not radically, with those that work for
society as a whole. In other words, what constitute good governance principles in
the fi sheries sector would largely be in harmony with those that exist for society, as
major discrepancies would not be sustainable. If not for anything else, national or
international legislation would ensure it. This is what happens when the human
rights principles agreed to by the UN are written into national legislation and made
obligatory for the ways in which governments deal with the fi shing rights of indigenous peoples. It should then be discerned if there is inconsistency between justice
principles applied at different orders.
Conclusion
Social justice is among those qualities of governance systems that have value in and
of themselves. It is an intrinsic condition taken for granted and pursued for its own
sake. Still, it has governability implications, and therefore retains a functional purpose. Unavoidably, when missing, a governance system would suffer from a legitimacy de fi cit. Stakeholders will question its design and operation. They will take
offence and voice their opposition to those governors who they hold accountable for
it. They will also be less willing to abide by the rules and regulations. In some
instances, they prefer the latter response to the former. Thus, one may conclude that
for governance systems to be governable, they must ascribe to values, norms and
principles that stakeholders support. Social justice is no doubt one of these values,
perhaps even the most basic one, whose derived principles, applications and outcomes will always come under scrutiny. Stakeholders are likely to oppose governance mechanisms that they consider unfair to them, regardless of the positive
merits these mechanisms may otherwise have. Conversely, they may be willing to
make major sacri fi ces, like accepting strict regulatory measures that may hurt them
economically, if the burden the restrictions impose is fairly shared.