42
S. Jentoft and R. Chuenpagdee
The diversity implies on-site presence. The complexity requires an eye for interaction,
by-effects and latent functions. The dynamics do not afford the governing system a rest
and are such that change does not necessarily converge towards equilibrium. Nor are
they such that change is always cyclical. Instead, things often change in lasting ways.
As a result, the idea of adaptive governance and corrective feedbacks with built-in
learning does not always work well. Adaptive governance exists within limits, whereas
transformative governance is about surpassing or stretching them. Adaptation also
suggests marginal rather than fundamental, radical change and that a new solution is
sought within proximity of old ones. Change does not occur automatically, as in the
case of a natural evolutionally process, nor does it occur easily, as it would in the event
of a re-adjustment of the governing mechanism. Instead, change often comes as a
consequence of a decision-making process ridden with con fl icts and political log-rolling,
where winning outcomes are determined by power as much as an inherent collective
rationality.
Conclusion
Governors, be they individuals or agencies, operate within systems that are inherently diverse, complex and dynamic, restricting what they can possibly achieve.
Their ability to govern is limited, and falling short of expectations is part of the
norm. Yet, these limitations are also opportunities; they are not necessarily given
once and for all, but may be subject to governance initiatives and reforms such as
institutional redesign, organizational innovation and the development of new management tools. Sometimes these marginal adjustments of routines, which Kooiman
( 2003 ) labels “ fi rst” order governance, will suf fi ce. Other times they require a more
thorough overhaul (“second-order” governance), such as institutional reform. In
some instances, however, governors must start over again by rethinking the basic
principles, images and values that underpin governance in the fi rst place and the
ways in which they provide guidance for institutional design and operation (“metaorder” governance). Such is the case when governance failure becomes critical.
A governability assessment must include a systematic search for possible malfunctions among the diversity of the system components and their complex connections.
Governors must be prepared for the fact that things will take time; governance is
often a slow process, because it involves multiple stakeholders who need to be convinced that there is a problem and that there is a need for change. If they are not
convinced they will tend to resist the call for change.
The beginning of the governability assessment described in this chapter enables
the governor(s), including researchers, to identify what the problem is, how the
system works, and what might possibly explain why it does not work. The goals of
governance are assumed to be negotiated internally as part of interactions; they are
not predetermined as something that the system necessarily tries to achieve. As we
anticipate that goals are themselves the outcomes of the interactions structured by
the particular systems under scrutiny, they should be assessed empirically. In these
S. Jentoft and R. Chuenpagdee
The diversity implies on-site presence. The complexity requires an eye for interaction,
by-effects and latent functions. The dynamics do not afford the governing system a rest
and are such that change does not necessarily converge towards equilibrium. Nor are
they such that change is always cyclical. Instead, things often change in lasting ways.
As a result, the idea of adaptive governance and corrective feedbacks with built-in
learning does not always work well. Adaptive governance exists within limits, whereas
transformative governance is about surpassing or stretching them. Adaptation also
suggests marginal rather than fundamental, radical change and that a new solution is
sought within proximity of old ones. Change does not occur automatically, as in the
case of a natural evolutionally process, nor does it occur easily, as it would in the event
of a re-adjustment of the governing mechanism. Instead, change often comes as a
consequence of a decision-making process ridden with con fl icts and political log-rolling,
where winning outcomes are determined by power as much as an inherent collective
rationality.
Conclusion
Governors, be they individuals or agencies, operate within systems that are inherently diverse, complex and dynamic, restricting what they can possibly achieve.
Their ability to govern is limited, and falling short of expectations is part of the
norm. Yet, these limitations are also opportunities; they are not necessarily given
once and for all, but may be subject to governance initiatives and reforms such as
institutional redesign, organizational innovation and the development of new management tools. Sometimes these marginal adjustments of routines, which Kooiman
( 2003 ) labels “ fi rst” order governance, will suf fi ce. Other times they require a more
thorough overhaul (“second-order” governance), such as institutional reform. In
some instances, however, governors must start over again by rethinking the basic
principles, images and values that underpin governance in the fi rst place and the
ways in which they provide guidance for institutional design and operation (“metaorder” governance). Such is the case when governance failure becomes critical.
A governability assessment must include a systematic search for possible malfunctions among the diversity of the system components and their complex connections.
Governors must be prepared for the fact that things will take time; governance is
often a slow process, because it involves multiple stakeholders who need to be convinced that there is a problem and that there is a need for change. If they are not
convinced they will tend to resist the call for change.
The beginning of the governability assessment described in this chapter enables
the governor(s), including researchers, to identify what the problem is, how the
system works, and what might possibly explain why it does not work. The goals of
governance are assumed to be negotiated internally as part of interactions; they are
not predetermined as something that the system necessarily tries to achieve. As we
anticipate that goals are themselves the outcomes of the interactions structured by
the particular systems under scrutiny, they should be assessed empirically. In these