286
A. Song and R. Chuenpagdee
of Fisheries (DoF) in 1946, deterrence through enforcement of regulations and the
threat of sanctions continued to be the main form of policy response to illegal fi shing
in the decades that followed, persisting beyond independence from the colonial government in 1964. Despite fi shers’ prolonged acquaintance with the regulations (Hara
2001 ) , however, the ineffectiveness of this approach was evident. The process was
often treated with mistrust and disdain, and the ensuing violent confrontations with
resource users not only proved to be dangerous, but also demoralizing for the government enforcement personnel (Hara 2006a ) . With the rising eminence of co-management
regimes as a democratic and cost-effective way of achieving compliance, a participatory management initiative was put into practice in the SEA in the mid-1990s.
Unfortunately, as Njaya ( 2007, 2008 ) and Hara ( 2006b ) point out, the management
initiative’s implementation has been beseeched by several challenges, and it has only
been marginally successful in raising the support of the fi shing communities needed
in order to resolve illegal fi shing. There is a need for an alternative measure that has
a different focus and that recognizes the limited availability of fi nancial and human
resources in management in order to better address the illegal fi shing problem in the
SEA and the growing concern for the conservation of the lake’s ecosystem.
A multi-species and multi-gear small-scale fi shery is the main form of fi shing
activity in the SEA to this date (Smith 1998 ; Ngochera 2001 ) . It typically uses small
vessels such as planked boats and dug-out canoes to operate gillnets, longlines and
open-water seine nets called chilimira . Fishing is not only boat based, however. It
can also be done on land through, for example, beach seining. Much of the catch is
sold for cash income, signifying the commercial importance of the fi shery.
There is a great diversity too in the stakeholders involved in the SEA fi shery.
Gear owners commonly refer to those who own fi shing gear, but may not necessarily participate in fi shing. Crewmembers, on the other hand, are those who provide
manpower and technical know-how in the actual fi shing operation. Fish processors
and traders are also highly visible in fi shing communities. They set up their operation near landing sites to ensure a steady supply of fi sh and maintain a close relationship with fi shers. Though DoF holds the ultimate authority in overseeing
fi sheries matters, the Traditional Authority governs day-to-day fi shing matters at the
village level. The Traditional Authority is upheld by three hierarchical levels of
traditional leaders – the chief, the group village head and the village head. Other
relevant governing institutions include the Members of Parliaments that represent
the area at the national level and the Commercial Fishermen’s Association, which
exists to represent the preferences and judgments of a handful, but powerful, largescale fi shing owners and operators.
Study Design for Elicitation of Judgments and Preferences
In the context of illegal fi shing and the diverse group of stakeholders involved in the
Lake Malawi fi shery, this case study was designed to assess the extent to which fi shery
stakeholders value conservation through elicitation of judgments and preferences.
A. Song and R. Chuenpagdee
of Fisheries (DoF) in 1946, deterrence through enforcement of regulations and the
threat of sanctions continued to be the main form of policy response to illegal fi shing
in the decades that followed, persisting beyond independence from the colonial government in 1964. Despite fi shers’ prolonged acquaintance with the regulations (Hara
2001 ) , however, the ineffectiveness of this approach was evident. The process was
often treated with mistrust and disdain, and the ensuing violent confrontations with
resource users not only proved to be dangerous, but also demoralizing for the government enforcement personnel (Hara 2006a ) . With the rising eminence of co-management
regimes as a democratic and cost-effective way of achieving compliance, a participatory management initiative was put into practice in the SEA in the mid-1990s.
Unfortunately, as Njaya ( 2007, 2008 ) and Hara ( 2006b ) point out, the management
initiative’s implementation has been beseeched by several challenges, and it has only
been marginally successful in raising the support of the fi shing communities needed
in order to resolve illegal fi shing. There is a need for an alternative measure that has
a different focus and that recognizes the limited availability of fi nancial and human
resources in management in order to better address the illegal fi shing problem in the
SEA and the growing concern for the conservation of the lake’s ecosystem.
A multi-species and multi-gear small-scale fi shery is the main form of fi shing
activity in the SEA to this date (Smith 1998 ; Ngochera 2001 ) . It typically uses small
vessels such as planked boats and dug-out canoes to operate gillnets, longlines and
open-water seine nets called chilimira . Fishing is not only boat based, however. It
can also be done on land through, for example, beach seining. Much of the catch is
sold for cash income, signifying the commercial importance of the fi shery.
There is a great diversity too in the stakeholders involved in the SEA fi shery.
Gear owners commonly refer to those who own fi shing gear, but may not necessarily participate in fi shing. Crewmembers, on the other hand, are those who provide
manpower and technical know-how in the actual fi shing operation. Fish processors
and traders are also highly visible in fi shing communities. They set up their operation near landing sites to ensure a steady supply of fi sh and maintain a close relationship with fi shers. Though DoF holds the ultimate authority in overseeing
fi sheries matters, the Traditional Authority governs day-to-day fi shing matters at the
village level. The Traditional Authority is upheld by three hierarchical levels of
traditional leaders – the chief, the group village head and the village head. Other
relevant governing institutions include the Members of Parliaments that represent
the area at the national level and the Commercial Fishermen’s Association, which
exists to represent the preferences and judgments of a handful, but powerful, largescale fi shing owners and operators.
Study Design for Elicitation of Judgments and Preferences
In the context of illegal fi shing and the diverse group of stakeholders involved in the
Lake Malawi fi shery, this case study was designed to assess the extent to which fi shery
stakeholders value conservation through elicitation of judgments and preferences.