135
8 Applying the Governability Concept in Fisheries…
governability. As Mahon et al. ( 2008 , 104) point out, human-in-nature systems are
not easily controllable. In other words, they face important limits to their governability. Jentoft ( 2007 , 363) notes that the system-to-be-governed sometimes “alters
rapidly, unpredictably, irreversibly,” and that “for those affected, the result is uncertainty and surprise.” In terms of governability, the system-to-be-governed may alter
rapidly between one state and the next, sometimes appearing highly governable and
subsequently reverting to a state of low governability. Jentoft ( 2007 , 364) therefore
argues for a response that emphasizes ‘ fl exibility’, whereby “ fl exibility is […] about
the governing system’s aptitude in adapting promptly to system dynamics and
change.” Governors’ inability to respond fl exibly to the dynamics of the system-tobe-governed in question will affect the appropriateness of their responses and, in
turn, negatively in fl uence governability.
Fish chains clearly operate at various spatial scales (see Kooiman et al. 2005 ,
Part 2). While some ecosystems are geographically small, and some species have
only limited spatial range, others are extremely large (see, for example, the global
migratory patterns of high-seas tuna and the large marine ecosystems distinguished
by the United Nations Environment Programme and others). The same is true of
fi sher operations and of markets. Whereas some fi sh chains are based on local
fi sheries catering to local markets, others reach out and operate on various scale
levels. In linking the local to the national and international, fi sh chains often span
the jurisdictions of territorially based governing systems, creating multitudinous
interactions as well as tensions and ambiguities. We will highlight some scale effects
below, without pretending to be comprehensive.
Feature Effects on Systems-to-Be-Governed: Examples
from South Asia
The six fi sh chains included in the cells of Table 8.1 exemplify lower or higher
values with regard to diversity, complexity and dynamics. In the following section,
we brie fl y discuss each example, taking along scale effects, and providing hints of
possible implications for governance.
Case 1: Lower diversity . In the mid-1990s, fi sh merchants introduced a simple hoop
net for gathering sea snails (species unknown) to the small-scale fi sheries of the
Coromandel Coast in Tamil Nadu (Bavinck 1996, 1998 ) . This métier required few
fi shing skills and could be carried out by small inshore fi shing units, all of which
utilize the same fi shing methods. Produce was shipped to markets in the Middle
East, thereby integrating the métier into a global value chain. The region’s fi shers,
however, protested against the use of the net, arguing that it interfered in the food
web and would contribute to resource depletion. The operation of this fi shery
thereby became a governance issue at the regional level.
In governance terms the challenge was relatively simple. As the same technique
was being introduced to a larger region, the governing system could have decided
on a common measure to be implemented centrally, prohibiting, regulating or leaving
free the use of the net. As it turned out, however, the Fisheries Department, not
8 Applying the Governability Concept in Fisheries…
governability. As Mahon et al. ( 2008 , 104) point out, human-in-nature systems are
not easily controllable. In other words, they face important limits to their governability. Jentoft ( 2007 , 363) notes that the system-to-be-governed sometimes “alters
rapidly, unpredictably, irreversibly,” and that “for those affected, the result is uncertainty and surprise.” In terms of governability, the system-to-be-governed may alter
rapidly between one state and the next, sometimes appearing highly governable and
subsequently reverting to a state of low governability. Jentoft ( 2007 , 364) therefore
argues for a response that emphasizes ‘ fl exibility’, whereby “ fl exibility is […] about
the governing system’s aptitude in adapting promptly to system dynamics and
change.” Governors’ inability to respond fl exibly to the dynamics of the system-tobe-governed in question will affect the appropriateness of their responses and, in
turn, negatively in fl uence governability.
Fish chains clearly operate at various spatial scales (see Kooiman et al. 2005 ,
Part 2). While some ecosystems are geographically small, and some species have
only limited spatial range, others are extremely large (see, for example, the global
migratory patterns of high-seas tuna and the large marine ecosystems distinguished
by the United Nations Environment Programme and others). The same is true of
fi sher operations and of markets. Whereas some fi sh chains are based on local
fi sheries catering to local markets, others reach out and operate on various scale
levels. In linking the local to the national and international, fi sh chains often span
the jurisdictions of territorially based governing systems, creating multitudinous
interactions as well as tensions and ambiguities. We will highlight some scale effects
below, without pretending to be comprehensive.
Feature Effects on Systems-to-Be-Governed: Examples
from South Asia
The six fi sh chains included in the cells of Table 8.1 exemplify lower or higher
values with regard to diversity, complexity and dynamics. In the following section,
we brie fl y discuss each example, taking along scale effects, and providing hints of
possible implications for governance.
Case 1: Lower diversity . In the mid-1990s, fi sh merchants introduced a simple hoop
net for gathering sea snails (species unknown) to the small-scale fi sheries of the
Coromandel Coast in Tamil Nadu (Bavinck 1996, 1998 ) . This métier required few
fi shing skills and could be carried out by small inshore fi shing units, all of which
utilize the same fi shing methods. Produce was shipped to markets in the Middle
East, thereby integrating the métier into a global value chain. The region’s fi shers,
however, protested against the use of the net, arguing that it interfered in the food
web and would contribute to resource depletion. The operation of this fi shery
thereby became a governance issue at the regional level.
In governance terms the challenge was relatively simple. As the same technique
was being introduced to a larger region, the governing system could have decided
on a common measure to be implemented centrally, prohibiting, regulating or leaving
free the use of the net. As it turned out, however, the Fisheries Department, not